On common agency with informed principals

This thesis consists of three chapters that have as unifying subject the frame-work of common agency with informed principals. The first two chapters analyze the economic effects of privately informed lobbying applied to tariff protection (Chapter 1) and to customs unions agreements (Chapter 2). The third chapter investigates the choice of retailing strutures when principals (the producers) are privately informed about their production costs. Chapter 1 analyzes how lobbying affects economic policy when the interest groups have private information. I assume that the competitiveness of producers are lobbies private information in a Grossman and Helpman (1994) lobby game. This allows us to analyze the e¤ects of information transmission within their model. I show that the information transmission generates two informational asymmetry problems in the political game. One refers to the cost of signaling the lobby's competitiveness to the policy maker and the other to the cost of screening the rival lobby's competitiveness from the policy maker. As an important consequence information transmission may improve welfare through the reduction of harmful lobbying activity. Chapter 2 uses the framework of chapter 1 to study a customs union agreement when governments are subject to the pressure of special interest groups that have better information about the competitiveness of the industries they represent. I focus on the agreement's effect on the structure of political influence. When join a customs union, the structure of political pressure changes and with privately informed lobbies, a new effect emerges: the governments can use the information they learn from the lobby of one country to extract rents from the lobbies of the other country. I call this the "information transmission effect". This effect enhances the governments'bargaining power in a customs union and makes lobbies demand less protection. Thus, I find that information transmission increases the welfare of the agreement and decreases tari¤s towards non-members. I also investigate the incentives for the creation of a customs union and find that information transmission makes such agreement more likely to be politically sustainable. Chapter 3 investigates the choice of retailing structure when the manufacturers are privately informed about their production costs. Two retailing structures are analyzed, one where each manufacturer chooses her own retailer (exclusive dealing) and another where the manufacturers choose the same retailer (common agency). It is shown that common agency mitigates downstream competition but gives the retailer bargaining power to extract informational rents from the manufacturers, while in exclusive dealing there is no downstream coordination but also there are no incentives problem in the contract between manufacture and retailer. A pre- liminary characterization of the choice of the retailing structure for the case of substitute goods shows that when the uncertainty about the cost increases relatively to the size of the market, exclusive dealing tends to be the chosen retailing structure. On the other hand, when the market is big relatively to the costs, common agency emerges as the retailing structure. This thesis has greatly benefited from the contribution of Professors Humberto Moreira and Thierry Verdier. It also benefited from the stimulating environment of the Toulouse School of Economics, where part of this work was developed during the year of 2007.

Potential and costs for the production of electrolytic hydrogen in alcohol and sugar cane plants in the central and south regions of Brazil

This project verified the potential for the production of hydrogen via water electrolysis by using the exceeding electrical energy resultant from alcohol and sugar plants that use sugar cane bagasse as fuel. The studies were carried out in cogeneration plants authorized by the Electrical Energy National Agency (ANEEL). The processing history of sugar cane considered was based on the 2006/2007 harvests. The total bagasse produced, electrical energy generated and exceeding electrical energy in a year were calculated. It was obtained an average energy consumption value of 5.2 kWh Nm(-3) and the hydrogen production costs regarding the amount of sugar cane processed that ranged from US$ 0.50 to US$ 0.75 Nm(-3). The results pointed that the costs for the production of hydrogen via the bagasse exceeding energy are close to the production costs that use other sources of energy. As the energy generated from the bagasse is a renewable one, this alternative for the production of hydrogen is economical and environmentally viable. (C) 2008 International Association for Hydrogen Energy. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency

This paper considers the contacting approach to central banking in the context of a simple common agency model. The recent literature on optimal contracts suggests that the political principal of the central bank can design the appropriate incentive schemes that remedy for time-inconsistency problems in monetary policy. The effectiveness of such contracts, however, requires a central banker that attaches a positive weight to the incentive scheme. As a result, delegating monetary policy under such circumstances gives rise to the possibility that the central banker may respond to incentive schemes offered by other potential principals. We introduce common agency considerations in the design of optimal central banker contracts. We introduce two principals - society (government) and an interest group, whose objectives conflict with society's and we examine under what circumstances the government-offered or the interest-group-offered contract dominates. Our results largely depend on the type of bias that the interest group contract incorporates. In particular, when the interest group contract incorporates an inflationary bias the outcome depends on the principals' relative concern of the incentive schemes' costs. When the interest group contract incorporates an expansionary bias, however, it always dominates the government contract. A corollary of our results is that central banker contracts aiming to remove the expansionary bias of policymakers should be written explicitly in terms of the perceived bias.

Factors associated with home health care costs

Characteristics of Medicare-certified home health agencies in Texas and the contributions of selected agency characteristics on home health care costs were examined. Cost models were developed and estimated for both nursing and total visit costs using multiple regression procedures. The models included home health agency size, profit status, control, hospital-based affiliation, contract-cost ratio, service provision, competition, urban-rural input-price differences, and selected measures of patient case-mix. The study population comprised 314 home health agencies in Texas that had been certified at least one year on July, 1, 1986. Data for the analysis were obtained from Medicare Cost Reports for fiscal year ending between July 1, 1985 to June 30, 1986.^ Home health agency size, as measured by the logs of nursing and total visits, has a statistically significant negative linear relationship with nursing visit and total visit costs. Nursing and total visit costs decrease at a declining rate as size increases. The size-cost relationship is not altered when controlling for any other agency characteristic. The number of visits per patient per year, a measure of patient case-mix, is also negatively related to costs, suggesting that costs decline with care of chronic patients. Hospital-based affiliation and urban location are positively associated with costs. Together, the four characteristics explain 19 percent of the variance in nursing visit costs and 24 percent of the variance in total visit costs.^ Profit status and control, although correlated with other agency characteristics, exhibit no observable effect on costs. Although no relationship was found between costs and competition, contract cost ratio, or the provision on non-reimburseable services, no conclusions can be made due to problems with measurement of these variables. ^

A Case Study of an Agency's Three Family Preservation Contracts

This article presents a case study of a nonprofit child welfare agency that delivered family preservation services under three different purchase-of-service (POS) contracts. The research specifically focuses on how certain POS contract provisions and reimbursement rates influence the delivery of family preservation services. The three contacts examined differed on criteria, such as reimbursement mechanism, service volume, definition of clientele, and reimbursement rate. The study found that as reimbursement rates decline and as administrative costs increase, the service provider struggled with cash flow, staffing, fundraising, and service provision, among other things. It is concluded that contract-related resources, policies, and procedures impact provider agencies in multiple, significant ways that are critical to the provision of services and the accomplishment of positive client outcomes.

Costs and benefits of reducing lead in gasoline /

Mode of access: Internet.

Handbook : estimating sludge management costs /

Mode of access: Internet.

Estimating costs for water treatment as a function of size and treatment efficiency /

Mode of access: Internet.

A Preliminary analysis of the public costs of environmental protection : 1981-2000.

"May 1990."

Costs and water quality impacts of reducing agricultural nonpoint source pollution : an analysis methodology /

Aug. 1979.

Symposium on Energy and Human Health : human costs of electric power generation /

Mode of access: Internet.

Effects of thermal treatment of sludge on municipal wastewater treatment costs /

Mode of access: Internet.

Costs of wastewater treatment by land application /

Mode of access: Internet.

State-of-art review: water pollution control benefits and costs,

Includes bibliographies.

Regulatory strategies for construction site erosion control programs : forms, costs, and cost recovery mechanisms : contractor assistance for the cost of financing regulatory programs /

"December, 1980."