Are agent-based simulations robust? The wholesale electricity trading case

Agent-based computational economics is becoming widely used in practice. This paperexplores the consistency of some of its standard techniques. We focus in particular on prevailingwholesale electricity trading simulation methods. We include different supply and demandrepresentations and propose the Experience-Weighted Attractions method to include severalbehavioural algorithms. We compare the results across assumptions and to economic theorypredictions. The match is good under best-response and reinforcement learning but not underfictitious play. The simulations perform well under flat and upward-slopping supply bidding,and also for plausible demand elasticity assumptions. Learning is influenced by the number ofbids per plant and the initial conditions. The overall conclusion is that agent-based simulationassumptions are far from innocuous. We link their performance to underlying features, andidentify those that are better suited to model wholesale electricity markets.

Contracting externalities and multiple equilibria in sectors: Theory and evidence

We consider an economy where the production technology has constantreturns to scale but where in the descentralized equilibrium thereare aggregate increasing returns to scale. The result follows froma positive contracting externality among firms. If a firms issurrounded by more firms, employees have more opportunitiesoutside their own firm. This improves employees' incentives toinvest in the presence of ex post renegotiation at the firm level,at not cost. Our leading result is that if a region is sparselypopulated or if the degree of development in the region is lowenough, there are multiple equilibria in the level of sectorialemployment. From the theoretical model we derive a non-linearfirst-order censored difference equation for sectoral employment.Our results are strongly consistent with the multiple equilibriahypothesis and the existence of a sectoral critical scale (belowwich the sector follows a delocation process). The scale of theregions' population and the degree of development reduce thecritical scale of the sector.

Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

An economic theory of church strictness

This paper makes several contributions to the growing literatureon the economics of religion. First, we explicitly introduce spatial-location models into the economics of religion. Second, we offer a newexplanation for the observed tendency of state (monopoly) churches tolocate toward the "low-tension" end of the "strictness continuum" (ina one-dimensional product space): This result is obtained through theconjunction of "benevolent preferences" (denominations care about theaggregate utility of members) and asymmetric costs of going to a moreor less strict church than one prefers.We also derive implications regarding the relationship between religiousstrictness and membership. The driving forces of our analysis, religiousmarket interactions and asymmetric costs of membership, high-light newexplanations for some well-established stylized facts. The analysis opensthe way to new empirical tests, aimed at confronting the implications ofour model against more traditional explanations.

A theory of international conflict management and sanctioning

In this paper we analyze sanctioning policies in international law. We develop a model of international military conflict where the conflicting countries can be a target of international sanctions. These sanctions constitute an equilibrium outcome of an international political market for sanctions, where different countries trade political influence. We show that the level of sanctions in equilibrium is strictly positive but limited, in the sense that higher sanctions would exacerbate the military conflict, not reduce it. We then propose an alternative interpretation to the perceived lack of effectiveness of international sanctions, by showing that the problem might not be one of undersanctioning but of oversanctioning.

Wh-constructions in cape verdean creole: extensions of the copy theory of movement

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Solving heterogeneous-agent models by projection and perturbation

The paper proposes a numerical solution method for general equilibrium models with a continuum of heterogeneous agents, which combines elements of projection and of perturbation methods. The basic idea is to solve first for the stationary solutionof the model, without aggregate shocks but with fully specified idiosyncratic shocks. Afterwards one computes a first-order perturbation of the solution in the aggregate shocks. This approach allows to include a high-dimensional representation of the cross-sectional distribution in the state vector. The method is applied to a model of household saving with uninsurable income risk and liquidity constraints. The model includes not only productivity shocks, but also shocks to redistributive taxation, which cause substantial short-run variation in the cross-sectional distribution of wealth. If those shocks are operative, it is shown that a solution method based on very few statistics of the distribution is not suitable, while the proposed method can solve the model with high accuracy, at least for the case of small aggregate shocks. Techniques are discussed to reduce the dimension of the state space such that higher order perturbations are feasible.Matlab programs to solve the model can be downloaded.

