413 resultados para 220309 Metaphysics


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Mode of access: Internet.

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Mode of access: Internet.

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Editors: Oct. 1897-Oct. 1899, J.E. McLean.--Nov. 1899-Apr. 1906, C.B. Patterson (with J.E. McLean, Nov. 1900-May 1903; J.M. Scott, Sept. 1904-June 1905)

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Outline of sematology. 1831.--Sequel to sematology. 1837.--An appendix, now first published.

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Includes bibliographical references.

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Tr. of: Grundzuge der metaphysik.

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Imprint varies: v. 2-3, London, Printed for T. Cadell [etc.]--v.4-6, Edinburgh, Printed for Bell & Bradfute [etc.]

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Mode of access: Internet.

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Half-title: Vetera et nova; or, Extracts from the diary of a medical practitioner.

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Tr. of: Discours de metaphysique.

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One of the curious things about this challenging book is that its ostensible subject— the Saxon medical and political scientist Hermann Conring (1606–1681)— is not mentioned in the title. Constantin Fasolt argues that we cannot know what Conring really thought or meant in his writings, which means that his topic cannot be Conring as such and must instead be that which occludes our knowledge of him, the titular limits of history. Given that we do in fact learn a good deal about Conring from Fasolt’s book, we can only hope that the decapitation of its subject will be rectified in a subsequent edition, or perhaps by the restorative work of librarians putting together subject headings. And yet Fasolt’s decision is understandable, for Conring is indeed a stalking-horse for a much bigger quarry: historiography and the historical consciousness. By “history” Fasolt understands a way of imposing intelligibility on the world, which is founded on the twin assumptions that the past is gone and unchangeable, and that the meaning of texts can be determined by placing them in their historical contexts (ix). In challenging this mode of intelligibility, Fasolt is not attempting to improve professiona history—it’s already as good as it can be—but to displace it. He regards his work as a declaration of “independence from historical consciousness” (32). At the same time, Fasolt insists that he is not simply jumping from historiography to philosophy, or attempting to preempt history with ontology (37-39). That has been tried by Nietzsche and Heidegger, who have been tainted by Nazism (Fasolt thinks unfairly). It has also been attempted by modern philosophers from Gadamer to Foucault and Charles Taylor who, in failing to address the “violence” that its mode of intelligibility does to the world, have not succeeded in outflanking history. Perhaps, Fasolt wonders, it is only the personal experience of those who have been subject to this violence—the experience of those who have been subject to historical examination—that can break the spell of history. Fasolt’s disclaimer notwithstanding, in the course of these remarks I shall argue that he is indeed jumping from history to philosophy, or attempting to outflank history by subjecting it to a particular metaphysical understanding. I shall do so in part by sketching the recent intellectual history of this move—a historical examination that I hope inflicts as little violence as possible on Fasolt’s argument.