Volunteer decision making by older people: A test of a revised theory of planned behavior

This study was designed to test the utility of a revised theory of planned behavior in the prediction of intentions to volunteer among older people. Such a perspective allowed for the consideration of a broader range of social and contextual factors than has been examined in previous research on volunteer decision making among older people. The article reports the findings from a study that investigated volunteer intentions and behavior in a random sample of older people aged 65 to 74 years living in an Australian capital city. Results showed that, as predicted by the revised theory of planned behavior, intention to volunteer predicted subsequent reported volunteer behavior. Intention was, in turn, predicted by social norms (both subjective and behavioral), perceived behavioral control, and moral obligation, with the effect of attitude being mediated through moral obligation.

An investigation of pretend play, mental state terms and false belief understanding: In search of a metarepresentational link

The aim of this study was to investigate the association between false belief comprehension, the exhibition of pretend play and the use of mental state terms in pre-school children. Ferry children, aged between 36 and 54 months were videotaped engaging in free play with each parent. The exhibit-ion of six distinct acts of pretend play and the expression of 16 mental sr:ate terms were coded during play. Each child was also administered a pantomime task and three standard false belief casks. Reliable associations were also found between false belief performance and the pretence categories of object substitution and role assignment, and the exhibition of imaginary object pantomimes. Moreover, the use of mental state terms was positively correlated with false belief and the pretence categories of object substitution, imaginary play and role assignment, and negatively correlated with the exhibition of body part object pantomimes. These findings indicate that the development of a mental state lexicon and some, bur not all, components of pretend play are dependent on the capacity for metarepresentational cognition.

Refining specifications to logic programs

The refinement calculus provides a framework for the stepwise development of imperative programs from specifications. In this paper we study a refinement calculus for deriving logic programs. Dealing with logic programs rather than imperative programs has the dual advantages that, due to the expressive power of logic programs, the final program is closer to the original specification, and each refinement step can achieve more. Together these reduce the overall number of derivation steps. We present a logic programming language extended with specification constructs (including general predicates, assertions, and types and invariants) to form a wide-spectrum language. General predicates allow non-executable properties to be included in specifications. Assertions, types and invariants make assumptions about the intended inputs of a procedure explicit, and can be used during refinement to optimize the constructed logic program. We provide a semantics for the extended logic programming language and derive a set of refinement laws. Finally we apply these to an example derivation.

Glutamate and the neural basis of the subjective effects of ketamine

Context: Ketamine evokes psychosislike symptoms, and its primary action is to impair N-methyl-D-aspartate glutamate receptor neurotransmission, but it also induces secondary increases in glutamate release. Objectives: To identify the sites of action of ketamine in inducing symptoms and to determine the role of increased glutamate release using the glutamate release inhibitor lamotrigine. Design: Two experiments with different participants were performed using a double-blind, placebo-controlled, randomized, crossover, counterbalanced-order design. In the first experiment, the effect of intravenous ketamine hydrochloride on regional blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) signal and correlated symptoms was compared with intravenous saline placebo. In the second experiment, pretreatment with lamotrigine was compared with placebo to identify which effects of ketamine are mediated by increased glutamate release. Setting: Wellcome Trust Clinical Research Facility, Manchester, England. Participants: Thirty-three healthy, right-handed men were recruited by advertisements. Interventions: In experiment 1, participants were given intravenous ketamine (1-minute bolus of 0.26 mg/ kg, followed by a maintenance infusion of 0.25 mg/ kg/ h for the remainder of the session) or placebo (0.9% saline solution). In experiment 2, participants were pretreated with 300 mg of lamotrigine or placebo and then were given the same doses of ketamine as in experiment 1. Main Outcome Measures: Regional BOLD signal changes during ketamine or placebo infusion and Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale and Clinician- Administered Dissociative States Scale scores. Results: Ketamine induced a rapid, focal, and unexpected decrease in ventromedial frontal cortex, including orbitofrontal cortex and subgenual cingulate, which strongly predicted its dissociative effects and increased activity in mid- posterior cingulate, thalamus, and temporal cortical regions (r= 0.90). Activations correlated with Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale psychosis scores. Lamotrigine pretreatment prevented many of the BOLD signal changes and the symptoms. Conclusions: These 2 changes may underpin 2 fundamental processes of psychosis: abnormal perceptual experiences and impaired cognitive- emotional evaluation of their significance. The results are compatible with the theory that the neural and subjective effects of ketamine involve increased glutamate release.

