'The power gained, we will never surrender': Russian ruling elite versus the succession and economic crisis. OSW Point of View (Policy Brief), October 2009

Even though the economic crisis proved harmful to the Russian economy and people's living standards, it has nonetheless failed to make the elite revise its policy. Despite some problems, the government has managed to sustain economic and political stability, thanks to the reserves it amassed in the times of prosperity, and to the propaganda campaign that protected it, above all Vladimir Putin. The crisis failed to force the elite to implement deeper structural and political reforms. Moreover, it has actually reinforced existing tendencies, such as state control over the economy and its oil-oriented character, the elite's economic expansion at the expense of private businesses, and the preservation of political power. Thus, the crisis has so far failed to dismantle Putinism, indeed quite the reverse - it has in fact contributed to its becoming 'set in stone'.

Russian gas industry - current condition and prospects; New regional 'in-security' system in Central Asia; Caspian oil and gas: the facts at the end of the year 2000. OSW Study 1/2001

Russian gas industry: The current condition of the gas industry is one of the most crucial factors influencing the Russian state·s functioning, internal situation and international position. Not only is gas the principal energy resource in Russia, it also subsidises other sectors of the economy. Status of the main European gas exporter strengthens also Russia's importance in the international arena. New regional in-security: Ten years have passed since the Central Asian states declared their independence, but their relationship with Russia still remains close, and the latter treats them as its exclusive zone of influence. A crucial reason for keeping Central Asia within the orbit of Moscow·s influence is the fact that Russia exercises control over the most important transport routes out of the region of raw materials for the power industry, on which the economic development of Asia depends on. But this is the only manifestation of Central Asia·s economic dependence on Russia. Moscow lacks solid economic instruments (i.e. investment input or power industry dependence) to shape the situation in the region. Caspian oil and gas: Caspian stocks of energy resources are not, and most probably will not be, of any great significance on the world scale. Nevertheless it is the Caspian region which will have the opportunity to become an oil exporter which will reduce the dependence of the European countries on Arabian oil, and which will guarantee Russia the quantities of gas which are indispensable both for meeting its internal demands and for maintaining its current level of export. For Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, the confirmation of the existence of successive oil strata is not only an opportunity to increase income, but also an additional bargaining chip in the game for the future of the whole region. The stake in this game is the opportunity to limit the economic, and by extension the political influences of Russia in the region.

Systemic crisis in Alexander Lukashenko's regime. OSW Commentary No. 66, 2011-10-28

Measures undertaken by the Belarusian government in the areas of the economy, internal affairs and foreign policy in recent months have proven increasingly ineffective. Despite the deteriorating macroeconomic situation, Minsk is not implementing the reforms necessary to combat the crisis and its activity is limited only to feigned actions and administrative regulations. As a result, the economic situation is worsening but the chances of obtaining external loans as support, for example from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), are decreasing. At the same time there is mounting fear among the regime of social unrest, therefore by raising salaries of the least well-off groups of citizens it is trying to compensate for the increased costs of living. On the other hand, the government is extending the scope of control over society and competences of enforcement bodies. Belarus’s room for manoeuvre in foreign policy has also been diminishing substantially. Despite the EU’s declared willingness to reach an agreement and its encouragement, Lukashenko is not ready to make concessions in the political sphere (e.g. to rehabilitate political prisoners), and this is hindering the normalisation of relations with the West. Minsk furthermore feels a mounting pressure from Moscow, making the Belarusian negotiating position ever weaker. The lack of freedom of manoeuvre in foreign policy, no possibility to maintain a costly economic model and the lack of support from the majority of society all prove that Alexander Lukashenko’s regime is in severe crisis. The system he established is no longer able to respond to current threats with adequate and effective strategies. This situation is challenging the regime’s stability and calls into question its viability in the longer term.

Gazprom's position on the Russian gas market weakening. OSW Commentary No. 70, 2012-02-23

