The Bankers', insurance managers', and agents' magazine.

Separately paged supplements accompany some numbers.

The law of insurance of the state of Ohio : including fire, life, accident, casualty, quaranty, mutual benefit, fraternal and marine insurance, and pleading, practice and evidence relating thereto, as determined by the courts and contained in the statutes ... from the earliest period to date of publication, with full annotations from the decisions of the courts of Ohio and other states /

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Personal insurance, life and accident,

Mode of access: Internet.

Improving user-insurance communication on accident reports

This paper presents an easy to use methodology and system for insurance companies targeting at managing traffic accidents reports process. The main objective is to facilitate and accelerate the process of creating and finalizing the necessary accident reports in cases without mortal victims involved. The diverse entities participating in the process from the moment an accident occurs until the related final actions needed are included. Nowadays, this market is limited to the consulting platforms offered by the insurance companies. Copyright 2014 ACM.

Volunteers 'piggy-backing' on their private insurance : an uncertain protection against liability

Volunteering is a very important part of life in Australia with an estimated 36% of the adult population volunteering in 2010. Voluntary work generates economic benefits, addresses community needs and develops the social networks that form the backbone of civil society. Without volunteers, many essential services would either cease to exist or become too expensive for many people to afford. These volunteers, who by definition are not in receipt of any remuneration for their work and services, are exposed to personal injury and to legal liability in the discharge of their functions. It is therefore appropriate that statutory protection is extended to volunteers and that volunteer organisations procure public liability and personal accident cover where possible. However, given the patchwork quilt of circumstances where statutory or institutional cover is available to volunteers and the existence of many and diverse exclusions, it is important to have regard also to what scope a volunteer may have to avail themselves of protection against liability for volunteering activity by relying upon their own personal insurance cover. This article considers the extent of private insurance cover and its availability to volunteers under home and contents insurance and under comprehensive motor vehicle insurance. The most common policies in the Australian market are examined and the uncertain nature of protection against liability afforded by these policies is discussed. This uncertainty could be reduced should the Federal Government through amendments to the Insurance Contracts Regulations standardise the circumstances and extent to which liability protection was afforded to an insured holding home and contents insurance and comprehensive motor vehicle insurance cover.

Spontaneous and episodic volunteers: The legislative, insurance and risk management framework

Baby Boomers are a generation of life long association joiners, but following generations prefer spontaneous and episodic volunteering. This trend is apparent not only during natural disasters, but in most other spheres of volunteering. Legal liability for such volunteers is a growing concern, which unresolved, may dampen civic participation. We critically examine the current treatment of these liabilities through legislation, insurance and risk management.

Learning from insurance data: Injuries to other road users in motorcyclist at-fault crashes

In multi-vehicle motorcycle crashes, the motorcycle rider is less likely to be at-fault but more commonly severely injured than the other road user. Therefore, not surprisingly, crashes in which motorcycle riders are at-fault and particularly the injuries to the other road users in these crashes have received little research attention. This paper aims to address this gap in the literature by investigating the factors influencing the severity of injury to other road users in motorcyclist-at-fault crashes. Five years of data from Queensland, Australia, were obtained from a database of claims against the compulsory third party (CTP) injury insurance of the at-fault motorcyclists. Analysis of the data using an ordered probit model shows higher injury severity for crashes involving young (under 25) and older (60+) at-fault motorcyclists. Among the not at-fault road users, the young, old, and males were found to be more severely injured than others. Injuries to vehicle occupants were less severe than those to pillions. Crashes that occurred between vehicles traveling in opposite directions resulted in more severe injuries than those involving vehicles traveling in the same direction. While most existing studies have analyzed police reported crash data, this study used CTP insurance data. Comparison of results indicates the potential of using CTP insurance data as an alternative to police reported crash data for gaining a better understanding of risk factors for motorcycle crashes and injury severity.

