Three essays on dual-class stock structure

Dual-class stock structure is characterized by the separation of voting rights and cash flow rights. The departure from a common "one share-one vote" configuration creates ideal conditions for conflicts of interest and agency problems between controlling insiders (the holders of voting rights) and remaining shareholders. The owners of voting rights have the opportunity to extract private benefits and act in their personal interest; as a result, dual-class firms are often perceived to have low transparency and high information asymmetry. This dissertation investigates the quality of information and the information environment of firms with two classes of stock. The first essay examines the quality of information by studying accruals in dual-class firms in comparison to firms with only one class of stock. The results suggest that the quality of accruals is better in dual-class firms than in single-class firms. In addition, the difference in the quality of accruals between firms that abolish their dual-class share structure by unification and singe-class firms disappears in the post-unification period. The second essay investigates the earnings informativeness of dual-class firms by examining the explanatory power of earnings for returns. The results indicate that the earnings informativeness is lower for dual-class firms as compared to single-class firms. Earnings informativeness improves in firms that unify their shares. The third essay compares the level of information asymmetry between dual-class firms and single-class firms. It is documented that the information environment for dual-class firms is worse than for single-class firms. Also, the finding suggests that the difference in information environment between dual-class firms and single-class firms disappears after dual-class stock unification.

The market value implications of pension asset allocation

Pension funds have been part of the private sector since the 1850's. Defined Benefit pension plans [DB], where a company promises to make regular contributions to investment accounts held for participating employees in order to pay a promised lifelong annuity, are significant capital markets participants, amounting to 2.3 trillion dollars in 2010 (Federal Reserve Board, 2013). In 2006, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.158 (SFAS 158), Employers' Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension and Other Postemployment Plans, shifted information concerning funding status and pension asset/liability composition from disclosure in the footnotes to recognition in the financial statements. I add to the literature by being the first to examine the effect of recent pension reform during the financial crisis of 2008-09. This dissertation is comprised of three related essays. In my first essay, I investigate whether investors assign different pricing multiples to the various classes of pension assets when valuing firms. The pricing multiples on all classes of assets are significantly different from each other, but only investments in bonds and equities were value-relevant during the recent financial crisis. Consistent with investors viewing pension liabilities as liabilities of the firm, the pricing multiples on pension liabilities are significantly larger than those on non-pension liabilities. The only pension costs significantly associated with firm value are actual rate of return and interest expense. In my second essay, I investigate the role of accruals in predicting future cash flows, extending the Barth et al. (2001a) model of the accrual process. Using market value of equity as a proxy for cash flows, the results of this study suggest that aggregate accounting amounts mask how the components of earnings affect investors' ability to predict future cash flows. Disaggregating pension earnings components and accruals results in an increase in predictive power. During the 2008-2009 financial crisis, however, investors placed a greater (and negative) weight on the incremental information contained in the individual components of accruals. The inferences are robust to alternative specifications of accruals. Finally, in my third essay I investigate how investors view under-funded plans. On average, investors: view deficits arising from under-funded plans as belonging to the firm; reward firms with fully or over-funded pension plans; and encourage those funds with unfunded pension plans to become funded. Investors also encourage conservative pension asset allocations to mitigate firm risk, and smaller firms are perceived as being better able to handle the risk associated with underfunded plans. During the financial crisis of 2008-2009 underfunded status had a lower negative association with market value. In all three models, there are significant differences in pre- and post- SFAS 158 periods. These results are robust to various scenarios of the timing of the financial crisis and an alternative measure of funding.

Can Compensation Committees Effectively Mitigate the CEO Horizon Problem? The Role of Co-opted Directors

Extant research finds inconclusive evidence about the CEO horizon problem. One possibility is that compensation committees design CEO compensation in a way that discourages retiring CEOs from opportunistic earnings management and R&D reduction. However, compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors may not be as effective as those with fewer co-opted directors in mitigating the CEO horizon problem, because directors co-opted by the CEO tend to bias their decisions in favor of the CEO. I find that compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are associated with higher CEO compensation packages. I document R&D reduction and accruals management in firms with retiring CEOs and compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors, and find that R&D reduction and income-increasing accruals are less discouraged by compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors when deciding CEO compensation. I also examine the effect of boards of directors and compensation committee characteristics on CEO compensation and on mitigating the CEO horizon problem. I find that CEO compensation positively associates with CEO power, director independence, and the percentage of busy directors, and negatively associates with board of directors and committee size and director ownership. Moreover, I find that retiring CEOs are more likely to reduce R&D expenditures when CEOs have more power, and director tenure is longer; retiring CEOs in firms with large boards of directors and compensation committees are less likely to manage accruals.