As the difficulties Gazprom has faced in recent years on the European market have multiplied1, so more and more symptoms have appeared which may suggest that the company’s dominant position is deteriorating. The decision made by the Russian government in June 2011 to double the tax Gazprom has to pay on the extraction of gas, which was later approved by parliament, was the first time in many years when the company’s fiscal privileges were withdrawn. The process of Gazprom’s assets being taken over by private companies and business partners from within Vladimir Putin’s closest circle is underway. More and more frequently attempts are being made to challenge the company’s monopoly in areas of key importance for the functioning of the entire gas sector, such as Gazprom’s exclusive right to dispose of the Russian gas transportation system and its exports monopoly. Competition from independent gas producers on the domestic market is growing, and Gazprom is gradually being pushed out of some of that market’s most profitable segments (industrial clients). The emerging tendencies in the Russian gas sector derive from a number of factors – from the situation on the European gas market, through difficulties hampering the development of the sector in Russia itself, to the private interests of the current ruling class and its business partners. The plans for a structural reform of the monopoly (including isolating gas transportation system from Gazprom), presented since 2000 by the Ministry for Economic Development and since 2003 by the Russian Association of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP), suggest a direction for the changes necessary to stimulate the sector’s development and improve the efficiency of Gazprom itself. However, the monopolist’s current business model gives the government full control over this strategic enterprise, which is a core of Putin’s concept for developing Russia as a global energy power. Despite Putin’s recent statement that he “does not rule out privatising Gazprom in the future” (made at a meeting with political scientists in Moscow on 6 February this year), any structural reform of Gazprom (and consequently, a weakening of the state’s control over it) seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. Still, the developments on the domestic market – growing pressure from other gas companies (oil corporations and independent producers) and changes on the European market2 – may result in the weakening of Gazprom’s monopoly privileges and a gradual deterioration of its special status within Russia.

Could Transnistria block Moldova's integration with the EU? OSW Commentary No. 95, 2012-10-23

Moldova’s progress in its negotiations on an Association Agreement with the European Union, with a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) as its key element, has become a source of tension between Chisinau and the breakaway Republic of Transnistria. An almost certain refusal by Transnistria to join the DCFTA, will deprive the region of the benefits it currently enjoys under the EU Autonomous Trade Preferences (ATP) worsening its already precarious economic situation. It is to be expected that the issue will become an additional source of tension between the two sides of the Transnistrian conflict, and might also have a negative impact on the EU–Russia relationship. The signing of the Association Agreement, which is scheduled for the autumn of 2013, will be an important step towards Moldova’s integration with the EU. Both sides assign great importance to the speediest possible finalisation of the Agreement, and so far the negotiations have been described as progressing very smoothly. Transnistria’s highly sceptical attitude towards its possible accession to the DCFTA, however, is consistent with the interests of its main ally, Moscow. It is highly probable that Russia intends to thwart Moldova’s EU association process. Moscow’s objective seems to be to draw Moldova permanently into its own sphere of influence, and therefore it perceives Chisinau’s movement towards the EU as a transgression against its geopolitical interests. Consequently, in order to hinder this process, Russia may instrumentally exploit its extensive influence over Transnistria to provoke a crisis between Tiraspol and Chisinau. An apparent increase in Russian presence in the region over the last few months (including tighter control over Transnistria’s KGB and the Ministry of Information) may suggest that the Kremlin is preparing to implement such a scenario.

Is Vietnam the Right Choice for Foreign Investment?: The Case of the European Union’s Slipping Opportunity. ACES Working Papers, 2012

This analysis is broken into three interdependent sections: First, an analysis of the restrictions placed on foreign direct investment in Vietnam captures the current freedoms and inhibitors of investment in Vietnam. Foreign direct investment is defined by the UN as an investment made to acquire a lasting interest in or effective control over an enterprise operating outside of the economy of the investor. Second, a cursory look at the macroeconomic risks, to which investment dollars are susceptible, will paint a realistic portrait of return of foreign investment. Finally, this paper will examine the current, and historical, trade relationship between Vietnam and the European Union, in order to convey that the opportunity for investment in Vietnam remains to be an opportunity for Europe’s developed economies.

The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Perspective, CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 05.2, 25 October 1994

Many European and American observers of the EC have criticized "intergovemmentalist" ac­ counts for exaggerating the extent of member state control over the process of European integra­ tion. This essay seeks to ground these criticisms in a "historical institutionalist" account that stresses the need to study European integration as a political process which unfolds over time. Such a perspective highlights the limits of member-state control over long-term institutional de­ velopment, due to preoccupation with shorHerm concerns, the ubiquity of unintended conse­ quences, and processes that "lock in" past decusions and make reassertions of member-state control difficult. Brief examination of the evolution of social policy in the EC suggests the limita­ tions of treating the EC as an international regime facilitating collective action among essentially sovereign states. It is ore useful to view integration as a "path-dependent" process that has pro­ duced a fragmented but still discernible "multitiered" European polity.

