The change of behavior of two strains of Leishmania after cultivation in a defined medium

Attempts have been made to characterize two strains of Leishmania that became infective to golden hamsters only after they had been maintained for several years in a chemically defined culture medium. Observations were made on the growth rates of promastigotes in vitro, course of infection in hamsters, morphology of amastigotes, and electrophoretic mobility patterns of eight isoenzymes. Information was obtained about the buoyant densities of n-DNA and k-DNA, and one strain was tested against monoclonal antibodies. The identity of both strains remains obscure.

Explaining High Economic Growth in Small Tourism Countries with a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model

This paper shows that tourism specialisation can help to explain the observed high growth rates of small countries. For this purpose, two models of growth and trade are constructed to represent the trade relations between two countries. One of the countries is large, rich, has an own source of sustained growth and produces a tradable capital good. The other is a small poor economy, which does not have an own engine of growth and produces tradable tourism services. The poor country exports tourism services to and imports capital goods from the rich economy. In one model tourism is a luxury good, while in the other the expenditure elasticity of tourism imports is unitary. Two main results are obtained. In the long run, the tourism country overcomes decreasing returns and permanently grows because its terms of trade continuously improve. Since the tourism sector is relatively less productive than the capital good sector, tourism services become relatively scarcer and hence more expensive than the capital good. Moreover, along the transition the growth rate of the tourism economy holds well above the one of the rich country for a long time. The growth rate differential between countries is particularly high when tourism is a luxury good. In this case, there is a faster increase in the tourism demand. As a result, investment of the small economy is boosted and its terms of trade highly improve.

Factors explaining local privatization: A meta-regression analysis

Privatization of local public services has been implemented worldwide in the last decades. Why local governments privatize has been the subject of much discussion, and many empirical works have been devoted to analyzing the factors that explain local privatization. Such works have found a great diversity of motivations, and the variation among reported empirical results is large. To investigate this diversity we undertake a meta-regression analysis of the factors explaining the decision to privatize local services. Overall, our results indicate that significant relationships are very dependent upon the characteristics of the studies. Indeed, fiscal stress and political considerations have been found to contribute to local privatization specially in the studies of US cases published in the eighties that consider a broad range of services. Studies that focus on one service capture more accurately the influence of scale economies on privatization. Finally, governments of small towns are more affected by fiscal stress, political considerations and economic efficiency, while ideology seems to play a major role for large cities.

Why the EU does not Have an Independent Competition Agency: French Interests and Transaction Costs in Early European Integration

A major achievement of new institutionalism in economics and political science is the formalisation of the idea that certain policies are more efficient when administered by a politically independent organisation. Based on this insight, several policy actors and scholars criticise the European Community for relying too much on a multi-task, collegial, and politicised organisation, the European Commission. This raises important questions, some constitutional (who should be able to change the corresponding procedural rules?) and some political-economic (is Europe truly committed to free and competitive markets?). Though acknowledging the relevance of legal and normative arguments, this paper contributes to the debate with a positive political-scientific perspective. Based on the view that institutional equilibria raise the question of equilibrium institutions, it shows that collegiality was (a) an equilibrium institution during the Paris negotiations of 1950-51; and (b) an institutional equilibrium for the following 50 years. The conclusion points to some recent changes in the way that European competition policy is implemented, and discusses how these affect the “constitutional” principle of collegial European governance.

Political alliances and organisational change in political parties: a framework for analysis

This article sets out a theoretical framework for the study of organisational change within political alliances. To achieve this objective it uses as a starting point a series of premises, the most notable of which include the definition of organisational change as a discrete, complex and focussed phenomenon of changes in power within the party. In accordance with these premises, it analyses the synthetic model of organisational change proposed by Panebianco (1988). After examining its limitations, a number of amendments are proposed to adapt it to the way political alliances operate. The above has resulted in the design of four new models. In order to test its validity and explanatory power in a preliminary manner, the second part looks at the organisational change of the UDC within the CiU alliance between 1978 and 2001. The discussion and conclusions reached demonstrate the problems of determinism of the Panebianco model and suggest, tentatively, the importance of the power balance within the alliance as a key factor.

