Choice by sequential procedures

We propose a rule of decision-making, the sequential procedure guided byroutes, and show that three influential boundedly rational choice models can be equivalentlyunderstood as special cases of this rule. In addition, the sequential procedure guidedby routes is instrumental in showing that the three models are intimately related. We showthat choice with a status-quo bias is a refinement of rationalizability by game trees, which, inturn, is also a refinement of sequential rationalizability. Thus, we provide a sharp taxonomyof these choice models, and show that they all can be understood as choice by sequentialprocedures.

How accurate are surveyed preferences for public policies? Evidence from a unique institutional setup

Opinion polls are widely used to capture public sentiments on a varietyof issues. If citizens are unwilling to reveal certain policy preferences toothers, opinion polls may fail to characterize population preferences accurately.The innovation of this paper is to use unique data to measurebiases in opinion polls for a broad range of policies. I combine data on184 referenda held in Switzerland between 1987 and 2007, with postballotsurveys that ask for each proposal how the citizens voted. Thedifference between stated preferences in the survey and revealed preferences at the ballot box provides a direct measure of bias in opinion polls.I find that these biases vary by policy areas, with the largest ones occurring in policies on immigration, international integration, and votesinvolving liberal/conservative attitudes. Also, citizens show a tendencyto respond in accordance to the majority.

Social capabilities in Alzheimer’s patients

Patients with stage-I (very mild and mild) Alzheimer s disease were asked to participatein a Dictator Game, a type of game in which a subject has to decide how to allocate acertain amount of money between himself and another person. The game enables theexperimenter to examine the influence of social norms and social preferences on thedecision-making process. When the results of treatments involving Alzheimer s diseasepatients were compared with those of identical treatments involving patients with mildcognitive impairment or healthy control subjects, with similar ages and socialbackgrounds, no statistically significant difference was found. This finding suggests thatstage-I Alzheimer s disease patients may be as capable of making decisions involvingsocial norms and preferences as other individuals of their age. Whatever brain structuresare affected by the disease, they do not appear to influence, at this early stage, the neuralbasis for cooperation-enhancing social interactions.

Measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games

This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is related to risk aversion, experience seeking, and age.From the distribution of certainty equivalents we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of games. For many games, success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response to observed behavior is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Estimating probabilistic decision models, we show that the quality of predictions can be improved when individual characteristics are taken into account. Subjects behavior is consistent with probabilistic beliefs about the aggregate outcome, but inconsistent with probabilistic beliefs about individual behavior.

The importance of relative performance feedback information: Evidence from a natural experiment using high school students

We study the effect of providing relative performance feedback information onperformance, when individuals are rewarded according to their absolute performance. Anatural experiment that took place in a high school offers an unusual opportunity to testthis effect in a real-effort setting. For one year only, students received information thatallowed them to know whether they were performing above (below) the class average aswell as the distance from this average. We exploit a rich panel data set and find that theprovision of this information led to an increase of 5% in students grades. Moreover, theeffect was significant for the whole distribution. However, once the information wasremoved, the effect disappeared. To rule out the concern that the effect may beartificially driven by teachers within the school, we verify our results using nationallevel exams (externally graded) for the same students, and the effect remains.

The optimal length of contracts with application to outsourcing

This paper resolves three empirical puzzles in outsourcing by formalizing the adaptationcost of long-term performance contracts. Side-trading with a new partner alongside a long-term contract (to exploit an adaptation-requiring investment) is usually less effective than switching to the new partner when the contract expires. So long-term contracts that prevent holdup of specific investments may induce holdup of adaptation investments. Contract length therefore trades of specific and adaptation investments. Length should increase with the importance and specificity of self-investments, and decrease with the importance of adaptation investments for which side-trading is ineffective. My general model also shows how optimal length falls with cross-investments and wasteful investments.

Experiencing simulated outcomes

Whereas much literature has documented difficulties in making probabilistic inferences, it hasalso emphasized the importance of task characteristics in determining judgmental accuracy.Noting that people exhibit remarkable efficiency in encoding frequency information sequentially,we construct tasks that exploit this ability by requiring people to experience the outcomes ofsequentially simulated data. We report two experiments. The first involved seven well-knownprobabilistic inference tasks. Participants differed in statistical sophistication and answered withand without experience obtained through sequentially simulated outcomes in a design thatpermitted both between- and within-subject analyses. The second experiment involvedinterpreting the outcomes of a regression analysis when making inferences for investmentdecisions. In both experiments, even the statistically naïve make accurate probabilistic inferencesafter experiencing sequentially simulated outcomes and many prefer this presentation format. Weconclude by discussing theoretical and practical implications.

