972 resultados para legal liability
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Tesis (Maestría en Derecho Mercantil) U.A.N.L.
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Tesis ( Maestría en Ciencias Forestales ) U.A.N.L.
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UANL
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UANL
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UANL
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UANL
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UANL
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UANL
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UANL
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Il existe des interactions complexes entre les perceptions du public, les demandes et les attentes envers les professionnels de la santé par rapport au dépistage des gènes de susceptibilité au cancer et aux services médicaux offerts. Ce chapitre étudie les aspects éthiques et juridiques de ces interactions avec une emphase sur le consentement, la confidentialité, l’emploi, l’assurance et le dépistage chez les mineurs et les majeurs inaptes. Ce chapitre conclu sur la prise en compte d’enjeux entourant la propriété de l’information génétique et les brevets et propose des principes pouvant servir de base pour une responsabilité partagée quant à la participation des patients dans le développement de lignes directrices encadrant le dépistage des gènes de susceptibilité au cancer.
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UANL
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This paper studies the impact of banks' liability for environmental damages caused by their borrowers. Laws or court decisions that declare banks liable for environmental damages have two objectives : (1) finding someone to pay for the damages and (2) exerting a pressure on a firm's stakeholders to incite them to invest in environmental risk prevention. We study the effect that such legal decisions can have on financing relationships and especially on the incentives to reduce environmental risk in an environment where banks cannot commit to refinance the firm in all circumstances. Following an environmental accident, liable banks more readily agree to refinance the firm. We then show that bank liability effectively makes refinancing more attractive to banks, therefore improving the firm's risk-sharing possibilities. Consequently, the firm's incentives to invest in environmental risk reduction are weakened compared to the (bank) no-liability case. We also show that, when banks are liable, the firm invests at the full-commitment optimal level of risk reduction investment. If there are some externalities such that some damages cannot be accounted for, the socially efficient level of investment is greater than the privately optimal one. in that case, making banks non-liable can be socially desirable.
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This paper studies the impact of banks' liability for environmental damages caused by their borrowers. Laws or court decisions that declare banks liable for environmental damages have two objectives : (1) finding someone to pay for the damages and (2) exerting a pressure on a firm's stakeholders to incite them to invest in environmental risk prevention. We study the effect that such legal decisions can have on financing relationships and especially on the incentives to reduce environmental risk in an environment where banks cannot commit to refinance the firm in all circumstances. Following an environmental accident, liable banks more readily agree to refinance the firm. We then show that bank liability effectively makes refinancing more attractive to banks, therefore improving the firm's risk-sharing possibilities. Consequently, the firm's incentives to invest in environmental risk reduction are weakened compared to the (bank) no-liability case. We also show that, when banks are liable, the firm invests at the full-commitment optimal level of risk reduction investment. If there are some externalities such that some damages cannot be accounted for, the socially efficient level of investment is greater than the privately optimal one. in that case, making banks non-liable can be socially desirable.
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UANL
