Impacts of foreign exchange auctions on the informal market rate in Myanmar

Since the abolition of the official peg and the introduction of a managed float in April 2012, the Central Bank of Myanmar has operated the daily two–way auctions of foreign exchange aimed at smoothing exchange rate fluctuations. Despite the reforms to the foreign exchange regime, however, informal trading of foreign exchange remains pervasive. Using the daily informal exchange rate and Central Bank auction data, this study examines the impacts of auctions on the informal market rate. First, a VAR analysis indicates that the official rate did not Granger cause the informal rate. Second, GARCH models indicate that the auctions did not reduce the conditional variance of the informal rate returns. Overall, the auctions have only a quite modest impact on the informal exchange rate.

Simulating digital dividend auctions: Service neutrality versus dedicated licences

The award of the digital dividend can consolidate auctions as the preferred mechanism for spectrum allocation. Knowing in advance an estimate of what the results of an auction with these characteristics could be would be unquestionably useful for those in charge of designing the process, even if at the end another method such as a beauty contest is chosen. This article provides a simulation of a digital dividend auction in a major-type European country. In one of the scenarios, the spectrum is not pre-allocated to any service in particular (service neutrality) while in the remaining four, blocks of spectrum are pre-allocated to DTT, mobile multimedia and mobile broadband communications. The results of the simulations reveal that the service neutrality scenario maximizes revenues for the seller and that, in general, DTT operators would seem to have fewer opportunities as the spectrum packaging is less protective for them.

Trust and Reputation in Internet Auctions

Exchange between anonymous actors in Internet auctions corresponds to a one-shot prisoner's dilemma-like situation. Therefore, in any given auction the risk is high that seller and buyer will cheat and, as a consequence, that the market will collapse. However, mutual cooperation can be attained by the simple and very efficient institution of a public rating system. By this system, sellers have incentives to invest in reputation in order to enhance future chances of business. Using data from about 200 auctions of mobile phones we empirically explore the effects of the reputation system. In general, the analysis of nonobtrusive data from auctions may help to gain a deeper understanding of basic social processes of exchange, reputation, trust, and cooperation, and of the impact of institutions on the efficiency of markets. In this study we report empirical estimates of effects of reputation on characteristics of transactions such as the probability of a successful deal, the mode of payment, and the selling price (highest bid). In particular, we try to answer the question whether sellers receive a "premium" for reputation. Our results show that buyers are willing to pay higher prices for reputation in order to diminish the risk of exploitation. On the other hand, sellers protect themselves from cheating buyers by the choice of an appropriate payment mode. Therefore, despite the risk of mutual opportunistic behavior, simple institutional settings lead to cooperation, relatively rare events of fraud, and efficient markets.

Auctions-catalog einer höchst bedeutenden sammlung griechischer und römischer münzen sowie einer kleinen serie neuerer münzen des herrn H.C. Hoskier ... Die öffentliche versteigerung findet statt ... den 13. november ...

Catalog no. XX.

Rudolph Lepke's Kunst-Auctions-Haus : ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Berliner Kunsthandels /

Mode of access: Internet.

Book auctions in England in the seventeenth century (1676-1700) : with a chronological list of the book auctions of the period /

Includes index.

Auctions law and practice

This is the new edition of the leading work on the law and practice of auctions. The book looks at every aspect of auction practice from the economics of auction sales and restrictions on trading to criminal and other liabilities of the auctioneer. There is also a chapter on VAT. There have been important recent developments in the field of consumer protection and the book has been substantially revised to reflect these. In addition to general updating the new edition considers the practice of online auctions for the first time. There is also a section on looted art . The book continues to draw on case law from other common law jurisdictions.

Secondary market pricing behaviour around UK bond auctions

Using an event study approach, this article reports evidence that the UK Treasury bond market displayed anomalous pricing behaviour in the secondary market both immediately before and after auctions of seasoned bonds. Using a benchmark return derived from the behaviour of the underlying yield curve, the market offered statistically and economically significant excess returns, around the auctions held between 1992 and 2004. A cross-sectional analysis of the cumulative excess returns shows that the excess demand at the auctions is a key determinant of this excess return.

The implications of internet auctions for small to medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in Great Britain

DUE TO COPYRIGHT RESTRICTIONS ONLY AVAILABLE FOR CONSULTATION AT ASTON UNIVERSITY LIBRARY AND INFORMATION SERVICES WITH PRIOR ARRANGEMENT

Auctions with Untrustworthy Bidders

The paper analyzes auctions which are not completely enforceable. In such auctions, economic agents may fail to carry out their obligations, and parties involved cannot rely on external enforcement or control mechanisms for backing up a transaction. We propose two mechanisms that make bidders directly or indirectly reveal their trustworthiness. The first mechanism is based on discriminating bidding schedules that separate trustworthy from untrustworthy bidders. The second mechanism is a generalization of the Vickrey auction to the case of untrustworthy bidders. We prove that, if the winner is considered to have the trustworthiness of the second-highest bidder, truthfully declaring one's trustworthiness becomes a dominant strategy. We expect the proposed mechanisms to reduce the cost of trust management and to help agent designers avoid many market failures caused by lack of trust.

Bidding For Parking: The Impact of University Affiliation on Predicting Bid Values in Dutch Auctions of On-Campus Parking Permits

Parking is often underpriced and expanding its capacity is expensive; universities need a better way of reducing congestion outside of building costly parking garages. Demand based pricing mechanisms, such as auctions, offer a possible solution to the problem by promising to reduce parking at peak times. However, faculty, students, and staff at universities have systematically different parking needs, leading to different parking valuations. In this study, I determine the impact university affiliation has on predicting bid values cast in three Dutch Auctions of on-campus parking permits sold at Chapman University in Fall 2010. Using clustering techniques crosschecked with university demographic information to detect affiliation groups, I ran a log-linear regression, finding that university affiliation had a larger effect on bid amount than on lot location and fraction of auction duration. Generally, faculty were predicted to have higher bids whereas students were predicted to have lower bids.