On collective intentions: collective action in economics and philosophy

Philosophers and economists write about collective action from distinct but related points of view. This paper aims to bridge these perspectives. Economists have been concerned with rationality in a strategic context. There, problems posed by “coordination games” seem to point to a form of rational action, “team thinking,” which is not individualistic. Philosophers’ analyses of collective intention, however, sometimes reduce collective action to a set of individually instrumental actions. They do not, therefore, capture the first person plural perspective characteristic of team thinking. Other analyses, problematically, depict intentions ranging over others’ actions. I offer an analysis of collective intention which avoids these problems. A collective intention aims only at causing an individual action, but its propositional content stipulates its mirroring in other minds.

The transformation of collective action in Latin America

Includes bibliography

'Defending the rights'. An integrated model of collective action for "public water" in Italy

In many communities, supplying water for the people is a huge task and the fact that this essential service can be carried out by the private sector respecting the right to water, is a debated issue. This dissertation investigates the mechanisms through which a 'perceived rights violation' - which represents a specific form of perceived injustice which derives from the violation of absolute moral principles – can promote collective action. Indeed, literature on morality and collective action suggests that even if many people apparently sustain high moral principles (like human rights), only a minority decides to act in order to defend them. Taking advantage of the political situation in Italy, and the recent mobilization for "public water" we hypothesized that, because of its "sacred value", the perceived violation of the right to water facilitates identification with the social movement and activism. Through five studies adopting qualitative and quantitative methods, we confirmed our hypotheses demonstrating that the perceived violation of the right to water can sustain activism and it can influence vote intentions at the referendum for 'public water'. This path to collective action coexists with other 'classical' predictors of collective action, like instrumental factors (personal advantages, efficacy beliefs) and anger. The perceived rights violation can derive both from personal values (i.e. universalism) and external factors (i.e. a mobilization campaign). Furthermore, we demonstrated that it is possible to enhance the perceived violation of the right to water and anger through a specifically designed communication campaign. The final chapter summarizes the main findings and discusses the results, suggesting some innovative line of research for collective action literature.

The role of collective action in the provision of agri-environmental public goods: theoretical development through case studies in Italy

The thesis aims at analysing the role of collective action as a viable alternative to the traditional forms of intervention in agriculture in order to encourage the provision of agri-environmental public goods. Which are the main benefits of collective action, in terms of effectiveness and efficiency, compared to traditional market or public intervention policies? What are the drivers that encourage farmers to participate into collective action? To what extent it is possible to incorporate collective aspects into policies aimed at providing agri-environmental public goods? With the objective of addressing these research questions, the thesis is articulated in two levels: a theoretical analysis on the role of collective action in the provision of public goods and a specific investigation of two local initiative,s were an approach collective management of agro-environmental resources was successfully implemented. The first case study concerns a project named “Custodians of the Territory”, developed by the local agency in Tuscany “Comunità Montana Media Valle del Serchio”, which settled for an agreement with local farmers for a collective provision of environmental services related to the hydro-geological management of the district. The second case study is related to the territorial agri-environmental agreement experimented in Valdaso (Marche), where local farmers have adopted integrated pest management practices collectively with the aim of reducing the environmental impact of their farming practices. The analysis of these initiatives, carried out through participatory methods (Rapid Rural Appraisal), allowed developing a theoretical discussion on the role of innovative tools (such as co-production and co-management) in the provision of agri-environmental public goods. The case studies also provided some recommendations on the government intervention and policies needed to promote successful collective action for the provision of agri-environmental public goods.

A threshold hypothesis of institutional change: collective action in the Italian Alps during the 13th - 19th centuries.

