2006 Annual Report of the Superintendent of Banking

Annual report of the Iowa Division of Banking

Iowa Department of Commerce - Division of Banking, Agency Performance Plan, 2007

Annual Report, Agency Performance Plan

Investigation of County Treasurers' Tax-Sale Registration Fees, June 2007

On January 2, 2007, the Ombudsman received a complaint regarding the fee that county treasurers charge registrants at annual tax sales. The complainant said generally that many of the state’s counties, especially larger ones, appeared to be charging higher fees than was thought to be allowed by law. Investigation The investigation was conducted by Assistant Ombudsman Bert Dalmer. For purposes of this report, all investigative actions are ascribed to the Ombudsman. In early 2007, the Ombudsman surveyed tax-sale registration fees in 10 of the state’s 99 counties. Interviews of 10 county treasurers and/or some of their deputies were conducted. In addition, the Ombudsman researched the Iowa Code and relevant case law. The Ombudsman also consulted with the Iowa State Auditor and the president of the Iowa State County Treasurers Association.

An overall perspective on banking regulation

We survey the theory of banking regulation from the general perspectiveof regulatory theory. Starting by considering the different justificationsof financial intermediation, we proceed to identify the market failuresthat make banking regulation necessary. We then succinctly compare how theanalysis of regulation compares in the domains of banking and industrialorganization. Finally we analyse why a safety net for banks could be partof banking regulation and how it can be structured in an efficient way.

A model of shadow banking

We present a model of shadow banking in which financial intermediaries originate and trade loans, assemble these loans into diversified portfolios, and then finance these portfolios externally with riskless debt. In this model: i) outside investor wealth drives the demand for riskless debt and indirectly for securitization, ii) intermediary assets and leverage move together as in Adrian and Shin (2010), and iii) intermediaries increase their exposure to systematic risk as they reduce their idiosyncratic risk through diversification, as in Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2010). Under rational expectations, the shadow banking system is stable and improves welfare. When investors and intermediaries neglect tail risks, however, the expansion of risky lending and the concentration of risks in the intermediaries create financial fragility and fluctuations in liquidity over time.

Cashing by the hour: Why large law firms prefer hourly fees over contingent fees

Large law firms seem to prefer hourly fees over contingent fees. Thispaper provides a moral hazard explanation for this pattern of behavior.Contingent legal fees align the interests of the attorney with those ofthe client, but not necessarily with those of the partnership. We showthat the choice of hourly fees is a solution to an agency problem withmultiple principals, where the interests of one principal (law firm)collide with the interests of the other principal (client).

Book vs. fair value accounting in banking and intertemporal smoothing

The aim of this paper is to examine the pros and cons of book and fair value accounting from the perspective of the theory of banking. We consider the implications of the two accounting methods in an overlapping generations environment. As observed by Allen and Gale(1997), in an overlapping generation model, banks have a role as intergenerational connectors as they allow for intertemporal smoothing. Our main result is that when dividends depend on profits, book value ex ante dominates fair value, as it provides better intertemporal smoothing. This is in contrast with the standard view that states that, fair value yields a better allocation as it reflects the real opportunity cost of assets. Banking regulation play an important role by providing the right incentives for banks to smooth intertemporal consumption whereas market discipline improves intratemporal efficiency.

Retirement Investors' Club Plan Document; Fund Fees Comparison, 2005

The Retirement Investors’ Club (RIC) (also referred to as 457/401(a) deferred compensation) is a voluntary retirement savings program designed to help you meet your need for income at retirement and lower your current income taxes. Your contributions to RIC are automatically withdrawn from your paycheck and you are credited with an employer match. You may enroll*and make changes at any time. Other advantages are explained below…keep reading about this excellent employee benefit!

Optimal regulation of a fully insured deposit banking system

We analyze risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurancein the presence of private information when the market value of depositinsurance can be determined using Merton's (1997) formula. We show that,under the assumption that transferring funds from taxpayers to financialinstitutions has a social cost, the optimal regulation combines differentlevels of capital requirements combined with decreasing premia on depositinsurance. On the other hand, it is never efficient to require the banksto hold riskless assets, so that narrow banking is not efficient. Finally,chartering banks is necessary in order to decrease the cost of asymmetricinformation.

Interlocking directorates in Spanish banking in the twentieth century

Spanish banking historiography asserts that the largest banks performed in the twentieth century as though they constituted a monopoly. One of their main coordination schemes would have been a network of interlocking bank directors that would include most of the financial firms. Evidence available for the 1920s and 1960s seems to confirm the veracity of this hypothesis. In this paper, more systematic evidence is presented to cover the whole twentieth century with the aim of checking whether these networks persisted over the entire period or they were by-products of temporary situations. Our results show that no general network remained for more than a decade. Therefore, it should be ruled out that interlocking directorates worked as a coordination device of an alleged banking cartel.

Report on a review of selected general and application controls over the Iowa State University of Science and Technology tuition and fees system for the period of April 11 through May 2, 2008

Report on a review of selected general and application controls over the Iowa State University of Science and Technology tuition and fees system for the period of April 11 through May 2, 2008

Report on a review of selected general and application controls over the University of Northern Iowa’s tuition and fees system for the period May 24, 2007 through July 3, 2007

Report on a review of selected general and application controls over the University of Northern Iowa’s tuition and fees system for the period May 24, 2007 through July 3, 2007

Should banking supervision and monetary policy tasks be given to different agencies?

This paper adds some new arguments to the thesis that the responsibility forbanking supervision should be assigned to an agency formally separated bythe Central bank. We also provide some additional evidence on the macroand microeconomic performance of OECD countries whose banking systems areclassified according to the regulatory regime in place. We find that theinflation rate is considerably higher and more volatile in countries wherethe Central bank acts as a monopolist in banking supervision. Besides,although banks seem to be more profitable when Central banks supervise them,they incur into higher costs and rely more on deposits with respect to moresophisticated liabilities as a funding source.The data are not definitively in favor of functional separation. However, we argue that the evolution of financial intermediaries, moral hazard problems and especially cost accountability seem to suggest that separation would be a better solution for industrialized countries.We also critically discuss the current arrangement of financial regulationand supervision in the EMU: our proposal is to establish an independentEuropean System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) structured similarly to theESCB.

Department of Commerce - Division of Banking Performance Plan, FY 2009

Agency Performance Plan, Department of Commerce - Division of Banking

The choice of the form of representation in multinational banking: Evidence from Spain

This paper investigates foreign direct investment in the bankingsector. The attention has been addressed to test the importanceof OLI advantages as the determinants of the bank's decisionto invest in foreign locations. Nevertheless, since banks canexpand their activities abroad through different organizationalforms that imply different levels of foreign involvement, theissue of the form of representation has been tackled. Theresults show the importance of OLI advantages in the form ofrepresentation in multinational banking.