Coordination in Public Good Provision: How Individual Volunteering is Impacted by the Volunteering of Others

In this analysis, we examine the relationship between an individual's decision to volunteer and the average level of volunteering in the community where the individual resides. Our theoretical model is based on a coordination game , in which volunteering by others is informative regarding the benefit from volunteering. We demonstrate that the interaction between this information and one's private information makes it more likely that he or she will volunteer, given a higher level of contributions by his or her peers. We complement this theoretical work with an empirical analysis using Census 2000 Summary File 3 and Current Population Survey (CPS) 2004-2007 September supplement file data. We control for various individual and community characteristics, and employ robustness checks to verify the results of the baseline analysis. We additionally use an innovative instrumental variables strategy to account for reflection bias and endogeneity caused by selective sorting by individuals into neighborhoods, which allows us to argue for a causal interpretation. The empirical results in the baseline, as well as all robustness analyses, verify the main result of our theoretical model, and we employ a more general structure to further strengthen our results.

Effects of Experience, Knowledge and Signals on Willingness to Pay for a Public Good

This paper compares how increases in experience versus increases in knowledge about a public good affect willingness to pay (WTP) for its provision. This is challenging because while consumers are often certain about their previous experiences with a good, they may be uncertain about the accuracy of their knowledge. We therefore design and conduct a field experiment in which treated subjects receive a precise and objective signal regarding their knowledge about a public good before estimating their WTP for it. Using data for two different public goods, we show qualitative equivalence of the effect of knowledge and experience on valuation for a public good. Surprisingly, though, we find that the causal effect of objective signals about the accuracy of a subject’s knowledge for a public good can dramatically affect their valuation for it: treatment causes an increase of $150-$200 in WTP for well-informed individuals. We find no such effect for less informed subjects. Our results imply that WTP estimates for public goods are not only a function of true information states of the respondents but beliefs about those information states.

What is the Causal Effect of Information and Learning about a Public Good on Willingness to Pay?

In this study we elicit agents’ prior information set regarding a public good, exogenously give information treatments to survey respondents and subsequently elicit willingness to pay for the good and posterior information sets. The design of this field experiment allows us to perform theoretically motivated hypothesis testing between different updating rules: non-informative updating, Bayesian updating, and incomplete updating. We find causal evidence that agents imperfectly update their information sets. We also field causal evidence that the amount of additional information provided to subjects relative to their pre-existing information levels can affect stated WTP in ways consistent overload from too much learning. This result raises important (though familiar) issues for the use of stated preference methods in policy analysis.

Coordination in Public Good Provision: How Individual Volunteering is Impacted by the Volunteering of Others

In this analysis, we examine the relationship between an individual’s decision to volunteer and the average level of volunteering in the community where the individual resides. Our theoretical model is based on a coordination game , in which volunteering by others is informative regarding the benefit from volunteering. We demonstrate that the interaction between this information and one’s private information makes it more likely that he or she will volunteer, given a higher level of contributions by his or her peers. We complement this theoretical work with an empirical analysis using Census 2000 Summary File 3 and Current Population Survey (CPS) 2004-2007 September supplement file data. We control for various individual and community characteristics, and employ robustness checks to verify the results of the baseline analysis. We additionally use an innovative instrumental variables strategy to account for reflection bias and endogeneity caused by selective sorting by individuals into neighbourhoods, which allows us to argue for a causal interpretation. The empirical results in the baseline, as well as all robustness analyses, verify the main result of our theoretical model, and we employ a more general structure to further strengthen our results.

Determinants of public education expenditure: Evidence from Indian states

Public education expenditure varies significantly across Indian states. Using data on sixteen Indian states from 2001-2010, the paper tries to identify the determinants of per capita education expenditure of state governments in India. The econometric findings indicate that richer states spend more on education compared to the poorer states. A lower share of child population (0-14 years) is found to significantly enhance education expenditure at the state level. We do not find any evidence that political factors such as political ideology of the ruling party and level of corruption affect education expenditure of state governments.

Overtime Working and Contract Efficiency

We present a wage-hours contract designed to minimize costly turnover given investments in specific training combined with firm and worker information asymmetries. It may be optimal for the parties to work ‘long hours’ remunerated at premium rates for guaranteed overtime hours. Based on British plant and machine operatives, we test three predictions. First, trained workers with longer tenure are more likely to work overtime. Second, hourly overtime pay exceeds the value of marginal product while the basic hourly wage is less than the value of marginal product. Third, the basic hourly wage is negatively related to the overtime premium.