A social identity theory of leadership

A social identity theory of leadership is described that views leadership as a group process generated by social categorization and prototype-based depersonalization processes associated with social identity. Group identification, as self-categorization, constructs an intragroup prototypicality gradient that invests the most prototypical member with the appearance of having influence; the appearance arises because members cognitively and behaviorally conform to the prototype. The appearance of influence becomes a reality through depersonalized social attraction processes that make followers agree and comply with the leader's ideas and suggestions. Consensual social attraction also imbues the leader with apparent status and creates a status-based structural differentiation within the group into leader(s) and followers, which has characteristics of unequal status intergroup relations. In addition, a fundamental attribution process constructs a charismatic leadership personality for the leader, which further empowers the leader and sharpens the leader-follower status differential. Empirical support for the theory is reviewed and a range of implications discussed, including intergroup dimensions, uncertainty reduction and extremism, power, and pitfalls of prototype-based leadership.

Social cognition, language acquisition and the development of the theory of mind

Theory of Mind (ToM) is the cognitive achievement that enables us to report our propositional attitudes, to attribute such attitudes to others, and to use such postulated or observed mental states in the prediction and explanation of behavior. Most normally developing children acquire ToM between the ages of 3 and 5 years, but serious delays beyond this chronological and mental age have been observed in children with autism, as well is in those with severe sensory impairments. We examine data from Studies of ToM in normally developing children and those with deafness, blindness, autism and Williams syndrome, as well as data from lower primates, in a search for answers to key theoretical questions concerning the origins, nature and representation of knowledge about the mind. In answer to these, we offer a framework according to which ToM is jointly dependent upon language and social experience, and is produced by a conjunction of language acquisition with children's growing social understanding, acquired through conversation and interaction with others. We argue that adequate language and adequate social skills are jointly causally sufficient, and individually causally necessary, for producing ToM. Thus our account supports a social developmental theory of the genesis of human cognition, inspired by the work of Sellars and Vygotsky.

A refinement calculus for logic programs

Existing refinement calculi provide frameworks for the stepwise development of imperative programs from specifications. This paper presents a refinement calculus for deriving logic programs. The calculus contains a wide-spectrum logic programming language, including executable constructs such as sequential conjunction, disjunction, and existential quantification, as well as specification constructs such as general predicates, assumptions and universal quantification. A declarative semantics is defined for this wide-spectrum language based on executions. Executions are partial functions from states to states, where a state is represented as a set of bindings. The semantics is used to define the meaning of programs and specifications, including parameters and recursion. To complete the calculus, a notion of correctness-preserving refinement over programs in the wide-spectrum language is defined and refinement laws for developing programs are introduced. The refinement calculus is illustrated using example derivations and prototype tool support is discussed.

Theory of mind and peer acceptance in preschool children

Two studies tested the hypothesis that preschool children's theory of mind ability is related to their levels of peer acceptance. In Study 1, 78 children between the ages of 4 and 6 provided peer nominations that allowed determination of social preference and social impact scores, and classification in one of five peer status groups (following Coie & Dodge, 1983). Children were also tested on five different theory of mind tasks. The results showed that theory of mind scores were significantly related to social preference scores in a subsample of children who were over 5 years old. Further, popular children were found to score higher on theory of mind tasks than children classified as rejected. Study 2 replicated and extended the first study with a new sample of 87 4- to 6-year-old children. Study 2 included measures of peer acceptance, theory of mind ability and verbal intelligence, as well as teacher ratings of prosocial and aggressive behaviours. The results of Study 2 showed that for the total group of children, prosocial behaviour was the best predictor of social preference scores. When the Study 2 sample was split into older and younger children, theory of mind ability was found to be the best predictor of social preference scores for the older children (over age 5), while aggressive and prosocial behaviours were the best predictors of peer acceptance in the younger children. Overall, the pattern of results suggests that the impact of theory of mind ability on peer acceptance is modest but increases with children's age.

Drawing insight from pictures: The development of concepts of false drawing and false belief in children with deafness, normal hearing, and autism

Theory-of-mind concepts in children with deafness, autism, and normal development (N = 154) were examined in three experiments using a set of standard inferential false-belief tasks and matched sets of tasks involving false drawings. Results of all three experiments replicated previously published findings by showing that primary school children with deafness or autism, aged 6 to 13 years, scored significantly lower than normal-developing 4-year-old preschoolers on standard misleading-container and unseen-change tests of false-belief understanding. Furthermore, deaf and autistic children generally scored higher on drawing-based tests than on corresponding standard tests and, on the most challenging of the false-drawing tests in Experiment 2, they significantly outperformed the normal-developing preschoolers by clearly understanding their own false intentions and another person's false beliefs about an actively misleading drawing. In Experiment 3, preschoolers; outperformed older deaf and autistic children on standard tasks, but did less well on a task that required the drawing of a false belief. Methodological factors could not fully explain the findings, but early social and conversational experiences in the family were deemed likely contributors.