Divided but United: European Trade Policy & EC-U.S. Agricultural Negotiations in the Uruguay Round. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 07.3, 1996

How has the integration of trade policy and negotiating authority in Europe affected the external bargaining capabilities of the European Community (EC)? This paper analyzes the bargaining constraints and opportunities for the EC created by the obligation to negotiate as a single entity. The nature of demands in external~ the voting rules at the EC level, and the amount of autonomy exercised by EC negotiators contribute to explaining, this paper argues, whether the EC gains some external bargaining clout from its internal divisions and whether the final international agreement reflects the position of the median or the extreme countries in the Community. The Uruguay Round agricultural negotiations illustrate the consequences of the EC's institutional structure on its external bargaining capabilities. Negotiations between the EC and the U.S. were deadlocked for six years because the wide gap among the positions of the member states at the start of the Uruguay Round had prevented the EC from making sufficient concessions. The combination of a weakened unanimity rule and greater autonomy seized by Commission negotiators after the May 1992 reform of the Common Agricultural Policy made possible the conclusion of an EC-U.S. agricultural agreement. Although the majority of member states supported the Blair House agreement, the reinstating of the veto power in the EC and the tighter member states' control over the Commission eventually resulted in a renegotiation of the U.S.-EC agreement tilted in favor of France, the most recalcitrant country.

Did Egypt's Parliamentary Election just trump citizens’ rights? Arab Citizenship Review No. 12, 19 November 2015

Since the Muslim Brotherhood rule was toppled in July 2013, the regime of President Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi has strived to consolidate his one-man rule; he painted the political opposition and civil society as traitors and foreign agents and exploited the fight against terrorism to suppress freedom of expression, justify a crackdown on the press, eclipse justice in courtrooms, throw thousands in prison, and tighten his grip on police forces. The regime has postponed parliamentary elections for some time, while it marginalised and weakened the non-Islamist political parties that helped Sisi take power. He did so by promoting electoral lists with candidates who are loyal to the president, to ensure control over the new assembly and by obstructing any political alliance that could form an opposition. At the same time, the security apparatus has been given free rein to control the public sphere and engineer the electoral process. This may ultimately lead to a parliament that includes no advocates for rights and liberties, which is particularly significant since the incoming assembly will review the huge amount of legislation that President Sisi has issued in the absence of a parliament. In addition, shortly before elections, President Sisi raised questions about the constitution, calling for it to be amended to reduce the powers of the parliament and increase those of the president. It is thus clear that Sisi seeks not only to consolidate his regime, without political opposition, but to free his rule of any effective oversight from society or parliament.

Moldova: from oligarchic pluralism to Plahotniuc’s hegemony. OSW Commentary Number 208/07.04.2016

Moldova’s political system took shape due to the six-year rule of the Alliance for European Integration coalition but it has undergone a major transformation over the past six months. Resorting to skilful political manoeuvring and capitalising on his control over the Moldovan judiciary system, Vlad Plahotniuc, one of the leaders of the nominally pro-European Democratic Party and the richest person in the country, was able to bring about the arrest of his main political competitor, the former prime minister Vlad Filat, in October 2015. Then he pushed through the nomination of his trusted aide, Pavel Filip, for prime minister. In effect, Plahotniuc has concentrated political and business influence in his own hands on a scale unseen so far in Moldova’s history since 1991. All this indicates that he already not only controls the judiciary, the anti-corruption institutions, the Constitutional Court and the economic structures, but has also subordinated the greater part of parliament and is rapidly tightening his grip on the section of the state apparatus which until recently was influenced by Filat.

Hostages to dialogue. The process of normalising Serbian-Kosovar relations. OSW COMMENTARY No. 214, 2016-06-08

In March 2011, the governments of Kosovo and Serbia started a dialogue that was intended to lead to the normalisation of mutual relations. This process, launched under the pressure of the EU, was aimed at building up confidence between the parties and resolving the everyday problems of the Serbian and Albanian communities, and as a consequence, reducing tension in the Western Balkans. The start of talks between representatives of the antagonist countries was the breakthrough that led to the Kosovo government gaining control over the whole of its territory, the establishment of a border (or ‘administrative boundary line’, as Belgrade calls it), and the start of the process of subordinating the Kosovo Serbian institutions to the authorities in Prishtina. Serbia also lifted its trade blockade on Kosovo, and allowed Prishtina to join the regional organisations. As a result, progress has been made in the process of integration of both states with the EU: Serbia has started accession negotiations, and Kosovo has signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA).

Encadrement juridique des monnaies numériques : bitcoin et autres cryptomonnaies

Les informations relatives aux cryptomonnaies sont susceptibles de changer à l'avenir tant cette matière est nouvelle et encore peu ancrée dans le droit. Ce mémoire est une réflexion sur l'essor du Bitcoin et des cryptomonnaies à leurs débuts, alors même que le droit cherche à s'accaparer ces nouvelles technologies, à les intégrer dans son système préexistant.

