Preventing another Euro Area Crisis: EU Economic Governance ‘Six Pack’ – a case of too little, too late? Paper from the Colloquium: The Politics and Economics of the Euro Crisis, Institute for European Studies, University of Malta, 2 December 2011

Summary: The ‘Six Pack’ forms part of the economic governance reforms which are being implemented in order to prevent a repeat of the current sovereign debt crisis in the Euro Area. This legislative package involves strengthening the Stability and Growth Pact, with stronger financial sanctions and more focus on debt; a new directive on national budgetary frameworks and a new framework to monitor and correct macroeconomic imbalances. Furthermore, the implementation of the ‘Six Pack’ also involves procedural reforms, in particular reverse majority voting, as well as more oversight by the European Parliament. Inter-institutional negotiations on the ‘Six Pack’ took over a year. In the meantime, the sovereign debt crisis had deepened and broadened, implying that the ‘Six Pack’ may have come ‘too late’. The ‘Six Pack’ has also proved to be ‘too little’ to address the crisis and by the time it entered into force, further measures and proposals to strengthen economic governance had to be made. Nevertheless, the ‘Six Pack’ comprises some positive developments. In particular, recognising that fiscal policy is a matter of national sovereignty, it sets a new approach which relies on institutional reforms at national level. As such, it constitutes a first, small step to improve economic governance in the Euro Area.

Identity Construction in Europe: A Discursive Approach. IES WORKING PAPER 2/2010

Proposing a discursive approach to studying identity, this paper presents Positioning Theory as a theoretical framework for conceptualizing the construction of identity in discourse. The Positioning Diamond is employed to analyse the discourse surrounding the Danish Euro referendum. The analysis reveals how identities are constructed in discourse that promotes a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote in the referendum, highlighting the generally implicit allocation of rights and duties to actors within a specific narrative context. The penultimate section discusses appropriate criteria for evaluating discursive accounts, distinguishing between cases in which truth, normative and ethical criteria are applicable. Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion of policy considerations and recommendations.

Law and Foreign Direct Investment. IES WORKING PAPER 4/2011

In this paper we examine the effect of law on foreign direct investment outflows with a specific interest in the relationship between international investment law and domestic private property laws. Our results indicate that FDI investor is indifferent to host country property rights, hence shareholder protection by law is not a significant determinant of FDI outflows. We argue that FDI, in contrast with other types of capital flows, can effectively mitigate the agency problem through majority ownership and control, hence reduce exposure to ex-post expropriation by the affiliate. On the other hand, FDI investor remains exposed to risk of expropriation by the host government and is strongly sensitive to the enforcement of law in the host country. In contrast with recent literature we conclude that there are no causal relationship between bilateral investment treaties and FDI.

Communication and Campaigning in European Citizens‘ Initiatives. ZEI Discussion Paper 224, 2014

One million signatures from at least seven European Member States: Fulfilling the conditions of the European Citizens’ Initiative requires a communication campaign, which manages to reach and touch the citizens, as well as to encourage them to act. This empirical study analyses, which methods in this regard are successful or rather counterproductive. It comes to the conclusion that a variety of factors are decisive, and that these factors can differ in their manifestation – such as the availability of financial resources, the emotional potential of the issue or a sophisticated network of supporters.

Infospective on the European Elections and the European Parliament. EU Centre Singapore Background Brief No. 12, May 2014

With the 2014 European Elections just round the corner, the EU Centre has published an infospective (Background Brief 12) by Devi Shree Malarvanan and Dexter Lee (EU Centre in Singapore) entitled “Infospective on the European Elections and the European Parliament” This infospective covers the history of the European Parliament, highlighting the legislative powers that Parliament has since the 1960s. It also covers the issues and results of the previous 7 European elections, and will feature a sneak peak of the upcoming 2014 European Elections which will be held later in May.