Satisfaction in choice as a function of the number of alternatives: When "goods satiate" but "bads escalate"

Whereas people are typically thought to be better off with more choices, studiesshow that they often prefer to choose from small as opposed to large sets of alternatives.We propose that satisfaction from choice is an inverted U-shaped function of thenumber of alternatives. This proposition is derived theoretically by considering thebenefits and costs of different numbers of alternatives and is supported by fourexperimental studies. We also manipulate the perceptual costs of information processingand demonstrate how this affects the resulting satisfaction function. We furtherindicate that satisfaction when choosing from a given set is diminished if people aremade aware of the existence of other choice sets. The role of individual differences insatisfaction from choice is documented by noting effects due to gender and culture. Weconclude by emphasizing the need to have an explicit rationale for knowing how muchchoice is enough.

Rational reasoning or adaptive behavior? Evidence from two-person beauty contest games

Many experiments have shown that human subjects do not necessarily behave in line with game theoretic assumptions and solution concepts. The reasons for this non-conformity are multiple. In this paper we study the argument whether a deviation from game theory is because subjects are rational, but doubt that others are rational as well, compared to the argument that subjects, in general, are boundedly rational themselves. To distinguish these two hypotheses, we study behavior in repeated 2-person and many-person Beauty-Contest-Games which are strategically different from one another. We analyze four different treatments and observe that convergence toward equilibrium is driven by learning through the information about the other player s choice and adaptation rather than self-initiated rational reasoning.

How enforcement institutions affect markets

In an experiment we study market outcomes under alternative incentive structures for third-party enforcers. Our transactions resemble an anonymous credit market where lenders can give loans and borrowers can repay them. When borrowers default, judges are free to enforce repayment but are themselves paid differently in each of three treatments. First, paying judges according to lenders votes maximizes surplus and the equality of earnings. In contrast, paying judges according to borrowers votes triggers insufficient enforcement, destroying the market and producing the lowest surplus and the most unequal distribution of earnings. Lastly, judges paid the average earnings of borrowers and lenders achieve results close to those based on lender voting. We employ a steps-of-reasoning argument to interpret the performances of different institutions. When voting and enforcement rights are allocated to different classes of actors, the difficulty of their task changes, and arguably as a consequence they focus on high or low surplus equilibria.

Ambiguity seeking as a result of the status quo bias

Several factors affect attitudes toward ambiguity. What happens, however, when peopleare asked to exchange an ambiguous alternative in their possession for an unambiguousone? We present three experiments in which individuals preferred to retain the former.This status quo bias emerged both within- and between-subjects, with and withoutincentives, with different outcome distributions, and with endowments determined byboth the experimenter and the participants themselves. Findings emphasize the need toaccount for the frames of reference under which evaluations of probabilistic informationtake place as well as modifications that should be incorporated into descriptive modelsof decision making.

Promoting rule compliance in daily-life: Evidence from a randomized field experiment in the public libraries of Barcelona

We study how to promote compliance with rules in everyday situations. Having access to unique data on the universe of users of all public libraries inBarcelona, we test the effect of sending email messages with dierent contents.We find that users return their items earlier if asked to do so in a simple email.Emails reminding users of the penalties associated with late returns are more effective than emails with only a generic reminder. We find differential treatmenteffects by user types. The characteristics we analyze are previous compliance,gender, age, and nationality.

Bargaining on networks: An experiment

While markets are often decentralized, in many other cases agents in one role can only negotiate with a proper subset of the agents in the complementary role. There may be proximity issues or restricted communication flows. For example, information may be transmitted only through word-of-mouth, as is often the case for job openings, business opportunities, and confidential transactions. Bargaining can be considered to occur over a network that summarizes the structure of linkages among people. We conduct an alternating-offer bargaining experiment using separate simple networks, which are then joined during the session by an additional link. The results diverge sharply depending on how this connection is made. Payoffs can be systematically affected even for agents who are not connected by the new link. We use a graph-theoretic analysis to show that any two-sided network can be decomposed into simple networks of three types, so that our result can be generalized to more complex bargaining environments. Participants appear to grasp the essential characteristics of the networks and we observe a rather consistently high level of bargaining efficiency.

Generic finiteness of equilibrium payoffs for bimatrix games

It is shown that in any affine space of payoff matrices the equilibriumpayoffs of bimatrix games are generically finite.

What risks do people perceive in everyday life? A perspective gained from the experience sampling method (ESM)

The experiential sampling method (ESM) was used to collect data from 74 parttimestudents who described and assessed the risks involved in their current activitieswhen interrupted at random moments by text messages. The major categories ofperceived risk were short-term in nature and involved loss of time or materials relatedto work and physical damage (e.g., from transportation). Using techniques of multilevelanalysis, we demonstrate effects of gender, emotional state, and types of risk onassessments of risk. Specifically, females do not differ from males in assessing thepotential severity of risks but they see these as more likely to occur. Also, participantsassessed risks to be lower when in more positive self-reported emotional states. Wefurther demonstrate the potential of ESM by showing that risk assessments associatedwith current actions exceed those made retrospectively. We conclude by notingadvantages and disadvantages of ESM for collecting data about risk perceptions.