Rich and famous: recognition-based judgment in the Sunday Times rich list

Recognition as a cue to judgment in a novel, multi-option domain (the Sunday Times Rich List) is explored. As in previous studies, participants were found to make use of name recognition as a cue to the presumed wealth of individuals. Names that were recognized were judged to be the richest name from amongst the set presented at above chance levels. This effect persisted across situations in which more than one name was recognized; recognition was used as an inclusion criterion for the sub-set of names to be considered the richest of the set presented. However, when the question was reversed, and a “poorest” judgment was required, use of recognition as an exclusion criterion was observed only when a single name was recognized. Reaction times when making these judgments also show a distinction between “richest” and “poorest” questions with recognition of none of the options taking the longest time to judge in the “richest” question condition and full recognition of all the names presented taking longest to judge in the “poorest” question condition. Implications for decision-making using simple heuristics are discussed.

Deciding the price of fame

Previous studies of ignorance-driven decision-making have either analyzed when ignorance should prove advantageous on theoretical grounds, or else they have examined whether human behavior is consistent with an ignorance driven inference strategy (e.g., the recognition heuristic). The current study merges these research goals by examining whether – under conditions where ignorance driven inference might be expected – the type of advantages theoretical analyses predict are evident in human performance data. A single experiment shows that, when asked to make relative wealth judgments, participants reliably use recognition as a basis for their judgments. Their wealth judgments under these conditions are reliably more accurate when some of the target names are unknown than when participants recognize all the names (the “less-is-more effect”). these data are robust against a number of variations on the size of the pool from which participants have to choose and the nature of the wealth judgment.

Phonological similarity effects without a phonological store: an individual differences model

The feature model of immediate memory (Nairne, 1990) is applied to an experiment testing individual differences in phonological confusions amongst a group (N=100) of participants performing a verbal memory test. By simulating the performance of an equivalent number of “pseudo-participants” the model fits both the mean performance and the variability within the group. Experimental data show that high-performing individuals are significantly more likely to demonstrate phonological confusions than low performance individuals and this is also true of the model, despite the model’s lack of either an explicit phonological store or a performance-linked strategy shift away from phonological storage. It is concluded that a dedicated phonological store is not necessary to explain the basic phonological confusion effect, and the reduction in such an effect can also be explained without requiring a change in encoding or rehearsal strategy or the deployment of a different storage buffer.

When does ignorance make us smart? Additional factors guiding heuristic inference

“Fast & frugal” heuristics represent an appealing way of implementing bounded rationality and decision-making under pressure. The recognition heuristic is the simplest and most fundamental of these heuristics. Simulation and experimental studies have shown that this ignorance-driven heuristic inference can prove superior to knowledge based inference (Borges, Goldstein, Ortman & Gigerenzer, 1999; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002) and have shown how the heuristic could develop from ACT-R’s forgetting function (Schooler & Hertwig, 2005). Mathematical analyses also demonstrate that, under certain conditions, a “less-is-more effect” will always occur (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). The further analyses presented in this paper show, however, that these conditions may constitute a special case and that the less-is-more effect in decision-making is subject to the moderating influence of the number of options to be considered and the framing of the question.

Less-is-more effects in knowledge-based heuristic inference

Inference on the basis of recognition alone is assumed to occur prior to accessing further information (Pachur & Hertwig, 2006). A counterintuitive result of this is the “less-is-more” effect: a drop in the accuracy with which choices are made as to which of two or more items scores highest on a given criterion as more items are learned (Frosch, Beaman & McCloy, 2007; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). In this paper, we show that less-is-more effects are not unique to recognition-based inference but can also be observed with a knowledge-based strategy provided two assumptions, limited information and differential access, are met. The LINDA model which embodies these assumptions is presented. Analysis of the less-is-more effects predicted by LINDA and by recognition-driven inference shows that these occur for similar reasons and casts doubt upon the “special” nature of recognition-based inference. Suggestions are made for empirical tests to compare knowledge-based and recognition-based less-is-more effects

Lexical access across languages: a multinomial model of auditory distraction

Recall in many types of verbal memory task is reliably disrupted by the presence of auditory distracters, with verbal distracters frequently proving the most disruptive (Beaman, 2005). A multinomial processing tree model (Schweickert, 1993) is applied to the effects on free recall of background speech from a known or an unknown language. The model reproduces the free recall curve and the impact on memory of verbal distracters for which a lexical entry exists (i.e., verbal items from a known language). The effects of semantic relatedness of distracters within a language is found to depend upon a redintegrative factor thought to reflect the contribution of the speech-production system. The differential impacts of known and unknown languages cannot be accounted for in this way, but the same effects of distraction are observed amongst bilinguals, regardless of distracter-language.

Emotion and anticipation in an enactive framework for cognition (response to Andy Clark)

Undeniably, anticipation plays a crucial role in cognition. By what means, to what extent, and what it achieves remain open questions. In a recent BBS target article, Clark (in press) depicts an integrative model of the brain that builds on hierarchical Bayesian models of neural processing (Rao and Ballard, 1999; Friston, 2005; Brown et al., 2011), and their most recent formulation using the free-energy principle borrowed from thermodynamics (Feldman and Friston, 2010; Friston, 2010; Friston et al., 2010). Hierarchical generative models of cognition, such as those described by Clark, presuppose the manipulation of representations and internal models of the world, in as much detail as is perceptually available. Perhaps surprisingly, Clark acknowledges the existence of a “virtual version of the sensory data” (p. 4), but with no reference to some of the historical debates that shaped cognitive science, related to the storage, manipulation, and retrieval of representations in a cognitive system (Shanahan, 1997), or accounting for the emergence of intentionality within such a system (Searle, 1980; Preston and Bishop, 2002). Instead of demonstrating how this Bayesian framework responds to these foundational questions, Clark describes the structure and the functional properties of an action-oriented, multi-level system that is meant to combine perception, learning, and experience (Niedenthal, 2007).

Does grammatical aspect affect motion event cognition? A cross-linguistic comparison of English and Swedish speakers

In this article, we explore whether cross-linguistic differences in grammatical aspect encoding may give rise to differences in memory and cognition. We compared native speakers of two languages that encode aspect differently (English and Swedish) in four tasks that examined verbal descriptions of stimuli, online triads matching, and memory-based triads matching with and without verbal interference. Results showed between-group differences in verbal descriptions and in memory-based triads matching. However, no differences were found in online triads matching and in memory-based triads matching with verbal interference. These findings need to be interpreted in the context of the overall pattern of performance, which indicated that both groups based their similarity judgments on common perceptual characteristics of motion events. These results show for the first time a cross-linguistic difference in memory as a function of differences in grammatical aspect encoding, but they also contribute to the emerging view that language fine tunes rather than shapes perceptual processes that are likely to be universal and unchanging.

Zombie mouse in a Chinese Room

John Searle’s Chinese Room Argument (CRA) purports to demonstrate that syntax is not sufficient for semantics, and, hence, because computation cannot yield understanding, the computational theory of mind, which equates the mind to an information processing system based on formal computations, fails. In this paper, we use the CRA, and the debate that emerged from it, to develop a philosophical critique of recent advances in robotics and neuroscience. We describe results from a body of work that contributes to blurring the divide between biological and artificial systems; so-called animats, autonomous robots that are controlled by biological neural tissue and what may be described as remote-controlled rodents, living animals endowed with augmented abilities provided by external controllers. We argue that, even though at first sight, these chimeric systems may seem to escape the CRA, on closer analysis, they do not. We conclude by discussing the role of the body–brain dynamics in the processes that give rise to genuine understanding of the world, in line with recent proposals from enactive cognitive science.