Politicising the Union? The Influence of ‘Leading Candidates’ for the Commission Presidency. Bruges Political Research Paper No. 36, October 2014

‘Leading candidates’ competed for the European Commission Presidency in the campaign for the European elections in May 2014. This element of political contestation poses a challenge to the Union’s institutional design. This article investigates to what extent competing ‘leading candidates’ enhances the process of deliberation and party contestation and thus strengthen the role of European Parliament (EP) party groups. In light of the example of the ‘Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats’ and its ‘leading candidate’, Martin Schulz, it is shown that the election campaign did strive to be EU-wide. However, Schulz’s influence on internal party cohesion and coalition formation remained limited. Therefore the influence of an elected ‘leading candidate’ is regarded as a symbolic act, which could deepen the relationship between the EP and the Commission as well as strengthen the democratic and political standing of both institutions vis-à-vis the European Council.

Eurodéputé: «Seconde chance» ou «Tremplin» – Comparaisons des trajectoires politiques de candidats PSE et PPE aux élections européennes de 2014 en France et en Suède. = MEP: "Second Chance" or "Jump" - comparisons of PSE candidates and political trajectories EPP in European elections 2014 in France and Sweden. Bruges Political Research Paper No. 40, February 2015

Le mandat d’eurodéputé est conçu différemment dans chaque état membre. Cet article teste la validité des cultures politiques inclusive et exclusive, créées pour l’analyse des sélections des candidats français et suédois et leur conception du mandat européen. Leur sélection demeure un monopole partisan national où l’adhésion à un parti et la professionnalisation politique priment. La distinction apparait dans le degré d’ouverture de la sélection et la conception de la fonction d’eurodéputé et du Parlement européen. Les conclusions valident l’approche créée, montrant un déplacement du curseur le long des continuums formés par les cultures inclusive et exclusive. La France, «exclusive», reste centrée sur Paris et des élections ayant des conséquences sur le pouvoir exécutif. La Suède est plus inclusive tant dans les profils des candidats que dans les processus qui les intègrent aux listes et dans la façon de concevoir le rôle des MEP et du Parlement européen. Cet article se fonde sur un mémoire de Master: E. Cazenave, Eurodéputé: «Seconde chance» ou «Tremplin»? Comparaison des trajectoires politiques de candidats PPE et PSE aux élections européennes de 2014 en France et en Suède, Bruges, Collège d’Europe, 2014

An election too far ? Four scenarios for Greece after the elections. European Policy Brief No. 9, June 2012

The results of the Greek elections on 17 June are of crucial importance for both the country itself and the eurozone. This Policy Brief outlines the possible post-election scenarios. It argues that an intelligent modification of the current adjustment programme is the best course of action. Other policy choices would likely have a worse outcome, as they would either underestimate the resentment of the current programme among Greeks or risk leading to the

The European Parliament: it has to do with you. European Policy Brief No. 25, March 2014

In the City, the citizen is king. At least theoretically. In the European City currently being built around twenty eight national democracies, the citizen will soon be called upon, in May, to democratically elect his or her representative in the European Parliament for the next five years. Since the very first election of Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage in 1979, spectacular progress has been made by the “European Economic Community” that we now all know as the European Union. And the powers vested in citizen representatives are equally impressive. But there is a real possibility that European citizens will turn their backs on the upcoming European elections like never before. Why?

Twenty-eight national elections for a Parliament in constant evolution. European Policy Brief No. 26, March 2014

In the City, the citizen is king. At least theoretically. In the European City currently being built around twenty-eight national democracies, the citizen will soon be called upon, in May, to democratically elect his or her representative in the European Parliament for the next five years. Since the very first election of Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage in 1979, spectacular progress has been made by the “European Economic Community” that we now all know as the European Union. And the powers vested in citizen representatives are equally impressive. But there is a real possibility that European citizens will turn their backs on the upcoming European elections like never before. Why?

European elections: from ‘second-order’ elections to ‘first-order supranational’ elections, How can a ‘first-order supranational’ European election be created? European Policy Brief No. 34, April 2014

Starting from the idea that European elections cannot be considered as purely second order elections, the author gathers some proposals in order to encourage a more effective electoral process. According to the author, if political leaders adopt these reforms, it could transform gradually the European elections into genuine ‘first-order supranational elections’.