Effect of Earnings Volatility on Cost of Debt: The case of Swedish Limited Companies

The paper empirically tests the relationship between earnings volatility and cost of debt with a sample of more than 77,000 Swedish limited companies over the period 2006 to 2013 observing more than 677,000 firm years. As called upon by many researchers recently that there is very limited evidence of the association between earnings volatility and cost of debt this paper contributes greatly to the existing literature of earnings quality and debt contracts, especially on the consequence of earnings quality in the debt market. Earnings volatility is a proxy used for earnings quality while cost of debt is a component of debt contract. After controlling for firms’ profitability, liquidity, solvency, cashflow volatility, accruals volatility, sales volatility, business risk, financial risk and size this paper studies the effect of earnings volatility measured by standard deviation of Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA) on Cost of Debt. Overall finding suggests that lenders in Sweden does take earnings volatility into consideration while determining cost of debt for borrowers. But a deeper analysis of various industries suggest earnings volatility is not consistently used by lenders across all the industries. Lenders in Sweden are rather more sensitive to borrowers’ financial risk across all the industries. It may also be stated that larger borrowers tend to secure loans at a lower interest rate, the results are consistent with majority of the industries. Swedish debt market appears to be well prepared for financial crises as the debt crisis seems to have no or little adverse effect borrowers’ cost of capital. This study is the only empirical evidence to study the association between earnings volatility and cost of debt. Prior indirect research suggests earnings volatility has a negative effect on cost debt (i.e. an increase in earnings volatility will increase firm’s cost of debt). Our direct evidence from the Swedish debt market is consistent for some industries including media, real estate activities, transportation & warehousing, and other consumer services.

Earnings management nas instituições particulares de solidariedade social

A manipulação contabilística constitui-se como uma problemática atual, relatada sob os mais diversos contextos. Este estudo descritivo pretende verificar a existência de Earnings Management no contexto das Instituições Particulares de Solidariedade Social (IPSS) e averiguar as razões (motivações) que levam a estas práticas. A amostra para este estudo é constituída por 14 instituições portuguesas, num total de 58 observações situadas entre os anos 2009 e 2014. Para a análise dos dados foi utilizada uma abordagem quantitativa, primeiramente através de estatística descritiva e correlacional. Para testar a existência de Earnings Management utilizou-se um modelo baseado no estudo de accruals agregados (Modelo de Jones - 1991) e um modelo complementar baseado na distribuição de frequência de resultados (Burgstahler e Dichev -1997). Os resultados permitem inferir a existência destas práticas neste setor e as motivações estarão relacionadas com a rendibilidade das instituições.

Are joint audits associated with higher audit fees?

In its October 2010 Green Paper on audit policy, the European Commission suggested that joint audits might be a way of improving the audit market in Europe. However, some parties consider that a joint audit system is not an efficient solution because the perceived improvements in audit quality, if any, are not commensurate with the significant increase in audit fees. We compare audit fees paid during the years 2007-2011 by listed companies in France, where joint audits are mandatory, with those paid by British and Italian companies. Theory suggests that audit fees in countries with high investor protection, such as the UK, are likely to be greater than those in countries with lower investor protection, such as France and Italy, ceteris paribus. However, we find significantly higher audit fees in France after controlling for well-documented auditor, client, and engagement attributes, which vary across countries. Furthermore, since we do not find statistically significant differences in the magnitude of abnormal accruals, the higher audit fees observed in France do not appear to be associated with higher audit quality.

Assessing earnings management in european publicly traded firms

We investigate if investors may benefit from using the accruals quality measure to assess the level of earnings management exercised by firms when preparing their accounting statements. More earnings management is expected to be associated with high information asymmetry among stock market participants because it makes earnings information less precise, thus providing an information advantage to informed investors relative to liquidity traders. Our results based on a sample of European publicly traded firms are consistent with a positive association between earnings management and information asymmetry. However, given some previous studies suggesting that accruals based measures may be noisy indicators of earnings management we further develop and test a method to enhance the performance of accruals quality in detecting earnings management.

