A post-mortem of the Vilnius Summit: Not yet a ‘Thessaloniki moment’ for the Eastern Partnership. CEPS Commentary, 3 December 2013

In assessing the third Eastern Partnership (EaP) Summit at Vilnius on November 28-29th, this CEPS Commentary concludes that the event fell far short of its initial ambition to define the geopolitical finalité of EU-EaP relations by projecting a path towards future accession to the EU for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

EEAS 2.0: A legal commentary on Council Decision 2010/427/EU establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service. CEPS Paperbacks. February 2013

This short and user-friendly legal commentary on the 2010 Council Decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the EEAS is the first of its kind. It is intended to inform those involved in the review process and to serve as a reference document for practitioners and analysts dealing with the EEAS. Rather than an elaborate doctrinal piece, this legal commentary is a textual and contextual analysis of each article that takes account of i) other relevant legal provisions (primary, secondary, international); ii) the process leading to the adoption of the 2010 Council Decision; iii) the preamble of the Council Decision and iv) insofar as it is possible at this stage, early implementation. Wherever relevant, cross-references to other provisions of the Council Decision have been made so as to tie in the different commentaries and ensure overall consistency.

Impact of the ‘Big bang’ enlargement on EU foreign policy – 10 years on. CEPS Commentary, 5 May 2014

The tendency within the EU today to blur distinctions between internal and external policies and between hard and soft security demands a more holistic and inclusive approach in tackling challenges and seizing opportunities if the EU is to make good on its foreign policy objectives. In his assessment of the impact of the ‘big bang’ enlargement on EU foreign policy a decade later, Steven Blockmans finds that the experience and expertise of the (by now not so) new member states has been and will continue to be indispensable for the European Union.

Euroscepticism vs. Political Pragmatism: The Finns Party tones down its criticism of the EU. EPIN Commentary No. 19, 26 June 2014

While many Eurosceptic parties in Europe achieved historical successes in this year’s EP elections, Finland’s populist Finns Party was unable to fulfil its own high expectations. With the eurozone crisis at least temporarily subsiding and Finland’s own economy struggling, the party has been unable to find a new electoral trump card. Facing a changed political climate and stiffer competition, the party is currently toning down its criticism of the EU, as indicated by its recent decision to join the British Tories in the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group.

Reshaping politics of the left and centre in Greece after the 2014 EP election. EPIN Commentary No. 21/10 September 2014

The political landscape in Greece is confused and volatile at the moment; the right and extreme- right-wing parties are accorded a disproportionately large place in political debate, while the radical left-wing SYRIZA party is attempting to maintain a ‘leftist’ profile and demonstrate its capacity to govern through a strategy of image normalisation. These tensions make it very difficult for the Greek government to stick to the EU’s tough reform agenda. The governing coalition is trying to conceal the social effects of implementing structural policy reforms, even postponing some measures to avoid bearing their political cost. At the same time, it is adopting a very rushed, and thus quite worrying, attitude towards a fast-track growth agenda, without taking into consideration the conditions for sustainable economic development.

The strength of the Christian Democrats, the weakness of the opposition. Germany before the parliamentary elections. OSW Commentary No. 114, 12.09.2013

The political campaign before Germany’s parliamentary elections to be held on 22 September has in all its glory reflected the trends visible during the last four years of the government of Chancellor Angela Merkel – the strength of the Christian Democrats, the weakness of the opposition and the increasing marginalisation of the coalition partner, the FDP. The CDU/CSU remains the most popular political choice in Germany, largely because Angela Merkel has consistently remained the most popular German politician. Everything indicates that the CDU/CSU will win the election, even though it has been running a passive campaign and the Chancellor herself has been avoiding confrontation, presenting herself as a kind of cross-party representative of the interests of all social groups. The Christian Democrats’ main competitors, the Social Democrats, have been unable to play to their strengths and present themselves as a serious alternative to the CDU/CSU. The Christian Democrats, despite their difficult cooperation with the liberal FDP, have declared their willingness to continue doing so during the next parliamentary term. If the numbers make that impossible, and the Social Democrats and the Greens have too few votes to be able to form a government, a grand coalition of the Christian Democrats and the SPD will be formed in Germany.

The case of the disappearing Fiscal Compact. CEPS Commentary, 5 November 2014

Following the Commission’s autumn forecast showing that only five euro-area countries exhibit a fiscal balance better than the 0.5% of GDP deficit allowed by the Fiscal Compact, Daniel Gros and Cinzia Alcidi attempt to explain in this new Commentary why there is precious little policy debate over these flagrant treaty violations. They find that it is not possible to put fiscal policy in a legal straightjacket and that the tight rules enshrined in the new Treaty and in national constitutions are discarded as soon as they become politically inconvenient.

