Local Public-Services Provision under Public-Private Partnerships : Contractual Design and Contracting Parties Incentives

When deciding to resort to a PPP contract for the provision of a local public service, local governments have to consider the demand risk allocation between the contracting parties. In this article, I investigate the effects of demand risk allocation on the accountability of procuring authorities regarding consumers changing demand, as well as on the cost-reducing effort incentives of the private public-service provider. I show that contracts in which the private provider bears demand risk motivate more the public authority from responding to customer needs. This is due to the fact that consumers are empowered when the private provider bears demand risk, that is, they have the possibility to oust the private provider in case of non-satisfaction with the service provision, which provides procuring authorities with more credibility in side-trading and then more incentives to be responsive. As a consequence, I show that there is a lower matching with consumers' preferences over time when demand risk is on the public authority rather than on the private provider, and this is corroborated in the light of two famous case studies. However, contracts in which the private provider does not bear demand risk motivate more the private provider from investing in cost-reducing efforts. I highlight then a tradeoff in the allocation of demand risk between productive and allocative efficiency. The striking policy implication of this article for local governments would be that the current trend towards a greater resort to contracts where private providers bear little or no demand risk may not be optimal. Local governments should impose demand risk on private providers within PPP contracts when they expect that consumers' preferences over the service provision will change over time.

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, July 2014

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, August 2014

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, September 2014

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, October 2014

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, October 2014

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, December 2014

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, November 2014

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, January 2015

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

Yearbook of Private International Law, Volume XIV, 2012/2013

The "Yearbook of Private International Law" provides all about the conflict of laws developments of 2012 and 2013 in one book: Volume XIV (2012/2013) includes contributions on the proposed codification of the General Part of Private International Law in Europe, on the reform of the Chinese legal system as well as on defamation and violation of personality rights (the latter in a whole section). Furthermore, the book deals with the application of EU legislation on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgements, the recognition of judgements overturned by another judgement, and the conflict of decisions in international arbitration. Reports and court decisions from the Netherlands, Turkey, India, Finland, Croatia and Switzerland and a summary of two dissertations on the role of sovereignty and choice of courts agreements complete the book.

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, February 2015

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

Parental investment and its sensitivity to corticosterone is linked to melanin-based coloration in barn owls.

Behavioral and physiological responses to unpredictable changes in environmental conditions are, in part, mediated by glucocorticoids (corticosterone in birds). In polymorphic species, individuals of the same sex and age display different heritable melanin-based color morphs, associated with physiological and reproductive parameters and possibly alternative strategies to cope with variation in environmental conditions. We examined whether the role of corticosterone in resolving the trade-off between self-maintenance and reproductive activities covaries with the size of melanin-based spots displayed on the ventral body side of male barn owls. Administration of corticosterone to simulate physiological stress in males revealed pronounced changes in their food-provisioning rates to nestlings compared to control males. Corticosterone-treated males with small eumelanic spots reduced nestling provisioning rates as compared to controls, and also to a greater degree than did corticosterone-treated males with large spots. Large-spotted males generally exhibited lower parental provisioning and appear insensitive to exogenous corticosterone suggesting that the size of the black spots on the breast feathers predicts the ability to cope with stressful situations. The reduced provisioning rate of corticosterone-treated males caused a temporary reduction in nestling growth rates but, did not affect fledgling success. This suggests that moderately elevated corticosterone levels are not inhibitory to current reproduction but rather trigger behavioral responses to maximize lifetime reproductive success.

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, April 2015

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, March 2015

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

Dynamic models of energy allocation and investment

In dynamic models of energy allocation, assimilated energy is allocated to reproduction, somatic growth, maintenance or storage, and the allocation pattern can change with age. The expected evolutionary outcome is an optimal allocation pattern, but this depends on the environment experienced during the evolutionary process and on the fitness costs and benefits incurred by allocating resources in different ways. Here we review existing treatments which encompass some of the possibilities as regards constant or variable environments and their predictability or unpredictability, and the ways in which production rates and mortality rates depend on body size and composition and age and on the pattern of energy allocation. The optimal policy is to allocate resources where selection pressures are highest, and simultaneous allocation to several body subsystems and reproduction can be optimal if these pressures are equal. This may explain balanced growth commonly observed during ontogeny. Growth ceases at maturity in many models; factors favouring growth after maturity include non-linear trade-offs, variable season length, and production and mortality rates both increasing (or decreasing) functions of body size. We cannot yet say whether these are sufficient to account for the many known cases of growth after maturity and not all reasonable models have yet been explored. Factors favouring storage are also reviewed.