Non-traditional investment of pension funds : a brief overview of the antitrust question /

"December 1980."

The railroad merger problem. Report together with individual views of the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate pursuant to S. Res. 258, Eighty-seventh Congress, as extended providing for a study of the antitrust laws of the United States, and their administration, interpretation and effect.

At head of title: 88th Cong., 1st sess. Committee print.

Telecommunications : development of competition in local telephone markets : report to the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Business Rights, and Competition, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate /

"B-283167"--P. 3.

Modern American antitrust law; a guide to its domestic and foreign application,

At head of title: Institute for International and Foreign Trade Law of the Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C.

Unfair practices in the meat packing industry. Report together with Minority views to accompany S. 1356, to amend the antitrust laws by vesting in the Federal Trade Commission jurisdiction to prevent monopolistic acts or practices and other unlawful restraints in commerce by certain persons engaged in commerce in meat and meat products, and for other purposes.

Mode of access: Internet.

American enterprise and Scandinavian antitrust law

"Appendix 1: Legislation controlling restrictive business practices ... from Guide to legislation on restrictive business practices, published in Paris by the European Productivity Agency of the Organization for European Cooperation and Development": p. [301]-352

Google’s Antitrust Cases Competition Analysis in New Economy Markets

Today, global economic performance largely depends on digital ecosystems. E-commerce, cloud, social media, sharing economy are the main products of the modern innovative economic systems which are constantly raising new regulatory questions. Meanwhile the United States has an unimpeachable dominance in innovation and new technologies, as well as a large and open domestic market, the EU is only recently discovering the importance of empowering the European digital economy and aims to break down its highly fragmented cross-border online economic environment. As global economy is rapidly becoming digital, Europe’s effort to create and invest in common digital market is understandable. The comprehensive investigations launched by the European Commission into the role of social network, search engine, or sharing economy internet platforms, which are new generation technologies dominated by American firms; or the recent decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union declaring that the Commission’s US Safe Harbor Decision is invalid1 might be considered as part of an anti-American protectionist policy. However, these measures could rather be seen as part of a broader trend to foster European enterprises in technology developments.

Dominating search: Google before the law

For many, particularly in the Anglophone world and Western Europe, it may be obvious that Google has a monopoly over online search and advertising and that this is an undesirable state of affairs, due to Google's ability to mediate information flows online. The baffling question may be why governments and regulators are doing little to nothing about this situation, given the increasingly pivotal importance of the internet and free flowing communications in our lives. However, the law concerning monopolies, namely antitrust or competition law, works in what may be seen as a less intuitive way by the general public. Monopolies themselves are not illegal. Conduct that is unlawful, i.e. abuses of that market power, is defined by a complex set of rules and revolves principally around economic harm suffered due to anticompetitive behavior. However the effect of information monopolies over search, such as Google’s, is more than just economic, yet competition law does not address this. Furthermore, Google’s collection and analysis of user data and its portfolio of related services make it difficult for others to compete. Such a situation may also explain why Google’s established search rivals, Bing and Yahoo, have not managed to provide services that are as effective or popular as Google’s own (on this issue see also the texts by Dirk Lewandowski and Astrid Mager in this reader). Users, however, are not entirely powerless. Google's business model rests, at least partially, on them – especially the data collected about them. If they stop using Google, then Google is nothing.

Free software and the law. Out of the frying pan and into the fire: How shaking up intellectual property suits competition law just fine

Free software is viewed as a revolutionary and subversive practice, and in particular has dealt a strong blow to the traditional conception of intellectual property law (although in its current form could be considered a 'hack' of IP rights). However, other (capitalist) areas of law have been swift to embrace free software, or at least incorporate it into its own tenets. One area in particular is that of competition (antitrust) law, which itself has long been in theoretical conflict with intellectual property, due to the restriction on competition inherent in the grant of ‘monopoly’ rights by copyrights, patents and trademarks. This contribution will examine how competition law has approached free software by examining instances in which courts have had to deal with such initiatives, for instance in the Oracle Sun Systems merger, and the implications that these decisions have on free software initiatives. The presence or absence of corporate involvement in initiatives will be an important factor in this investigation, with it being posited that true instances of ‘commons-based peer production’ can still subvert the capitalist system, including perplexing its laws beyond intellectual property.