European Union Leadership and Enlargement in 2014. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 14, July 2014

On July 15, 2014 the European Parliament confirmed the new European Commission President. An absolute majority was needed for this purpose, and the 422 votes “For” cleared the 376-vote threshold in the legislative body of 751 members. A Grand Coalition has been formed among the three largest political parties: the European People’s Party (EPP), the Progressive Alliances of Socialists Democrats (S&D), and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE). Considering policy decisions going forward, the European Union (EU) faces the pressing question: Will there be more, less, or similar power from the EU? There are a greater number voices from across the political spectrum contributing to the democratic plurality. European leaders may regain trust by acknowledging that future governance will not be “business as usual” as the reform agenda gets underway. 2014 has been an exciting and important year in European politics. “This time is different” was the motto for the European Parliament’s election campaign. This essay analyzes recent EU political trends with the new Commission leadership and the Parliamentary elections results. The Parliamentary elections, held in late May, and the new European Commission, planned to be in place in the autumn, influence the leadership direction of the 28-member bloc. Additionally, this year on July 1 Croatia celebrated the first anniversary of joining the EU in 2013. Leading the way for candidate countries, Croatia embraces the democratic politics and capitalist market economics embodied by the EU. The greater number of seats held by newer political parties in the European Parliament demonstrates increasing plurality in the EU democracy. The Parliamentary elections have taken place every 5 years since 1979. In this eighth legislative session, the EPP and the S&D remain the largest parties represented, with 221 and 191 seats respectively. As the EU has evolved, a greater number of voices influence politics. The ongoing point of contention on a host of policies is national sovereignty in relation to pooled sovereignty in the EU. The European Parliament is important for democracy in EU governance since it is the direct link from the national citizens to their elected leaders at the supranational level. The representatives of the European Commission are appointed by the national governments of Member States, and their heads of government are the representatives to the European Council. These three political institutions – the European Parliament, the European Commission, and the European Council – together with other important institutions, including the European Court of Justice Luxembourg, form the EU. The new European Commission President is Jean-Claude Juncker, former Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Luxembourg (1995-2013). After being nominated by the European Council on June 27, his candidacy was voted on by the European Parliament on July 15, according to the guidelines of the Lisbon Treaty. The leadership for the President of the European Commission has been an important issue, considering Britain’s deliberations on whether or not to stay in the EU in the face of a future national referendum. Voting on June 27, among the European Council on the nomination of Commission President-Designate Juncker, was 26 in favor and 2 opposed. Only Viktor Orbán, the prime minister of Hungary, joined David Cameron, the prime minister of the United Kingdom (UK), with a negative vote (Spiegel and Parker 2014). The UK had not been supportive, being concerned that Juncker embraces the policies of a federalist, prioritizing an ever-closer union above the interests of individual Member States. Historically, since joining the predecessor institution of the European Economic Community in 1973, the UK has had a relatively independent attitude about participation in the EU.

The New European Commission Presidency and the Advent of European Democracy. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 17, August 2014