This dissertation is about collective action issues in common property resources. Its focus is the “threshold hypothesis,” which posits the existence of a threshold in group size that drives the process of institutional change. This hypothesis is tested using a six-century dataset concerning the management of the commons by hundreds of communities in the Italian Alps. The analysis seeks to determine the group size threshold and the institutional changes that occur when groups cross this threshold. There are five main findings. First, the number of individuals in villages remained stable for six centuries, despite the population in the region tripling in the same period. Second, the longitudinal analysis of face-to-face assemblies and community size led to the empirical identification of a threshold size that triggered the transition from informal to more formal regimes to manage common property resources. Third, when groups increased in size, gradual organizational changes took place: large groups split into independent subgroups or structured interactions into multiple layers while maintaining a single formal organization. Fourth, resource heterogeneity seemed to have had no significant impact on various institutional characteristics. Fifth, social heterogeneity showed statistically significant impacts, especially on institutional complexity, consensus, and the relative importance of governance rules versus resource management rules. Overall, the empirical evidence from this research supports the “threshold hypothesis.” These findings shed light on the rationale of institutional change in common property regimes, and clarify the mechanisms of collective action in traditional societies. Further research may generalize these conclusions to other domains of collective action and to present-day applications.

Institutions as key drivers of collective action in WUAs [Water User Associations] of Uzbekistan

This paper presents a multifactor approach for performance assessment of Water Users Associations (WUAs) in Uzbekistan in order to identify the drivers for improved and effi cient performance of WUAs. The study was carried out in the Fergana Valley where the WUAs were created along the South Fergana Main Canal during the last 10 years. The farmers and the employees of 20 WUAs were questioned about the WUAs’ activities and the quantitative and qualitative data were obtained. This became a base for the calculation of 36 indicators divided into 6 groups: Water supply, technical conditions, economic conditions, social and cultural conditions, organizational conditions and information conditions. All the indicators assessed with a differentiated point system adjusted for subjectivity of several of them give the total maximal result for the associations of 250 point. The WUAs of the Fergana Valley showed the score between 145 and 219 points, what refl ects a highly diverse level of the WUAs performance in the region. The analysis of the indicators revealed that the key points of the WUA’s success are the organizational and institutional conditions including the participatory factors and awareness of both the farmers and employees about the work of WUA. The research showed that the low performance of the WUAs is always explained by the low technical and economic conditions along with weak organization and information dissemination conditions. It is clear that it is complicated to improve technical and economic conditions immediately because they are cost-based and cost-induced. However, it is possible to improve the organizational conditions and to strengthen the institutional basis via formal and information institutions which will gradually lead to improvement of economic and technical conditions of WUAs. Farmers should be involved into the WUA Governance and into the process of making common decisions and solving common problems together via proper institutions. Their awareness can also be improved by leading additional trainings for increasing farmers’ agronomic and irrigation knowledge, teaching them water saving technologies and acquainting them with the use of water measuring equipment so it can bring reliable water supply, transparent budgeting and adequate as well as equitable water allocation to the water users.

Wanting to Get More or Protecting One's Assets: Age-Differential Effects of Gain Versus Loss Perceptions on the Willingness to Engage in Collective Action

OBJECTIVES: The present research examined motivational differences across adulthood that might contribute to age-related differences in the willingness to engage in collective action. Two experiments addressed the role of gain and loss orientation for age-related differences in the willingness to engage in collective action across adulthood. METHOD: In Experiment 1, N = 169 adults (20-85 years) were confronted with a hypothetical scenario that involved either an impending increase or decrease of health insurance costs for their respective age group. In Experiment 2, N = 231 adults (18-83 years) were asked to list an advantage or disadvantage they perceived in being a member of their age group. Subsequently, participants indicated their willingness to engage in collective action on behalf of their age group. RESULTS: Both experiments suggest that, with increasing age, people are more willing to engage in collective action when they are confronted with the prospect of loss or a disadvantage. DISCUSSION: The findings highlight the role of motivational processes for involvement in collective action across adulthood. With increasing age, (anticipated) loss or perceived disadvantages become more important for the willingness to participate in collective action.