Russia goes on the offensive ahead of the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius. OSW Commentary No. 115, 30.09.2013

In recent weeks, Russia has stepped up its efforts to prevent a group of former Soviet republics from tightening their relations with the European Union. The intensification of these efforts comes ahead of the upcoming Eastern Partnership summit, scheduled to take place in Vilnius on 28-29 November. It is expected that during the summit Kiev will sign the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (AA) initialled in March 2012, including an agreement for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). Meanwhile, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia are expected to initial similar documents, effectively accepting their terms and conditions, and paving the way for their official signing in the near future. Moscow has always viewed the relations between the EU and the post-Soviet states as a threat to its own influence in the region. Consequently, any attempts to tighten these relations have been actively opposed by Russia. The EU’s Eastern Partnership programme, launched in 2009, has posed a particular challenge to Moscow’s policies in the region.. Russia responded by rolling out a Eurasian integration project, which began in 2010 with the establishment of the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, and is expected to culminate in the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union by 2015. Moscow’s overarching objective has been to persuade the countries in the region, especially Ukraine, to adopt an unambiguously pro-Russian geopolitical stance and to join the integration project proposed by the Kremlin. The Russian government hopes that this would permanently place these states in Moscow’s sphere of influence and at the same time prevent them from developing closer relations with Brussels. Russia has regularly taken actions aimed at showcasing the benefits of integration with the Customs Union (particularly, by promising preferential pricing of Russian energy resources) and at the same time it has adopted measures highlighting the pitfalls of retaining a pro-European orientation (mainly by imposing occasional trade sanctions). The upcoming summit in Vilnius, during which Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia could lock themselves on to a pro-European course, has spurred Moscow to intensify its efforts to torpedo a successful outcome of the Vilnius meeting, with a view to slowing down or even blocking the possibility of closer cooperation between the EU and the former Soviet republics.

The shape of the banking union confirms Berlin's privileged position in the eurozone. OSW Commentary No. 123, 10.01.2014

On 18 December 2013, EU finance ministers reached agreement on the structure of a banking union. The body will be tasked with oversight of the largest banks across the EU. It will also devise recovery and resolution programmes for institutions at risk of bankruptcy, and it will handle wind-up arrangements and decide on the allocation of resulting costs. The proposals are expected to be approved by March of this year by the governments of the eurozone states, by other EU members interested in joining the banking union, and by the European Parliament. A compromise on the supervision of the largest banks in the eurozone was reached several months ago. The most recent negotiations focused on the second pillar of the banking union: a Single Resolution Mechanism. The parties successfully negotiated a set of procedures for rescuing banks capable of recovery and for the closure of institutions that cannot be rescued. A joint position was also agreed on the allocation of costs resulting from such actions.

The NSA: the impact of the wiretapping scandal on German-American relations. OSW Commentary No. 124, 14.01.2014

Edward Snowden revealed that America’s National Security Agency (NSA) had tapped Chancellor Angela Merkel’s mobile phone and had collected date en masse. This has caused the largest crisis of confidence in relations between Germany and the US since the Iraq war. Due to the technological advantage which American intelligence services have, Germany wishes to continue close co-operation with the US but is making efforts to change the legal basis of this co-operation dating back to Cold War times. Berlin would like to secure part of provisions similar to the Five Eyes alliance – agreements signed between the US, the UK, Canada, New Zealand and Australia in the second half of the 1940s, aimed at intelligence sharing and a ban mutual bugging. This could spell the end of the last (not including the military presence) relic of Germany’s dependence on the US which emerged following World War II and took shape in the shadow of the Cold War. The process of Germany’s emancipation in trans-Atlantic relations, which began after Germany’s reunification, would be complete. The US is however opposed to such far-reaching changes as it is interested in continued co-operation with Germany without limiting it. Were it not to sign agreements satisfactory for Berlin, this would lead to a protracted crisis of confidence in German-American relations.

