Small wars in the age of Clausewitz: the watershed between partisan war and people's war

Around the time of Clausewitz’s writing, a new element was introduced into partisan warfare: ideology. Previously, under the ancien régime, partisans were what today we would call special forces, light infantry or cavalry, almost always mercenaries, carrying out special operations, while the main action in war took place between regular armies. Clausewitz lectured his students on such ‘small wars’. In the American War of Independence and the resistance against Napoleon and his allies, operations carried out by such partisans merged with counter-revolutionary, nationalist insurgencies, but these Clausewitz analysed in a distinct category, ‘people's war’. Small wars, people's war, etc. should thus not be thought of as monopoly of either the political Right or the Left.

Goodbye to all that: on small wars and big choices

This article reflects on a decade of British counterinsurgency operations. Questioning the idea that lessons have been learnt, the paper challenges the assumptions that are being used to frame future strategic choice. Suggesting that defence engagement is primarily focused on optimising overseas interventions while avoiding a deeper strategic reassessment about whether the UK should be undertaking these sorts of activities, the article calls for a proper debate on Britain's national security interests.

The origins of small wars: from special operations to ideological insurgencies

This edited volume explores the origins of the term small wars and traces it to special operations. In the 17th century, such "guerrilla/petite guerre" special operations grew out of training and winter operations of the regular forces as practiced in the 16th century. In the 18th century, they fused with a tradition going back to Antiquity, of employing special ethnic groups (such as the Hungarian Hussars) for special operations. Side by side with these special operations, however, there was the even older genealogy of uprisings and insurgencies, which since the Spanish Guerrilla of 1808-1812 has been associated with this term. All three traditions have influenced each other.

Small wars and insurgencies in theory and practice, 1500-1850

In early modern times, warfare in Europe took on many diverse and overlapping forms. Our modern notions of ‘regular’ and ‘irregular’ warfare, of ‘major war’ and ‘small war’, have their roots in much greater diversity than such binary notions allow for. While insurgencies go back to time immemorial, they have become conceptually fused with ‘small wars’. This is a term first used to denote special operations, often carried out by military companies formed from special ethnic groups and then recruited into larger armies. In its Spanish form, guerrilla, the term ‘small war’ came to stand for an ideologically-motivated insurgency against the state authorities or occupying forces of another power. There is much overlap between the phenomena of irregular warfare in the sense of special operations alongside regular operations, and irregular warfare of insurgents against the regular forces of a state. This book demonstrates how long the two phenomena were in flux and fed on each other, from the raiding operations of the 16th century to the ‘small wars’ or special operations conducted by special units in the 19th century, which existed alongside and could merge with a popular insurgency. This book is based on a special issue of the journal Small Wars & Insurgencies.

The Spanish Guerrilla 1808-1814 as a model for people’s wars and resistance movements

Transforming the meaning of the term 'guerrilla' which had once meant feud or private warfare, and then irregular war conducted by special forces on behalf of a state or government, the Spanish Guerrilla (part of the Peninsular War) against Napoleon became the model to be emulated by insurgency movements across the world. Even though the term itself continued to be used, even in Spanish, for special operations, in henceforth became imbued with an ideological dimension, which is how it would be used especially in the 20th century.

An auction theoretical approach to fiscal wars

I examine a situation where a firm has to choose to locate a new factory in one of several jurisdictions and it depends on the private information held by each jurisdiction. Jurisdiction compete for the location of the new factory. This competition may take the form of expenditures already incurred on infraestructure, commitments to spend on infraestructure, tax incentives or even cash payments. The model combines two elements that are usually considered separately; competition is desirable because we want the factory to be located in the jurisdiction that values it the most, but competition in itself is wasteful. I show that expected total amount paid to the firm under a large family of arrangements. Moreover, I show that the ex-ante optimal mechanism that guarantees that the firm chooses the jurisdiction with the highest value for the factory, minimizes the total expected payment to the firm, and balances the budget in an ex-ante sense - can be implemented by running a standard auction and subsidizing participation.