991 resultados para union power
Resumo:
We lay out a model of wage bargaining with two leading features:bargaining is ex post to relevant investments and there isindividual bargaining in firms without a Union. We compareindividual ex post bargaining to coordinated ex post bargainingand we analyze the effects on wage formation. As opposed to exante bargaining models, the costs of destroying the employmentrelationship play a crucial role in determining wages. Highfiring costs in particular yield a rent for employees. Ourtheory points to a employer size-wage effect that is independentof the production function and market power. We derive a simpleleast squares specification from the theoretical model thatallow us to estimate components of the wage premium fromcoordination. We reject the hypothesis that labor coordinationdoes not alter the extensive form of the bargaining game. Laborcoordination substantially increases bargaining power butdecreases labor's ability to pose costly threats to the firm.
Resumo:
Using an ethnographic analysis of the social interfaces between state agents and Cape Verdean students in Portugal, observed through participant observation in medical appointments, social work, immigration services and legal support to immigrants, this article aims to examine disciplinary state practices and the negotiations and power struggles that take place. The ethnographic cases discussed demonstrate how the idea of a fair and neutral state is simultaneously reproduced and denied in practice, thus elucidating the state as a symbol of union of an effective disunity. The ethnographic examples also indicate other dimensions of state practice, besides micro-disciplinary powers, which create room for flexibility and adaptation. And it is in this sense that ethnographies of interfaces between state and citizen offer a more relative perspective of excessively systematic interpretations of governmentality, illustrating how the effects of contradictory state practices are as unpredictable as human action itself.
Resumo:
We study the link between corruption and economic integration. We show that if an economic union establishes a common regulation for public procurement, the country more prone to corruption benefits more from integration. However, if the propensities to corruption are too distinct, the less corrupt country will not be willing to join the union. This difference in corruption propensities can be offset by a difference in efficiency. We also show that corruption is lower if integration occurs. A panel data analysis for the European Union confirms that more corrupt countries are more favorable towards integration but less acceptable as potential new members.
Resumo:
We present a novel approach to N-person bargaining, based on the idea thatthe agreement reached in a negotiation is determined by how the directconflict resulting from disagreement would be resolved. Our basic buildingblock is the disagreement function, which maps each set of feasible outcomesinto a disagreement point. Using this function and a weak axiom basedon individual rationality we reach a unique solution: the agreement inthe shadow of conflict, ASC. This agreement may be construed as the limitof a sequence of partial agreements, each of which is reached as a functionof the parties relative power. We examine the connection between ASC andasymmetric Nash solutions. We show the connection between the power ofthe parties embodied in the ASC solution and the bias in the SWF thatwould select ASC as an asymmetric Nash solution.
Resumo:
Speech by Governor Culver.
Resumo:
In this paper we study the evolution of the labor share in the OECD since 1970. We show it is essentially related to the capital-output ratio; that this relationship is shifted by factors like the price of imported materials or the skill mix; and that discrepancies between the marginal product of labor and the real wage (due to, e.g., product market power, union bargaining, and labor adjustment costs) cause departures from it. We provide estimates of the model with panel data on 14 industries and 14 countries for 1973-93 and use them to compute the evolution of the wage gap in Germany and the US.
Resumo:
One aspect of person-job fit reflects congruence between personal preferences and job design; as congruence increases so should satisfaction. We hypothesized that power distance would moderate whether fit is related to satisfaction with degree of job formalization. We obtained measures of job-formalization, fit and satisfaction, as well as organizational commitment from employees (n = 772) in a multinational firm with subsidiaries in six countries. Confirming previous findings, individuals from low power-distance cultures were most satisfied with increasing fit. However, the extent to which individuals from high power-distance cultures were satisfied did not necessarily depend on increasing fit, but mostly on whether the degree of formalization received was congruent to cultural norms. Irrespective of culture, satisfaction with formalization predicted a broad measure of organizational commitment. Apart from our novel extension of fit theory, we show how moderation can be tested in the context of polynomial response surface regression and how specific hypotheses can be tested regarding different points on the response surface.
Resumo:
Report of the Memorial Union Revenue Bond Funds of Iowa State University of Science and Technology as of and for the year ended June 30, 2008
Resumo:
Agency Performance Plan, Department of Commerce - Credit Union Division
Resumo:
This report outlines the strategic plan for Credit Union Division including, goals and mission.