Musiciens migrants d'origine arabe dans le contexte montréalais : le parcours de la reconnaissance

Ce mémoire traite des parcours de musiciens migrants d’origine arabe à Montréal. Il s’intéresse à la manière dont ces derniers construisent leurs carrières musicales dans ce contexte et acquièrent la reconnaissance des différents acteurs qu’ils côtoient – pairs, intervenants culturels, public. La méthodologie adoptée est de nature qualitative et correspond à une perspective ethnosociologique, le contexte musical de l’étude inscrivant la démarche dans le domaine de la sociomusicologie. Cinq musiciens ayant migré d’un pays arabe avec une pratique musicale préalable ont été rencontrés, ainsi que cinq acteurs du milieu musical qui interagissent avec eux. Ce corpus d’entretiens a été complété par de l’observation et l’étude de traces (ex. : disques, cv). La démarche d’enquête a permis d’élaborer un ensemble de propositions visant à comprendre les phénomènes sociaux observés. Il apparaît que ces musiciens construisent leurs carrières montréalaises grâce à une actualisation et réappropriation originale des sources et influences musicales accumulées au fil de leur vie, processus néanmoins tributaire des rouages du milieu musical. Celui-ci est constitué de multiples acteurs ayant chacun leurs objectifs, intérêts, contraintes vis-à-vis desquels les musiciens doivent s’ajuster, négocier, faire des compromis. Puis, l’ethnicité arabe qui est construite et mise en scène par les performances musicales peut vraisemblablement agir comme outil pour se démarquer dans le contexte montréalais. Cependant, les dynamiques qui sous-tendent les rapports sociaux que ces artistes entretiennent dans la métropole font en sorte qu’ils ont ultimement peu d’emprise sur la manière dont se manifeste la reconnaissance à leur égard et vis-à-vis de leurs pratiques musicales.

Sea surface temperature reconstruction based on alkenones of sediment core M35003-4

Evidence for abrupt climate changes on millennial and shorter timescales is widespread in marine and terrestrial climate records (Dansgard et al., 1993, doi:10.1038/364218a0; Bond et al., 1993, doi:10.1038/365143a0; Charles et al., 1996, doi:10.1016/0012-821X(96)00083-0, Bard et al., 1997, doi:10.1038/385707a0). Rapid reorganization of ocean circulation is considered to exert some control over these changes (Broecker et al., 1985, doi:10.1038/315021a0), as are shifts in the concentrations of atmospheric greenhouse gases (Broecker, 1994, doi:10.1038/372421a0). The response of the climate system to these two influences is fundamentally different: slowing of thermohaline overturn in the North Atlantic Ocean is expected to decrease northward heat transport by the ocean and to induce warming of the tropical Atlantic (Crowley, 1992, doi:10.1029/92PA01058; Manabe and Stouffer, 1997, doi:10.1029/96PA03932), whereas atmospheric greenhouse forcing should cause roughly synchronous global temperature changes (Manabe et al., 1991, doi:10.1175/1520-0442(1991)004<0785:TROACO>2.0.CO;2). So these two mechanisms of climate change should be distinguishable by the timing of surface-water temperature variations relative to changes in deep-water circulation. Here we present a high-temporal-resolution record of sea surface temperatures from the western tropical North Atlantic Ocean which spans the past 29,000 years, derived from measurements of temperature-sensitive alkenone unsaturation in sedimentary organic matter. We find significant warming is documented for Heinrich event H1 (16,900-15,400 calendar years bp) and the Younger Dryas event (12,900-11,600 cal. yr bp), which were periods of intense cooling in the northern North Atlantic. Temperature changes in the tropical and high-latitude North Atlantic are out of phase, suggesting that the thermohaline circulation was the important trigger for these rapid climate changes.

(Table 1) 87Sr/86Sr and Sr/Ca ratios in foraminiferal calcite from DSDP Holes 3-21 and 39-357

The 87Sr/86Sr ratio of ancient seawater, as recorded in marine carbonates, is an important tracer of long-term variations in ocean chemistry (Burke et al., 1982, doi:10.1130/0091-7613(1982)10<516:VOSSTP>2.0.CO;2; Peterman et al., 1970, doi:10.1016/0016-7037(70)90154-7; Dasch and Biscaye, 1971, doi:10.1016/0012-821X(71)90164-6; Veizer and Compston, 1974, doi:10.1016/0016-7037(74)90099-4; Brass, 1976, doi:10.1016/0016-7037(76)90025-9). However, the Sr isotope balance of the oceans has been difficult to constrain; consequently, attempts to evaluate the temporal 87Sr/86Sr changes have been largely qualitative. To constrain the causes of these variations we have measured 87Sr/86Sr ratios in carefully cleaned unrecrystallized foraminifera from DSDP sites 21 and 357. The data presented here have been quantitatively modelled taking advantage of recent advances in understanding of the Sr geochemical cycle. They suggest that whereas hydrothermal fluxes and carbonate recycling are of major importance in defining the marine 87Sr/86Sr ratio, the major control over its variations through the Cenozoic has been changes in the isotope composition of Sr derived from the weathering of silicate rocks.