Internet privatization, WikiLeaks, and free expression

In late 2010, the online nonprofit media organization WikiLeaks published classified documents detailing correspondence between the U.S. State Department and its diplomatic missions around the world, numbering around 250,000 cables. These diplomatic cables contained classified information with comments on world leaders, foreign states, and various international and domestic issues. Negative reactions to the publication of these cables came from both the U.S. political class (which was generally condemnatory of WikiLeaks, invoking national security concerns and the jeopardizing of U.S. interests abroad) and the corporate world, with various companies ceasing to continue to provide services to WikiLeaks despite no legal measure (e.g., a court injunction) forcing them to do so. This article focuses on the legal remedies available to WikiLeaks against this corporate suppression of its speech in the U.S. and Europe since these are the two principle arenas in which the actors concerned are operating. The transatlantic legal protection of free expression will be considered, yet, as will be explained in greater detail, the legal conception of this constitutional and fundamental right comes from a time when the state posed the greater threat to freedom. As a result, it is not generally enforceable against private, non-state entities interfering with speech and expression which is the case here. Other areas of law, namely antitrust/competition, contract and tort will then be examined to determine whether WikiLeaks and its partners can attempt to enforce their right indirectly through these other means. Finally, there will be some concluding thoughts about the implications of the corporate response to the WikiLeaks embassy cables leak for freedom of expression online.

Mergers in Durable Goods Industries

Revised 2008-11.-- Published as an article in: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2008, 68, pp. 691-701.

Układy zbiorowe pracy a prawo antymonopolowe Unii Europejskiej i Stanów Zjednoczonych

Względy społeczne są silnie chronione w prawie Unii Europejskiej i Stanów Zjednoczonych. Ważnym elementem wskazanych systemów prawnych jest również prawo antymonopolowe, którego cel, najogólniej rzecz ujmując, stanowi zapewnienie właściwego funkcjonowania rynku. Kwestie socjalne nie mieszczą się w optyce prawa antymonopolowego. Może to prowadzić do powstania bardzo skomplikowanej sytuacji między prawem antymonopolowym a unormowaniami służącymi ochronie względów socjalnych. Istnieją obszary, na których te dwa zespoły norm są komplementarne, ale zauważyć należy również, że na pewnych płaszczyznach cele prawa pracy są odmienne, a nawet przeciwstawne wobec zadań stawianych przed prawem antymonopolowym. Sferę, w której powstanie konfliktów jest najbardziej prawdopodobne stanowią układy zbiorowe pracy. Zgodnie z unijnym i amerykańskim orzecznictwem prawo antymonopolowe nie może być wykorzystywane do uniemożliwienia osiągnięcia celów socjalnych chronionych przez prawo. Istnieją jednak przypadki, w których stosownie prawa antymonopolowego do układów zbiorowych pracy jest możliwe.

Final report of the Lyme disease review panel of the Infectious Diseases Society of America.

In April 2008, the Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA) entered into an agreement with Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal to voluntarily undertake a special review of its 2006 Lyme disease guidelines. This agreement ended the Attorney General's investigation into the process by which the guidelines were developed. The IDSA agreed to convene an independent panel to conduct a one-time review of the guidelines. The Review Panel members, vetted by an ombudsman for potential conflicts of interest, reviewed the entirety of the 2006 guidelines, with particular attention to the recommendations devoted to post-Lyme disease syndromes. After multiple meetings, a public hearing, and extensive review of research and other information, the Review Panel concluded that the recommendations contained in the 2006 guidelines were medically and scientifically justified on the basis of all of the available evidence and that no changes to the guidelines were necessary.

Mergers, Acquisitions, and Alliances

© 2012 by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.This article considers the determinants and effects of M&As in the pharmaceutical industry, with a particular focus on innovation and R&D productivity. As is the case in other industries, mergers in the pharmaceutical field are driven by a variety of company motives and conditions. These include defensive responses to industry shocks as well as more proactive rationales, such as economies of scale and scope, access to new technologies, and expansion to new markets. It is important to take account of firms' characteristics and motivations in evaluating merger performance, rather than using a broad aggregate brushstroke. Research to date on pharmaceuticals suggests considerable variation in both motivation and outcomes. From an antitrust policy standpoint, the larger horizontal mergers in pharmaceuticals have run into few challenges from regulatory authorities in the United States and the European Union, given the option to spin off competing therapeutic products to other drug firms.