Alpine Common Property Institutions under Change: Conditions for Successful and Unsuccessful Collective Action by Alpine Farmers in the Canton of Grisons, Switzerland

The protection and sustainable management of alpine summer pastures has been stated as a goal in Swiss national law since 1996, and direct payments from the state for summer pasturing have been tied to sustainability criteria since 2000. This reflects the increasing value of the alpine cultural landscape as a public good. However, provision of this public good remains in the hands of local farmers and their local common pool resource (CPR) institutions for managing alpine pastures. These institutions are increasingly struggling to maintain their institutional arrangements, particularly regarding the work needed to maintain the pastures. This paper examines two cases of local CPR institutions for managing alpine pastures in the Swiss Canton of Grisons that manifest different institutional developments in light of changing conditions. The differences in how these institutions reacted to change and the impacts this has had on the provision of the CPR are explained by focusing on relative prices, bargaining power, and ideology as drivers of institutional change that are often neglected within common property research. Key words: summer pasture management, institutional change, bargaining power, ideology

Policy processes and collective action in water reforms: the cases of Nicaragua and Suriname

Las reformas de agua en países en desarrollo suelen llevarse a cabo junto con cambios institucionales más profundos o, incluso, acompañadas de cambios constitucionales o de régimen político. Por lo tanto, los marcos institucionales adaptados a países gobernados sujetos al estado de derecho pueden no ser apropiados para contextos gobernados fundamentalmente, al menos en sus inicios, por instituciones informales o poco maduras. Esta tesis toma las reformas de agua como punto de partida y pretende contribuir a la literatura mediante una serie de análisis empíricos tanto del ámbito general como del plano individual o sujeto personal de la política del agua. En el ámbito general, el foco se pone en los factores que explican el fallo de la acción colectiva en dos contextos diferentes: 1) en la implementación de la nueva Ley de Aguas de Nicaragua y 2) en el mantenimiento y revitalización de las instituciones de riego en Surinam. En el plano del individuo, la investigación se centra en las decisiones de los usuarios de los recursos y analiza el papel crítico de las variables sociales para la gestión de los recursos comunes. Para ello, el método de investigación utilizado es mixto, combinando el análisis de entrevistas, encuestas y experimentos. En el ámbito general, los resultados muestran que las principales barreras para la implementación de la nueva Ley de Aguas de Nicaragua podrían tener su reflejo en el lenguaje de la Ley y, por tanto, en la forma en la que se definen y configuran las instituciones incluidas en dicha Ley. Así, la investigación demuestra que la implementación de políticas no puede ser estudiada o entendida sin tener en cuenta tanto el diseño de la propia política como el marco socio-ecológico en el que se enmarca. El contexto específico de Nicaragua remarca la importancia de considerar tanto las instituciones formales como informales en los procesos de transición política. A pesar de que las reformas de agua requieren plazos largos para su implementación, el hecho de que exista una diferencia entre las reglas tal cual se definen formalmente y las reglas que operan en la realidad merece una mayor consideración en el diseño de políticas basadas fundamentalmente en instituciones formales. En el ámbito de la conducta individual, el análisis de la acción colectiva ofrece una serie de observaciones empíricas interesantes. En el caso de Nicaragua, los resultados indican que la intensidad de las relaciones sociales, el tipo de agentes dispuestos a proporcionar apoyo social y el nivel de confianza en la comunidad son factores que explican de manera significativa la participación en la comunidad. Sin embargo, el hecho de que la gestión colectiva de riego se produzca, en la mayoría de casos, en torno a lazos familiares sugiere que las variables de capital social críticas se definen en gran medida en la esfera familiar, siendo difícil que se extiendan fuera de estos nexos. El análisis experimental de los resultados de un juego de uso de recurso común y contribución al bien público muestra que las preferencias pro-sociales de los individuos y la heterogeneidad del grupo en términos de composición por sexo son factores que explican significativamente los resultados y las decisiones de apropiación a lo largo del juego. En términos del diseño de las políticas, es fundamental tener en cuenta las dinámicas de participación y uso de los recursos comunes de manera que los niveles de cooperación puedan mantenerse en el largo plazo, lo cual, como se observa en el caso de Surinam, no es siempre posible. Finalmente, el caso de Surinam es un ejemplo ilustrativo de los procesos de acción colectiva en economías en transición. El análisis del fallo de la acción colectiva en Surinam muestra que los procesos políticos vinculados al período colonial y de independencia explican en gran medida la falta de claridad en las reglas operacionales