Corporate rumor activity, belief and accuracy

An integrated model relating workplace rumor activity, belief, and accuracy is proposed and tested. Senior VPs of Communications from a sample of Fortune-500 corporations and CEOs of established public relations firms were surveyed regarding rumor episodes that they had experienced. Results confirmed previous research on the role of uncertainty, anxiety, and belief in rumor activity. In addition, a reduced sense of control mediated the effects of uncertainty on anxiety, and anxiety mediated the effects of importance on rumor activity. Evidence was found for the roles of group bias in how strongly a rumor is believed. Rumor activity was also implicated in the formation of more accurate rumors. The significance of these results for rumor theory and for Public Relations practitioners is presented. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.

Opening windows into the mind: mothers' preferences for mental state explanations and children's theory of mind

A new questionnaire, the Maternal Mental State Input Inventory (MMSII) was created to measure mothers' preferences for introducing and elaborating on mental states in conversation with their young children. In two studies, the questionnaire was given to mothers of young children, and the children's theory of mind (ToM) development was assessed with standard tasks. In both studies, the questionnaire exhibited good internal reliability, and significant correlations emerged between mothers' self-reported preferences for elaborated, explanatory talk about the mental states and children's theory of mind performance. Further, mothers' conversational preferences, as measured by the MMSII, were the best predictors of children's theory of mind development when relevant control variables were included in the analyses. These results converge with naturalistic observational research that has demonstrated links between mothers' conversational styles and their children's theory of mind. They go further in suggesting that mothers' tendencies toward elaborated, explanatory talk about a range of mental states is particularly beneficial to children's theory of mind development. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Health care marketing: the theory of planned behavior applied to patients' choise between private and public providers in the portuguese health care system.

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for degree of Master in Statistics and Information Management.

Interactive Epistemology and Reasoning: On the Foundations of Game Theory

Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have been conducted so far. However, in the case of imperfect information some players are not fully informed about some choices. Game-theoretic analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, games are modelled by so-called form structures which extract and formalize the significant parts of the underlying strategic interaction. The basic and most commonly used models of games are the normal form, which rather sparsely describes a game merely in terms of the players' strategy sets and utilities, and the extensive form, which models a game in a more detailed way as a tree. In fact, it is standard to formalize static games with the normal form and dynamic games with the extensive form. Secondly, solution concepts are developed to solve models of games in the sense of identifying the choices that should be taken by rational players. Indeed, the ultimate objective of the classical approach to game theory, which is of normative character, is the development of a solution concept that is capable of identifying a unique choice for every player in an arbitrary game. However, given the large variety of games, it is not at all certain whether it is possible to device a solution concept with such universal capability. Alternatively, interactive epistemology provides an epistemic approach to game theory of descriptive character. This rather recent discipline analyzes the relation between knowledge, belief and choice of game-playing agents in an epistemic framework. The description of the players' choices in a given game relative to various epistemic assumptions constitutes the fundamental problem addressed by an epistemic approach to game theory. In a general sense, the objective of interactive epistemology consists in characterizing existing game-theoretic solution concepts in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as in proposing novel solution concepts by studying the game-theoretic implications of refined or new epistemic hypotheses. Intuitively, an epistemic model of a game can be interpreted as representing the reasoning of the players. Indeed, before making a decision in a game, the players reason about the game and their respective opponents, given their knowledge and beliefs. Precisely these epistemic mental states on which players base their decisions are explicitly expressible in an epistemic framework. In this PhD thesis, we consider an epistemic approach to game theory from a foundational point of view. In Chapter 1, basic game-theoretic notions as well as Aumann's epistemic framework for games are expounded and illustrated. Also, Aumann's sufficient conditions for backward induction are presented and his conceptual views discussed. In Chapter 2, Aumann's interactive epistemology is conceptually analyzed. In Chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Conrad Heilmann, a three-stage account for dynamic games is introduced and a type-based epistemic model is extended with a notion of agent connectedness. Then, sufficient conditions for backward induction are derived. In Chapter 4, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa, a topological approach to interactive epistemology is initiated. In particular, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge is defined and some implications for games considered. In Chapter 5, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa and Andrés Perea, Aumann's impossibility theorem on agreeing to disagree is revisited and weakened in the sense that possible contexts are provided in which agents can indeed agree to disagree.