971 resultados para 2D Electoral Paradoxes
Resumo:
Aquest paper tracta dels resultats del referèndum sobre la Constitució Europea que es va celebrar a Espanya el 20 de febrer de 2005. Hi trobem un panorama general del context en el qual se celebrà la consulta, i, a través de l’anàlisi d’enquestes postelectorals, analitza la composició del vot afirmatiu i del negatiu, la posició dels diferents partits polítics i el comportament electoral dels diversos actors socials, dividits per classe social, religió, edat, gènere, territori, etc. També hi ha una anàlisi de l’abstenció i de la participació a Espanya en aquest cas.
Resumo:
When two candidates of different quality compete in a one dimensional policy space, the equilibrium outcomes are asymmetric and do not correspond to the median. There are three main effects. First, the better candidate adopts more centrist policies than the worse candidate. Second, the equilibrium is statistical, in the sense that it predicts a probability distribution of outcomes rather than a single degenerate outcome. Third, the equilibrium varies systematically with the level of uncertainty about the location of the median voter. We test these three predictions using laboratory experiments, and find strong support for all three. We also observe some biases and show that they canbe explained by quantal response equilibrium.
Resumo:
L’objectiu d’aquestes pàgines és descriure el desenvolupament del sistema electoral a Austràlia des de la perspectiva que comporta tant la seva complexitat com flexibilitat. Una complexitat a què s’ha acostumat el ciutadà australià fruit de la naturalesa federal del país. En comptes que les modificacions en les regles del joc democràtic facin perillar la credibilitat del poder polític, Austràlia sempre ha conservat una ferma evolució política a partir dels eixos de buscar la millor representació ciutadana. Aquesta diversitat i sofisticació constant no han portat a la ciutadania a una desinhibició de les regles democràtiques, sinó que s’ha combinat amb una participació electoral obligada dels ciutadans que els implica directament amb el seu sistema polític.
Resumo:
L’autor constata la presència de clivelles europeus conseqüència d’apostes que només la Unió Europea pot tractar ja que s’escapen de l’acció dels governs europeus. De les dos clivelles descobertes per Hix i Lord en el Parlament europeu, la que oposa els partidaris de la "Europa liberal" amb els de l’"Europa social" és avui determinant per dues raons, doctrinal la primera i empírica la segona, que l’autor desenvolupa en aquest treball.
Resumo:
Aquest projecte presenta la implementació d'un disseny, i la seva posterior síntesi en una FPGA, d'una arquitectura de tipus wormhole packet switching per a una infraestructura de NetWork-On-Chip amb una topologia 2D-Mesh. Agafant un router circuit switching com a punt de partida, s'han especificat els mòduls en Verilog per tal d'obtenir l'arquitectura wormhole desitjada. Dissenyar la màquina de control per governar els flits que conformen els paquets dins la NoC,i afegir les cues a la sortida del router (outuput queuing) són els punts principals d'aquest treball. A més, com a punt final s'han comparat ambdues arquitectures de router en termes de costos en àrea i en memòria i se n’han obtingut diverses conclusions i resultats experimentals.
Resumo:
Aquest projecte presenta una avaluació de les diferents alternatives d'encaminament per a una NoC amb una topologia mesh 2D. Per tal d'exposar aquestes alternatives s'ha estudiat la composició d'un router implementat amb l'algorisme determinista XY i s'ha adaptat per tal que aquest suportés els algorismes parcialment adaptatius West First, North Last i Negative First. Un cop tenim els routers implementats es disposa un estudi dels diferents algorismes i com cadascun d'aquests actuen en front uns mateixos estímuls per tal de crear una comparativa entre ells que ens faciliti una elecció a priori.
Resumo:
Recent attempts to incorporate optimal fiscal policy into New Keynesian models subject to nominal inertia, have tended to assume that policy makers are benevolent and have access to a commitment technology. A separate literature, on the New Political Economy, has focused on real economies where there is strategic use of policy instruments in a world of political conflict. In this paper we combine these literatures and assume that policy is set in a New Keynesian economy by one of two policy makers facing electoral uncertainty (in terms of infrequent elections and an endogenous voting mechanism). The policy makers generally share the social welfare function, but differ in their preferences over fiscal expenditure (in its size and/or composition). Given the environment, policy shall be realistically constrained to be time-consistent. In a sticky-price economy, such heterogeneity gives rise to the possibility of one policy maker utilising (nominal) debt strategically to tie the hands of the other party, and influence the outcome of any future elections. This can give rise to a deficit bias, implying a sub-optimally high level of steady-state debt, and can also imply a sub-optimal response to shocks. The steady-state distortions and inflation bias this generates, combined with the volatility induced by the electoral cycle in a sticky-price environment, can significantly
Resumo:
There has been much debate regarding the electoral strategy adopted by New Labour in the lead-up to and then during their time in government. This paper addresses the issue from the perspective of left/right and libertarian/authoritarian considerations by examining data on individual attitudes from the British Social Attitudes survey between 1986 and 2009. The analysis indicates that New Labour’s move towards the right on economic and public policy was the main driver towards attracting new centrist voters and could thus be labelled ‘broadly’ populist. The move towards a tougher stance on law and order was more ‘narrowly’ populist in that it was used more to minimise the reduction in support from Labour’s traditional base on the left than to attract new votes.
Resumo:
The 3x1 Program for Migrants is a matching grant scheme that seeks to direct the money sent by migrant organizations abroad to the provision of public and social infrastructure, and to productive projects in migrants’ communities of origin. To do so, the municipal, state, and federal administrations match the amount sent by hometown associations by 3 to 1. This opens the door to the political manipulation of the program. We explore the impact of a particular facet of Mexican political life on the operation of the 3x1: its recent democratization and the increasing political competition at the municipal level. Relying on the literature on redistributive politics, we posit that an increasing number of effective parties in elections may have two different effects. On the one hand, the need to cater to more heterogeneous constituencies may increase the provision of public projects. On the other hand, since smaller coalitions are needed to win elections under tighter competition, fewer public and more private (clientelistic) projects could be awarded. Using a unique dataset on the 3x1 Program for Migrants for over 2,400 municipalities in the period 2002 through 2007, we find a lower provision of public goods in electorally competitive jurisdictions. Thus, we remain sceptical about the program success in promoting public goods in politically competitive locations with high migration levels.
Resumo:
To study the adaptation of natural killer (NK) cells to their major histocompatibility complex (MHC) class I environment we have established a novel mouse model with mosaic expression of H-2D(d) using a Cre/loxP system. In these mice, we noticed that NK cells expressing the inhibitory receptor for D(d), Ly49A, were specifically underrepresented among cells with low D(d) levels. That was due to the acquisition of D(d) molecules by the Ly49A+ NK cells that have lost their D(d) transgene. The uptake of H-2D molecules via the Ly49A receptor was restricted to strong ligands of Ly49A. Surprisingly, when Ly49A+ NK cells were D(d+), uptake of the alternative ligand D(k) was not detectable. Similarly, one anti-Ly49A mAb (A1) bound inefficiently when Ly49A was expressed on D(d+) NK cells. Concomitantly, functional assays demonstrated a reduced capacity of Ly49A to inhibit H-2(b)D(d) as compared with H-2(b) NK cells, rendering Ly49A+ NK cells in D(d+) mice particularly reactive. Minor reductions of D(d) levels and/or increases of activating ligands on environmental cells may thus suffice to abrogate Ly49A-mediated NK cell inhibition. The mechanistic explanation for all these phenomena is likely the partial masking of Ly49A by D(d) on the same cell via a lateral binding site in the H-2D(d) molecule.