Accounting for risk: The advent of capped conveyancing title insurance

Title insurance companies originating from America, have, in the past 15 years become part of the Australian conveyancing landscape. However for most residential freehold owners, their activities would be a mystery. A purchaser does not routinely obtain title insurance, with the companies presently focussing on servicing the mortgagee sector. While the lack of penetration in the residential purchaser market may be attributed to the consumer’s lack of knowledge, evidence from Ontario and New Zealand illustrates that title insurance is likely to become an additional cost in the conveyancing process in Australia. In this article we highlight the reasons why, and demonstrate how title insurers have, by working with the legal profession been able to subtly move the risk of responsibility for compensation for loss, (at least in the first instance) from the state to the insurer, but with the added benefit for the state and the conveyancing agents that the cost of the insurance is ultimately borne by the consumer. In New Zealand this development is being accelerated by the introduction of capped conveyancing title insurance. Whether title insurance will become part of the conveyancing process is no longer the relevant question for Australia, (it undoubtedly will), but the unknown issue is just how title insurance companies will work with conveyancing agents to infiltrate the market, and what response this infiltration will have in terms of the state’s view as to their continued role in the provision of assurance. We suggest that developments from New Zealand in relation to capped conveyancing insurance are likely to be replicated in Australia in the near future, and that the state’s role in providing an assurance fund will continue, though the state may seek to expand the areas in which the right to compensation is restricted.

Impact of type of drug insurance on adherence, persistence and costs of antidepressant drugs : a Quebec population-based study

Contexte: À date, il existe peu de données sur l’adhésion, la persistance et les coûts associés aux antidépresseurs selon le type d’assurance médicament (privé ou public). Objectif: Comparer selon le régime d’assurance médicament (privé ou public), l'adhésion, la persistance et les coûts des antidépresseurs. Méthodes de recherche: Une étude de cohorte appariée a été réalisée en utilisant des bases de données du Québec. Sujets: Nous avons sélectionné 194 patients assurés par un régime privé et 1923 patients assurés par le régime public de la Régie de l’assurance maladie du Québec (RAMQ) (18-64 ans) qui ont rempli au moins une ordonnance pour un antidépresseur entre décembre 2007 et septembre 2009. Mesures: L’adhésion, mesurée sur une période d’un an, a été estimée en utilisant le proportion of prescribed days covered (PPDC). Un modèle de régression linéaire a été utilisé afin d’estimer la différence moyenne en PPDC entre les patients assurés par un régime privé et ceux assurés par le régime public de la RAMQ. La persistance a été comparé entre ces deux groupes avec un modèle de régression de survie Cox, et le coût mensuel d'antidépresseurs ($ CAN) a été comparé entre ces deux groupes en utilisant un modèle de régression linéaire. Résultats: Le PPDC parmi les patients assurés par un régime privé était de 86,4% (intervalle de confiance (IC) 95%: 83,3%-89,5%) versus 81,3% (IC 95%: 80,1%-82,5%) pour les patients assurés par le régime public de la RAMQ, pour une différence moyenne ajustée de 6,7% (IC 95%: 3,0%-10,4%). La persistance après un an parmi les patients assurés par un régime privé était de 49,5% versus 18,9% pour les patients assurés par le régime public de la RAMQ (p <0,001), et le rapport de risque ajusté était de 0,48 (IC 95%: 0,30-0,76). Comparativement aux patients assurés par le régime public de la RAMQ, les patients ayant une assurance privée ont payé 14,94 $ CAD (95% CI: $12,30-$17,58) de plus par mois en moyenne pour leurs antidépresseurs. Conclusion: Les patients assurés par un régime privé avaient une meilleure adhésion, persistance, mais avaient aussi un plus haut coût pour leurs antidépresseurs que ceux assurés par le régime public de la RAMQ. Cette différence de coûts peut être due aux différentes exigences de paiement en pharmacie entre les deux régimes ainsi qu’aux limites des honoraires des pharmaciens imposés par le régime public.

