Identification and ethnic diversity underlie support for multicultural rights : a multilevel analysis in Bulgaria

Bulgaria is historically a multicultural society, composed of the Bulgarian (ethnic) majority and a number of ethnic minorities among which Bulgarian Turks and Roma are the largest. Both minority communities are stigmatized in contemporary Bulgaria, though to different degrees and for different reasons. Ethnic minorities' rights to preserve their culture, customs, and language are a topic of contentious debate. The purpose of this study was to examine individual- and context-level antecedents of the ethnic Bulgarian majority's support for multicultural rights of ethnic minorities. Multilevel regression analyses were conducted with International Social Survey Programme ISSP 2003 data (N = 920 in 28 Bulgarian districts). At the individual-level, an ethnic conception of the nation and anti-Roma symbolic prejudice were negatively related to support for multicultural rights, whereas national identification was positively related to the support of these rights. Over and above individual-level effects, and in line with recent extensions of intergroup contact theory, thepercentage ofBulgarianTurks withindistricts was positively related to support for multicultural rights. Importantly, support for multicultural rights was particularly high in districts characterized by ethnic diversity, that is, in districts with high proportions of both Bulgarian Turks and Roma. The beneficial effects of ethnic diversity and theoretical implications of findings are discussed.

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

The relationship between creativity and moral judgment

A sample of 50 male and female subjects ranging in age from 12 to 73 were divided into three groups according to the scale of maturity of moral judgment developed by Lawrence Kohlberg. Subjects were also tested on a measure of creativity developed by Torrance after the formulations of Guilford in order to test the hypothesis that the re^- lationship between creativity and maturity of moral judgment is curvilinear. Researchers have failed to develop any working hypothesis concerning the relationship between creativity and moral judgment or postulate any consistent theoretical framework concerning the possible relationship between these two constructs. The empirical investigation involved a scientific testing of a random selection of elementary subjects9 high school adolescents, and creative adults. Tests included Kohlberg8s Moral dilemmas and Guilford's Product Improvement Task. A trend analysis was conducted to reveal whether or not a curvilinear relationship existed between the independent variable (Moral Maturity Stages) and the de~ pe dent variable (creativity performance under each level). Curvilinear trends were observed in two out of four creativity subscales but were not statistically significant. It was concluded that these contradictory findings were due to the relatively small number of subjects tested, the narrow range or moral judgment scores, and the limited conception of creativity defined by the creativity measure used (The Product Improvement Task). It was suggested that an instrument assessing an identity status would be most useful as well as a creativity measure better suited for a theory of creativity essentially developmental in perspective.

A Pragmatic Approach to Ethical Inquiry on Transhuman Athletes and Gene Doping in Sport

Gene doping is the most recent addition to the list of banned practices formulated by the World Anti-doping Agency. It is a subset of doping that utilizes the technology involved in gene therapy. The latter is still in the experimental phase but has the potential to be used as a type of medical treatment involving alterations of a patient‘s genes. I apply a pragmatic form of ethical inquiry to evaluate the application of this medical innovation in the context of sport for performance-enhancement purposes and how it will affect sport, the individual, society and humanity at large. I analyze the probable ethical implications that will emerge from such procedures in terms of values that lie at the heart of the major arguments offered by scholars on both affirmative and opposing sides of the debate on gene doping, namely fairness, autonomy and the conception of what it means to be human.

"All The Best Cowboys Have Daddy Issues": [Post]Oedipal Fatherhood And Subjectivity In ABC's Lost

ABC's popular television series Lost has been praised as one of the most innovative programs in the history of broadcast television primarily due to its unique storytelling content and structure. In this thesis, I argue that in spite of its unconventional stances in terms of narrative, genre, and character descriptions, Lost still conforms to the conventional understanding of family, fatherhood, and subjectivity by perpetuating the psychoanalytic myth of the Oedipus complex. The series emphasizes the centrality of the father in the lives of the survivors, and constructs character developments according to Freud's essentialist and phallocentric conception of subjectivity. In this way, it continues the classic psychoanalytic tradition that views the father as the essence of one's identity. In order to support this argument, I conduct a discursive reading of the show's two main characters: Jack Shepherd and John Locke. Through such a reading, I explore and unearth the mythic/psychoanalytic importance of the father in the psychology of these fictional constructs.