y colectivas que gobiernan la gestión de los sistemas de riego y drenaje. Los resultados empíricos sugieren que a pesar de que la acción colectiva para la provisión de los servicios de riego y drenaje estaba bien establecida bajo el régimen colonial, la auto-organización no prosperó en un contexto dependiente del apoyo externo y regido fundamentalmente por reglas diseñadas al nivel competencial del gobierno central. El sistema socio-ecológico que se desarrolló durante la transición post-colonial favoreció, así, la emergencia de comportamientos oportunistas, y posteriormente la inoperancia de los Water Boards (WBs) creados en la época colonial. En este sentido, cualquier intento por revitalizar los WBs y fomentar el desarrollo de la auto-organización de los usuarios necesitará abordar los problemas relacionados con los patrones demográficos, incluyendo la distribución de la tierra, el diseño de instituciones y la falta de confianza en el gobierno, además de las inversiones típicas en infraestructura y sistemas de información hidrológicos. El liderazgo del gobierno, aportando empuje de arriba-abajo, es, además, otro elemento imprescindible en Surinam. ABSTRACT Water reforms in developing countries take place along deeper institutional and even constitutional. Therefore, institutional frameworks that might result in positive outcomes in countries governed by the rule of law might not fit in contexts governed mainly by informal or immature institutions. This thesis takes water reforms as the starting point and aims to contribute to the literature by presenting several conceptual and empirical analyses at both general and individual levels. At the general national level, the focus is on the factors explaining failure of collective action in two different settings: 1) in the implementation of the new Nicaraguan Water Law and 2) in sustaining and revitalizing irrigation institutions in Suriname. At the individual level, the research focuses on the actions of resource users and analyzes the critical role of social variables for common pool resources management. For this purpose, the research presented in this thesis makes use of a mixed-method approach, combining interviews, surveys and experimental methods. Overall, the results show that major barriers for the implementation of the new Nicaraguan Water Law have its reflection on the language of the Law and, therefore, on the way institutions are defined and configured. In this sense, our study shows that implementation cannot fruitfully be studied and understood without taking into account both the policy design and the social-ecological context in which it is framed. The specific setting of Nicaragua highlights the relevance of considering both formal and informal institutions when promoting policy transitions. Despite the unquestionable fact that water reforms implementation needs long periods of time, there is still a gap between the rules on paper and the rules on the ground that deserves further attention when proposing policy changes on the basis of formal institutions. At the level of the individual agent, the analysis of collective action provides a number of interesting empirical insights. In the case of Nicaragua, I found that the intensity of social networks, the type of agents willing to provide social support and the level of trust in the community are all significant factors in explaining collective action at community level. However, the fact that most collective irrigation relies on family ties suggests that critical social capital variables might be defined within the family sphere and making it difficult to go beyond it. Experimental research combining a common pool resource and a public good game in Nicaragua shows that individuals’ pro-social traits and group heterogeneity in terms of sex composition are significant variables in explaining efficiency outcomes and effort decisions along the game. Thus, with regard to policy design, it is fundamental to consider carefully the dynamics of agents' participation and use of common pool resources, for sustaining cooperation in the long term, which, as seen in the case and Surinam, is not always possible. The case of Suriname provides a rich setting for the analysis of collective action in transition economies. The analysis of decay of collective irrigation in Suriname shows that the lack of clear operational and collective choice rules appear to be rooted in deeper political processes that date back to the colonial period. The empirical findings suggest that despite collective action for the provision of irrigation and drainage services was well established during the colonial period, self-organization did not flourish in a context governed by colonial state-crafted rules and mostly dependent on external support. The social-ecological system developed during the post-colonial transition process favored the emergence of opportunistic behavior. In this respect, any attempt to revitalize WBs and support self-organization will need to tackle the problems derived from demographic patterns, including land allocation, institutions design and government distrust, in addition to the typical investments in both physical infrastructure and hydrological information systems. The leadership role of the government, acting as a top-down trigger, is another essential element in Suriname.