The Effects of Experience on Preference Uncertainty: Theory and Empirics for Public and Quasi-Public Environmental Goods

This paper develop and estimates a model of demand estimation for environmental public goods which allows for consumers to learn about their preferences through consumption experiences. We develop a theoretical model of Bayesian updating, perform comparative statics over the model, and show how the theoretical model can be consistently incorporated into a reduced form econometric model. We then estimate the model using data collected for two environmental goods. We find that the predictions of the theoretical exercise that additional experience makes consumers more certain over their preferences in both mean and variance are supported in each case.

A public key encryption based on third order linear sequences

Based on third order linear sequences, an improvement version of the Diffie-Hellman distribution key scheme and the ElGamal public key cryptosystem scheme are proposed, together with an implementation and computational cost. The security relies on the difficulty of factoring an RSA integer and on the difficulty of computing the discrete logarithm.

Peut-on faire confiance à l'administration ? Une analyse du concept de confiance, appliqué au secteur public

D'une manière générale, la confiance est un « lubrifiant » (Arrow, 1974) facilitant les relations sociales (eg Luhmann, 1968, Giddens, 1984, Zucker, 1986). D'un point de vue économique, un environnement institutionnel bénéficiant d'une confiance élevée serait corrélé avec la performance de l'économie nationale (eg Dyer and Chu, 2003). La confiance, en tant que capital social, permettrait et engendrerait des comportements altruistes et coopératifs impactant et soutenant la prospérité économique d'une communauté (Fukuyama, 1995). Dans un cadre organisationnel, la confiance engendre une communication plus ouverte et facilite l'échange d'information (eg Smith and Barclay, 1997, Currall and Judge, 1995), facilite la gestion des conflits (eg Blomqvist, 2002), l'apprentissage commun (eg Bijlsma-Frankema, 2004) ou diminue les coûts d'intégration (eg Bidault and Jarillo, 1995), par exemple.

Decentralization and the Gains from Monitoring

This paper analyzes the delegation of contracting capacity in a moral hazard environment with sequential production in a project which involves a principal and two agents. The agent in charge of the …nal production can obtain soft information about the other agent's effort choice by investing in monitoring. I investigate the circumstances under which it is optimal for the principal to use a centralized organization in which she designs the contracts with both agents or to use a decentralized organization in which she contracts only one agent, and delegates the power to contract the other agent. It is shown that in this setting a decentralized organization can be superior to a centralized organization. This is because the principal is better off under monitoring and the incentives for an agent to invest in monitoring can be higher in a decentralized organization. The circumstances under which this is true are related to the monitoring costs and the importance of each agent for production. The results explain the recent application of the design-build method in public procurement. Journal of Economic Literature Classi…cation Numbers: D23, D82, L14, L22. Keywords: Decentralization of Contracting, Monitoring, Moral Hazard.

Les difficultés de gestion des partenariats public-privé en Europe. Pour une lecture "institutionnelle"

Les partenariats public-privé se développent dans la quasi-totalité des pays de l'OCDE. De nombreux acteurs, publics ou privés, y voient un moyen pour développer de nouvelles infrastructures et prestations publiques à moindre coût et de manière sensiblement plus rapide et plus efficace. Considérés sous l'angle de leur gestion, les PPP s'avèrent finalement bien plus complexes qu'ils ne paraissent d'un premier abord. Basé sur une revue de la littérature européenne portant sur les expériences en cours sur le Continent, l'article vise à faire état de la nature des débats gestionnaires entourant cette nouvelle forme de coordination des activités étatiques en relevant plus spécifiquement les difficultés auxquelles la plupart des PPP sont confrontés, sur la base d'une lecture institutionnelle.

Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) : A pedagogical guide for decision makers in the public sector

This guide introduces Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), a performance measurement technique, in such a way as to be appropriate to decision makers with little or no background in economics and operational research. The use of mathematics is kept to a minimum. This guide therefore adopts a strong practical approach in order to allow decision makers to conduct their own efficiency analysis and to easily interpret results. DEA helps decision makers for the following reasons: - By calculating an efficiency score, it indicates if a firm is efficient or has capacity for improvement. - By setting target values for input and output, it calculates how much input must be decreased or output increased in order to become efficient. - By identifying the nature of returns to scale, it indicates if a firm has to decrease or increase its scale (or size) in order to minimize the average cost. - By identifying a set of benchmarks, it specifies which other firms' processes need to be analysed in order to improve its own practices.