Les obligations du franchiseur : étude du droit civil et du guide d'Unidroit sur les accords internationaux de franchise principale

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit (LL.M.)". Ce mémoire a été accepté à l'unanimité et classé parmi les 15% des mémoires de la discipline.

La monnaie en droit : nature d'une abstraction outre fondée : essai dialectique et logique sur la dualité dans la catégoricité juridique et sur l'abstraction d'hérédité monétaire

"Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Docteur en droit (LL.D.)"

Intégration scolaire des élèves handicapés par une déficience intellectuelle et droit à l'égalité

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maître en droit (LL.M.)"

L'autonomie de la clause compromissoire en matière d'arbitrage international

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de maîtrise en droit (LL.M.) (Option: droit des affaires )"

La justification du droit d'auteur dans l'environnement numérique

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maître en droit (L.L.M.) option Technologies de l'information"

La propriété des créances : approche comparative

"Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures de l'Université de Montréal en vue de l'obtention du grade de Docteur en Droit (L.L.D.) et à l'Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3"

La partialité par les projets

Cet article examine la question de savoir comment nous pourrions défendre de la manière la plus efficace la thèse selon laquelle la partialité envers certaines personnes, mais pas envers d’autres, est moralement permise. Les philosophes qui insistentsur le fait que la morale doit faire une place à la partialité n’ont pas rendu explicite leurs raisons pour cette conclusion ; le présent article propose une évaluation comparative d’une variété de stratégies argumentatives qui pourraient être déployées à cette fin. Une stratégie prometteuse fait appel à l’efficacité reconnue de l’argument du « point de vue personnel », qui est ici interprété comme faisant spécifiquement référence aux projets de l’agent. Si les exigences morales doivent être atténuées face à l’importance particulière que l’agent attache à ses propres projets, alors peut-être les attachements partiaux d’un agent à d’autres personnes devraient-ils également bénéficier d’une certaine protection à l’égard des exigences morales impartiales. Nous pouvons renforcer cet argument en relevant l’omniprésence de l’agence plurielle ou collective dans le contexte des relations personnelles : souvent deux agents (ou plus) entrenant de telles relations s’engagent dans des projets communs et peuvent même en venir à constituer un agent pluriel. Cette approche parvient à justifier un traitement moral particulier de nos co-agents, bien qu’elle ne se conforme pas à tous les aspects de notre conception initiale de la partialité.

L'habitude en matière de conduite automobile : une analyse de ses composantes et du rôle qu'elle joue dans le maintien et la régulation des comportements de conduite