Shocks, Monetary Policy and Institutions: Explaining Unemployment Persistence in Persistence in “Europe” and the United States

This paper examines the rise in European unemployment since the 1970s by introducing endogenous growth into an otherwise standard New Keynesian model with capital accumulation and unemployment. We subject the model to an uncorrelated cost push shock, in order to mimic a scenario akin to the one faced by central banks at the end of the 1970s. Monetary policy implements a disinfl ation by following an interest feedback rule calibrated to an estimate of a Bundesbank reaction function. 40 quarters after the shock has vanished, unemployment is still about 1.8 percentage points above its steady state. Our model also broadly reproduces cross country differences in unemployment by drawing on cross country differences in the size of cost push shock and the associated disinfl ation, the monetary policy reaction function and the wage setting structure.

Optimal Climate Change Policies When Governments Cannot Commit

This paper examines the optimal design of climate change policies in the context where governments want to encourage the private sector to undertake significant immediate investment in developing cleaner technologies, but the carbon taxes and other environmental policies that could in principle stimulate such investment will be imposed over a very long future. The conventional claim by environmental economists is that environmental policies alone are sufficient to induce firms to undertake optimal investment. However this argument requires governments to be able to commit to these future taxes, and it is far from clear that governments have this degree of commitment. We assume instead that governments cannot commit, and so both they and the private sector have to contemplate the possibility of there being governments in power in the future that give different (relative) weights to the environment. We show that this lack of commitment has a significant asymmetric effect. Compared to the situation where governments can commit it increases the incentive of the current government to have the investment undertaken, but reduces the incentive of the private sector to invest. Consequently governments may need to use additional policy instruments – such as R&D subsidies – to stimulate the required investment.

Both Sides of the Story: Skill-biased Technological Change, Labour Market Frictions, and Endogenous Two-Sided Heterogeneity

This paper presents a stylised framework to examine how skill-biased technological change and labour market frictions affect the relationship between economic expansion and unskilled unemployment. The first part of the analysis focuses on the investment decisions in skill-acquisition and technology adoption activities faced by workers and firms in response to the introduction of an innovative technology. The second part examines how endogenous two-sided heterogeneity in the labour market affects the macroeconomic outcomes in terms of unemployment, technological diffusion, and economic expansion. To conclude, the framework is used to discuss the effects of alternative forms of policy intervention on agents' investment decisions and on the macroeconomic outcomes.

Does Public Governance Always Matter? How Experience of Poor Institutional Quality Influences FDI to the South

This paper investigates whether the higher prevalence of South multinational enterprises (MNEs) in risky developing countries may be explained by the experience that they have acquired of poor institutional quality at home. We confirm the intuition provided by our analytical model by empirically showing that the positive impact of good public governance on foreign direct investment (FDI) in a given host country is moderated significantly, and even in some cases eliminated, when MNEs have been faced with poor institutional quality at home.

Future of the Clean Development Mechanism in Tackling Climate Change

Using a theoretical framework, we explain the impact of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) on emissions in Annex I and non-Annex I countries. We show that on one hand, emissions in the non-Annex I country decline because of abatement sponsored by the Annex I country under the CDM; on the other hand, emissions may increase because (i) the Annex I country increases emissions in its own country, and (ii) the non-Annex I country crowds out the bene ts from the CDM projects by increasing its domestic emissions. For the CDM to be e¤ective in reducing global emissions, we show that partial Certi ed Emissions Reduction credits should be given to the Annex I country that sponsors CDM projects in the non-Annex I country. We also suggest that the CDM Executive Board should not allow the CDM projects to be hosted by non-Annex I countries that are too conscious about their emission levels.

Financial Distress in Chinese Industry: Microeconomic, Macroeconomic and Institutional Infuences

We study the impact of both microeconomic factors and the macroeconomy on the financial distress of Chinese listed companies over a period of massive economic transition, 1995 to 2006. Based on an economic model of financial distress under the institutional setting of state protection against exit, and using our own firm-level measure of distress, we find important impacts of firm characteristics, macroeconomic instability and institutional factors on the hazard rate of financial distress. The results are robust to unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level, as well as those shared by firms in similar macroeconomic founding conditions. Comparison with related studies for other economies highlights important policy implications.