Crimean Tatars after Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. OSW Commentary No. 141, 30.06.2014

After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Crimean Tatars face the necessity of working out a modus vivendi to cope with the difficult situation which now confronts them. On the one hand, the desire to remain in their homeland, which they regained after exile in Soviet times, is an imperative encouraging them to accept the status quo, while on the other, the fear of Russia and the strong relations of Crimean Tatar elites with Kyiv would favour opposing the present state of affairs. Another fact pointing in favour of an agreement with Moscow is that Kyiv has not attempted to defend Crimea and has not been active in demanding its return to Ukraine, which has undermined Kyiv’s authority in the eyes of the Tatars. Therefore, the leaders of the Mejlis of Crimean Tatars (the national self-government) act carefully, trying to avoid actions which could be seen as provocative and thus liable to incite retribution. It could be expected that this course of action will continue, although it faces ever greater difficulties in the context of the Russian authorities’ adoption of a strongly anti-Tatar policy, which is likely to evoke more radical attitudes among the Crimean Tatars.

An aided economy: the characteristics of the Transnistrian economic model. OSW Commentary No. 108, 2013-05-14

The economy of breakaway Transnistria is a peculiar combination of the command-and-distribution model inherited from the USSR with elements of a free-market economy which is heavily dependent on Russian energy and financial subsidies. The main pillars of the region’s economy are several large industrial plants, built in the Soviet era, which generate more than half of its GDP (in 2012, Transnistria’s GDP reached around US$1 billion). As a consequence, the condition of each of these companies, whose production is almost exclusively export- -oriented, has a huge impact on the economic situation in Transnistria. This makes the region extremely sensitive to any changes in the economic situation of its key trade partners. This problem is additionally aggravated by the extremely low diversification of Transnistrian exports. The only major economic entity in Transnistria which regularly yields profits and is not so heavily dependent on the external situation is Sheriff. This corporation controls the greater part of the local wholesale and retail trade, as well as a major part of the services sector on the domestic market.

An economy with unrealistic indicators: an evaluation of the economic situation in Belarus and a forecast for 2013. OSW Commentary No. 103, 2013-02-20

The macroeconomic results achieved by Belarus in 2012 laid bare the weakness and the inefficiency of its economy. Belarus’s GDP and positive trade balance were growing in the first half of last year. However, this trend was reversed when Russia blocked the scheme of extremely lucrative manipulations in the re-export of Russian petroleum products by Belarus and when the demand for potassium fertilisers fell on the global market. It became clear once again that the outdated Belarusian model of a centrally planned economy is unable to generate sustainable growth, and the Belarusian economy needs thorough structural reforms. Nevertheless, President Alyaksandr Lukashenka consistently continues to block any changes in the system and at the same time expects that the economic indicators this year will reach levels far beyond the possibilities of the Belarusian economy. Therefore, there is a risk that the Belarusian government may employ – as they used to do – instruments aimed at artificially stimulating domestic demand, including money creation. This may upset the relative stability of state finances, which the regime managed to achieve last year. The worst case scenario would see a repeat of what happened in 2011, when a serious financial crisis occurred, forcing Minsk to make concessions (including selling the national network of gas pipelines) to Moscow, its only real source of loans. It thus cannot be ruled out that also this time the only way to recover from the slump will be to receive additional loan support and energy subsidies from Russia at the expense of selling further strategic companies to Russian investors.

The Berlin Republic and the real end of the post-war era. OSW Commentary No. 67, 2011-12-07

In the post-war era, Germany has undergone a deep change almost like clockwork every two decades. In 1949, the foundations were laid for the establishment of the two German states: the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic; 1968–1969 was the time of the student revolt as a harbinger of the democratisation and liberalisation of society; and in 1989–1990, the process of unification took place, with all its consequences. Two decades later, another deep revision of the values is happening, as a consequence of which Germany is bidding a final farewell to the post-war epoch and its inherent certainties: its advancing society, the homogeneous national state and the faith in Europe as a solution to the ‘German question.’ This revision will not be revolutionary. However, as with the previous turning points, Germany is becoming a different state and a different society, which Europe will have to build its relations with anew.

Towards a professional army. Changes to the structure of the officer cadre and the manning system of the Russian armed forces. OSW Commentary No. 73, 2012-03-28

The structure of the Russian army’s personnel has undergone a major transformation in recent years. The Armed Forces are no longer a downsized continuation of the Soviet-era mass army, but are gradually becoming a de facto professional army in which conscription, now employed on a diminishing scale, will primarily constitute a first step towards a continued professional military career. The cornerstone for the process of professionalisation has been laid by a personnel reform which cut the number of officer posts by nearly half and considerably restricted the recruitment of new officers, thus restoring traditional proportions to the structure of the officer corps. The plans to ultimately implement a manning system based predominantly on contract service are a natural consequence of these changes. The ongoing professionalisation of the Russian Armed Forces should be treated as a conscious effort which is mainly necessitated by global trends: despite the demographic changes taking place, Russia could still maintain an army with a declared strength of one million soldiers, most of them conscripts.