On June 15, 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker, the lead candidate of the European People’s Party, was elected President of the European Commission, with the support of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, and some of the European Socialists and Greens. Amid unprecedented Euroscepticism, the media and many pundits predicted a record-low voter turnout and record-high results for Europhobic parties. The aforementioned parties then decided that the political outcome of these 2014 European elections would also be unprecedented. For the first time in EU history, the European political parties agreed to nominate candidates to chair the institution, which they justified by putting forward Article 17 of the Lisbon Treaty. The European Parliament has often characteristically used political discourse - the logos, to influence the EU’s institutional framework, even though it entails grappling with Member States. It took the form of reports and resolutions, like the official use of the phrase “European Parliament” in 1962, direct universal suffrage elections in 1975 and a European Union in 1984. Nominating contenders to chair the European Commission is no exception. It requires a specific political discourse whose origins can be traced back to the early years of the European Parliament, when it was still the “Common Assembly”. This political discourse is one of the elements thanks to which the European Parliament acquired visibility and new prerogatives, in pursuit of its legitimacy. However, the executive branch in all member states is not intent on yielding such prerogatives to the European Parliament. As a matter of fact, the European Parliament has often ended up strengthening the heads of state and governments, since MEPs are forced to resort to self-discipline. The symbolic significance of its logos and, consequently, its own politicisation as a source of legitimacy, is thus undermined. For instance, in 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker’s election actually strengthened German Chancellor Angela Merkel. First she questioned the fact that the candidate whose party holds the parliamentary majority after the election should be appointed President of the Commission. Then she seemed strongly intent on democratising the Union, when she confronted David Cameron, who openly opposed Juncker, believed to be too federalist and old-fashioned a candidate. By doing so, she eventually reduced the symbolic dimension of the European Parliament’s initiative, and Juncker’s election. She also unquestionably embodied EU leadership. This paper aims at analysing Juncker’s election to the Presidency of the European Commission, as well as other questions it raises. In the first part, I lay out some thoughts about the sociohistorical context of voting in European elections in order to make the readers understand why the European Parliament should be bolder. Secondly, I try to explain how the European Parliament has used the logos as a weapon to grapple with member states for more power, as was the case during the 2014 European elections. Last but not least, I seek to show how Angela Merkel got hold of that weapon and took advantage of it, thus proving that despite MEPs’ best efforts, Juncker’s task will be all the more complicated as he was not the consensual candidate of all the governments.

Divided but United: European Trade Policy & EC-U.S. Agricultural Negotiations in the Uruguay Round. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 07.3, 1996

How has the integration of trade policy and negotiating authority in Europe affected the external bargaining capabilities of the European Community (EC)? This paper analyzes the bargaining constraints and opportunities for the EC created by the obligation to negotiate as a single entity. The nature of demands in external~ the voting rules at the EC level, and the amount of autonomy exercised by EC negotiators contribute to explaining, this paper argues, whether the EC gains some external bargaining clout from its internal divisions and whether the final international agreement reflects the position of the median or the extreme countries in the Community. The Uruguay Round agricultural negotiations illustrate the consequences of the EC's institutional structure on its external bargaining capabilities. Negotiations between the EC and the U.S. were deadlocked for six years because the wide gap among the positions of the member states at the start of the Uruguay Round had prevented the EC from making sufficient concessions. The combination of a weakened unanimity rule and greater autonomy seized by Commission negotiators after the May 1992 reform of the Common Agricultural Policy made possible the conclusion of an EC-U.S. agricultural agreement. Although the majority of member states supported the Blair House agreement, the reinstating of the veto power in the EC and the tighter member states' control over the Commission eventually resulted in a renegotiation of the U.S.-EC agreement tilted in favor of France, the most recalcitrant country.

European Corporate Governance Reform and the German Party Paradox. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 03.1, 2003

This paper addresses the current discussion on links between party politics and production regimes. Why do German Social Democrats opt for more corporate governance liberalization than the CDU although, in terms of the distributional outcomes of such reforms, one would expect the situation to be reversed? I divide my analysis into three stages. First, I use the European Parliament’s crucial vote on the European takeover directive in July 2001 as a test case to show that the left-right dimension does indeed matter in corporate governance reform, beside cross-class and cross-party nation-based interests. In a second step, by analyzing the party positions in the main German corporate governance reforms in the 1990s, I show that the SPD and the CDU behave “paradoxically” in the sense that the SPD favored more corporate governance liberalization than the CDU, which protected the institutions of “Rhenish,” “organized” capitalism. This constellation occurred in the discussions on company disclosure, management accountability, the power of banks, network dissolution, and takeover regulation. Third, I offer two explanations for this paradoxical party behavior. The first explanation concerns the historical conversion of ideas. I show that trade unions and Social Democrats favored a high degree of capital organization in the Weimar Republic, but this ideological position was driven in new directions at two watersheds: one in the late 1940s, the other in the late 1950s. My second explanation lies in the importance of conflicts over managerial control, in which both employees and minority shareholders oppose managers, and in which increased shareholder power strengthens the position of works councils.