Assessing Earnings Management in European Publicly Traded Firms

We investigate if investors may benefit from using the accruals quality measure to assess the level of earnings management exercised by firms when preparing their accounting statements. More earnings management is expected to be associated with high information asymmetry among stock market participants because it makes earnings information less precise, thus providing an information advantage to informed investors relative to liquidity traders. Our results based on a sample of European publicly traded firms are consistent with a positive association between earnings management and information asymmetry. However, given some previous studies suggesting that accruals based measures may be noisy indicators of earnings management we further develop and test a method to enhance the performance of accruals quality in detecting earnings management

Certificação de qualidade versus qualidade da informação financeira: estudo para empresas portuguesas

O presente estudo tem como objetivo analisar se as empresas que têm implementado um Sistema de Gestão da Qualidade, certificadas segundo a norma da International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 9001, apresentam também uma boa qualidade da informação financeira. Neste sentido, pretende-se testar a expectável relação positiva entre a certificação de qualidade de uma empresa e a qualidade da sua informação financeira. Para isso, identificaram-se as empresas que possuem certificação do Sistema de Gestão de Qualidade, segundo a norma ISO 9001, enquanto a qualidade da informação financeira foi aferida utilizando como proxy os accruals discricionários estimados através do modelo Jones (1991). Utiliza-se um modelo logit para testar a relação pretendida, tendo como variável dependente a variável binária relativa à certificação de qualidade e como principal variável explicativa a qualidade da informação financeira. Com base nos resultados obtidos foi possível verificar a existência de uma relação positiva e estatisticamente significativa entre certificação de qualidade das empresas e a sua qualidade da informação financeira.

The influence of remuneration structures on financial reporting quality: evidence from Australia

This cross-sectional study investigates the influence of a company's remuneration structure on managers' opportunistic behaviour. The findings support the proposed hypothesis that a higher level of compliance with Remuneration Principle 8-ASX Corporate Governance Council) is associated with a lower level of earnings management. The findings support the efficient functioning of the ASX proposed remuneration structure. This cross-sectional study investigates the influence of remuneration structures on financial reporting quality, based on a sample of companies listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). Compliance with Remuneration Principle eight issued by ASX (providing recommendations on formation, operation and disclosure of remuneration committees) is expected to improve financial reporting quality represented by a decreased level of earnings management. This study expands the corporate governance literature by examining an under-researched mechanism to address the agency problem. Earnings management, as a consequence of the agency problem, is measured using the level of absolute discretionary accruals. In this study, we use the modified Jones model to measure the level of discretionary accruals and the existence of reduced earnings management. The study is conducted using a random sample of 214 firm-year observations selected from the ASX listed companies. Our findings show a higher level of compliance with the principle on remuneration is associated with lower levels of earnings management. The findings support the efficient functioning of the ASX-proposed remuneration structure in reducing earnings manipulations.

Three Essays on Dual-Class Stock Structure

Dual-class stock structure is characterized by the separation of voting rights and cash flow rights. The departure from a common “one share-one vote” configuration creates ideal conditions for conflicts of interest and agency problems between controlling insiders (the holders of voting rights) and remaining shareholders. The owners of voting rights have the opportunity to extract private benefits and act in their personal interest; as a result, dual-class firms are often perceived to have low transparency and high information asymmetry. This dissertation investigates the quality of information and the information environment of firms with two classes of stock. The first essay examines the quality of information by studying accruals in dual-class firms in comparison to firms with only one class of stock. The results suggest that the quality of accruals is better in dual-class firms than in single-class firms. In addition, the difference in the quality of accruals between firms that abolish their dual-class share structure by unification and singe-class firms disappears in the post-unification period. The second essay investigates the earnings informativeness of dual-class firms by examining the explanatory power of earnings for returns. The results indicate that the earnings informativeness is lower for dual-class firms as compared to single-class firms. Earnings informativeness improves in firms that unify their shares. The third essay compares the level of information asymmetry between dual-class firms and single-class firms. It is documented that the information environment for dual-class firms is worse than for single-class firms. Also, the finding suggests that the difference in information environment between dual-class firms and single-class firms disappears after dual-class stock unification.

Was audit quality of Laventhol and Horwath poor?

Laventhol and Horwath (L&H), the then seventh largest accounting firm in the US, declared bankruptcy in November 1990. The firm claimed that its bankruptcy was due to the perception of it being a deep pocket rather than inherent deficiencies in its performance. In this study, we examine whether the audit quality of L&H was lower than other auditors. Results do not show that L&H is associated with lower quality audits either in terms of lower likelihood of issuing modified audit opinion, higher levels of discretionary accruals for its clients, or lower predictability of discretionary accruals for future non-discretionary net income for its clients than for clients of other auditors. Results of additional tests also do not suggest that auditors that take up clients of L&H report differently from L&H. This evidence does not support the proposition that L&H’s audit quality was less than audit quality of other audit firms during the period leading up to the bankruptcy.