« La grande majorité des accidents demeure liée aux comportements dangereux des usagers de la route ». Cet énoncé, lapidaire, fait aujourd’hui figure d’évidence au sein de la communauté des intervenants en sécurité routière. Il repose pourtant sur des prémisses discutables. Le problème le plus fondamental réside dans le fait que la recherche des dernières décennies s’est presque toute entière vouée à l’analyse des seuls aspects défaillants de la conduite (l’accident, les infractions, les erreurs et les fautes de conduite, les conducteurs à risque ou dysfonctionnels, les attitudes et traits de caractère incitant à la conduite dangereuse, etc.). Ce faisant, on a fini par oublier qu’il nous restait encore beaucoup de choses à apprendre sur le fonctionnement usuel de la conduite automobile. Comment, en effet, peut-on escompter élucider tous les rouages de la dynamique accidentelle sans avoir au préalable cerné, et bien compris, les mécanismes de la conduite « ordinaire » ? Comment peut-on parvenir à approfondir notre compréhension des comportements de conduite si l’on fait totalement abstraction de toutes les activités courantes, « normales », auxquelles se livrent les conducteurs lorsqu’ils sont au volant de leur véhicule ? C’est dans la perspective de mieux comprendre les comportements de conduite, dans leur complexité et dans leur diversité, que la présente thèse a été réalisée. Y a plus spécifiquement été examinée la question des habitudes en raison de leur prédominance dans l’activité de la conduite, mais également en raison de leur résistance, des obstacles bien concrets qu’elles sont susceptibles d’opposer à tous ceux qui tentent de modifier les comportements individuels de conduite. Des entrevues en profondeur, menées auprès de trente conducteurs et conductrices âgé(e)s de 17 à 54 ans, devaient permettre de répondre, entre autres, aux questions suivantes : De quoi sont constituées les différentes habitudes en matière de conduite automobile ? Quelle place occupent-elles dans la conduite des individus ? En quoi constituent-elles un frein au changement, à la modification des pratiques adoptées ? Quelles sont les dimensions qui participent à leur installation ? Les résultats de l’analyse ont permis de jeter les bases d’un modèle des comportements de conduite où les sensations corporelles se voient conférer un rôle des plus centraux, et où l’habitude – bien davantage caractérisée par la notion de confort que par celles d’automatisme ou de répétition – concourt non seulement à la pérennité, mais également à la régulation des conduites adoptées sur la route.

En marge du surréalisme: poétique du rêve chez Leiris et Queneau

Résumé: Ce mémoire consiste en une étude du récit de rêve chez deux auteurs qui ont fait partie du mouvement surréaliste dans leur jeunesse littéraire : Michel Leiris et Raymond Queneau. Dans ce travail, on tente d’une part de décrire la poétique du rêve chez Leiris et Queneau, par diverses analyses qui empruntent surtout à la narratologie et à la linguistique textuelle. D’autre part, nous mesurons la part d’influence du surréalisme dans la conception du rêve de chacun des deux auteurs. Le premier chapitre présente la conception surréaliste du rêve, plus particulièrement celle d’André Breton, telle qu’elle est exposée dans le premier Manifeste du surréalisme et dans les Vases communicants. Cette synthèse est suivie de l’analyse de quelques récits de rêve de Breton issus du recueil Clair de terre, et du périodique la Révolution surréaliste. Les deuxième et troisième chapitres abordent l’écriture du rêve chez Leiris et Queneau. On étudie d’abord les récits de rêve écrits alors que ces auteurs appartenaient au mouvement surréaliste (1924-1929). Ces textes se trouvent dans leurs journaux intimes et dans la revue la Révolution surréaliste. Sont ensuite étudiées certaines œuvres écrites après la période surréaliste qui contiennent des récits de rêve ou qui exploitent le rêve comme structure narrative. Par ces analyses, ce mémoire tente de montrer la contribution du travail sur le rêve à l’élaboration de la poétique personnelle des auteurs Leiris et Queneau. Mots clefs : récit de rêve, Michel Leiris, Raymond Queneau, surréalisme, littérature française.

Préférences décisives et précarité: Comment distinguer liberté comme capabilité et liberté comme non-domination?

Cet article se penche sur le rapport de la conception républicaine de la liberté comme non-domination défendue par P. Pettit avec la conception de la liberté comme capabilité proposée par A. Sen. L’usage que fait Pettit de la conception défendue par Sen lui permet d’avancer une conception plus réaliste des préférences des individus en contexte social. Cette définition des «préférences décisives» guide toute sa démonstration de la compatibilité de la liberté comme capabilité avec la théorie néorépublicaine. Elle lui permet en outre de donner une valeur particulière à l’objectif social de lutte contre la précarité, précarité comprise comme situation dans laquelle un individu est placé sous la dépendance arbitraire d’un autre en l’empêchant de se mouvoir à sa guise dans le jeu social. Nous examinons les enjeux de cette articulation à la lumière de la réponse critique qui a été formulée par Sen à l’effet que la conception néorépublicaine limitait trop la pluralité sociale de la liberté. Enfin, nous esquissons une manière de réconcilier l’approche par les capabilités avec la conception républicaine.