Testing for Hidden Information and Action in Automobile Insurance Market

I test the presence of hidden information and action in the automobile insurance market using a data set from several Colombian insurers. To identify the presence of hidden information I find a common knowledge variable providing information on policyholder s risk type which is related to both experienced risk and insurance demand and that was excluded from the pricing mechanism. Such unused variable is the record of policyholder s traffic offenses. I find evidence of adverse selection in six of the nine insurance companies for which the test is performed. From the point of view of hidden action I develop a dynamic model of effort in accident prevention given an insurance contract with bonus experience rating scheme and I show that individual accident probability decreases with previous accidents. This result brings a testable implication for the empirical identification of hidden action and based on that result I estimate an econometric model of the time spans between the purchase of the insurance and the first claim, between the first claim and the second one, and so on. I find strong evidence on the existence of unobserved heterogeneity that deceives the testable implication. Once the unobserved heterogeneity is controlled, I find conclusive statistical grounds supporting the presence of moral hazard in the Colombian insurance market.

Non-monotone insurance contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of this paper is to show the possibility of a non-monotone relation between coverage ans risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuous parameter which is correlated with lenience and for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cosr of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and iplies a positive correlation between overage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the SCP be broken, but also the monotonocity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (low) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case there are some coverage levels associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation between coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to desentangle single crossing ans non single croosing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function os riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric information), coverage is monotone function of riskiness, this also fives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirical tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouruéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variables (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variables conditioning on all observable variables. We show that this may be the case when the omitted variables have a non-monotonic relation with the observable ones. Moreover, because this non-dimensional does not capture this deature. Hence, our main results is to point out the importance of the SPC in testing predictions of the hidden information models.

On the cost of sympathy : a alternative model of insurance markets

The paper provides an alternative model for insurance market with three types of agents: households, providers of a service and insurance companies. Households have uncertainty about future leveIs of income. Providers, if hired by a household, perform a diagnoses and privately learn a signal. For each signal there is a procedure that maximizes the likelihood of the household obtaining the good state of nature. The paper assumes that providers care about their income and also about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature (sympathy assumption). This assumption is satisfied if, for example, they care about their reputation or if there are possible litigation costs in case they do not use the appropriate procedure. Finally, insurance companies offer contracts to both providers and households. The paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and shows that the sympathy assumption 1eads to a 10ss of welfare for the households due to the need to incentive providers to choose the least expensive treatment.

Do insurance defrauders want to be punished?

We analyze a Principal-Agent model of an insurer who faces an adverse selection problem. He is unable to observe if his client has a high risk or a low risk of having an accident. At the underwriting of the contract, the insurer requests the client to declare his risk. After that, the former can costly audit the truthfulness of this announcement. If the audit confirms a false declaration, the insurer is legally allowed to punish the defrauder. We characterize the efRcient contracts when this punishment is bounded from above by a legal restriction. Then, we do some comparative statics on the efRcient contracts and on the agent's utility. The most important result of this paper concerns the legal limit to a defrauder's punishment. We prove that there exists a uni que value of this legal limit that maximizes the expected utility of a high risk type. Facing this particular value of the legal limit to a defrauder's punishment, the insurer will effectively audit a low risk reporto We also show that this particular value increases with the probability of facing a high risk policyholder. Therefore, when this probability is sufRciently high, the nullity of the contract is not enough. From the point of view of a potential defrauder, the law should allow harder sanctions. This is an striking result because the nullity of the contract is a common sanction for this kind of fraud in the USA and in some European countries.

Optimal unemployment insurance for couples

This work analyzes the optimal design of an unemployment insurance program for couples, whose joint search problem in the labor market differ significantly from the problem faced by single agents. We use a version of the sequential search model of the labor market adapted to married agents to compare optimal constant policies for single and married agents, as well as characterize the optimal constant policy when the agency faces single and married agents simultaneously. Our main result is that an agency that gives equal weights to single and married agents will want to give equal utility promises to both types of agents and spend more on the single agent.