A Walrasian theory of commodity money: Paradoxical results

The objective of this note is to analyze some implications of the model of commodity money described in Banerjee and Maskin (1996) which may seem paradoxical. In order to do this, we incorporate a general production cost structure into the model. We focus on two different results. First, the existence of technologies that make counterfeiting a commodity more difficult may exclude it from being used as medium of exchange. Second, allocative distortions due to problems of asymmetric information may become larger in the presence of such technologies.

Institutional support of the firm: A theory of business registries

Registering originative business contracts allows entrepreneurs and creditors to choose, andcourts to enforce market-friendly contract rules that protect innocent third parties whenadjudicating disputes on subsequent contracts. This reduces information asymmetry for thirdparties, which enhances impersonal trade. It does so without seriously weakening property rights,because it is rightholders who choose or activate the legal rules and can, therefore, minimize thecost of any possible weakening. Registries are essential not only to make the chosen rules publicbut to ensure rightholders commitment and avoid rule-gaming, because independent registriesmake rightholders choices verifiable by courts. The theory is supported by comparative andhistorical analyses.

Systematic Assessment of Factors Influencing Preferences of Crohn's Disease Patients in Selecting an Anti-TNF agent (CHOOSE TNF TRIAL)

Background a nd A ims: I nfliximab (IFX), adalimumab (ADA)and certolizumab pegol (CZP) have similar efficacy for inductionand maintenance of clinical response and remission in Crohn'sdisease (CD). Given the comparable nature of t hese drugs,patients' p references m ay i nfluence the choice o f the product.Goal: to identify factors contributing to CD patients' decision inselecting one anti-TNF agent over the others.Methods: A p rospectdive s urvey was performed a mong a nti-TNF-naïve CD patients. Prior to completion of a questionnaire,patients were provided with a description of the three anti-TNFagents f ocusing on indications, route of administration, s ideeffects, and scientific evidence of efficacy and safety.Results: One hundred patients (47f/53m, mean age 45±16yrs)completed the questionnaire. Disease location was ileal, colonicand ileocolonic in 33%, 40% and 27% of patients, respectively.Thirty-six percent preferred ADA as medication of choice, while28% and 2 5% p referred CZP and IFX; 11% were u ndecided.Patients' decision in selecting an anti-TNF drug was influencedby t he following f actors: side effects ( 76%), p hysician'srecommendation (66%), route of administration (54%), efficacydata (52%), time required for therapy administration (27%),recommendations by other CD patients (21%) and interactionswith other medications (12%).Conclusions: T he majority of p atients p referred anti-TNFmedications t hat were a dministered by s ubcutaneous i njectionrather t han b y intravenous i nfusion. Side effect profile andphysicians' r ecommendation are t wo m ajor factors influencingthe patients' s election of a specific anti-TNF d rug. Patients'concerns about safety and lifestyle habits should be taken intoaccount when prescribing anti-TNF drugs.

A leverage theory of reputation building with co-branding: Complementarity in reputation building

We present a leverage theory of reputation building with co-branding. We showthat under certain conditions, co-branding that links unknown firms in a new sectorwith established firms in a mature sector allows the unknown firms to signal a highproduct quality and establish their own reputation. We compare this situationwith a benchmark in which both sectors are new and firms signal their qualityonly with prices. We investigate how this comparison is affected by the nature ofthe technology linking the two sectors and a cross-sector inference problem thatconsumers might face in identifying the true cause of product failure. We find thatco-branding facilitates the process in which a Þrm in the new sector to signal itsproduct quality only if the co-branding sectors produce complementary inputs andconsumers face a cross-sector inference problem. We apply our insight to economicsof superstars, multinational firms and co-authorship.

A theory of reference-dependent behavior

Extensive field and experimental evidence in a variety of environments show that behavior depends on a reference point. This paper provides an axiomatic characterization of this dependence. We proceed by imposing gradually more structure on both choice correspondences and preference relations, requiring increasingly higher levels of rationality, and freeing the decision-maker from certain types of inconsistencies. The appropriate degree of behavioral structure will depend on the phenomenon that is to be modeled. Lastly, we provide two applications of our work: one to model the status-quo bias, and another to model addictive behavior.

Externalities and interdependent growth: Theory and evidence

I formulate and estimate a model of externalities within countriesand technological interdependence across countries. I find that externalreturns to scale to physical capital within countries are 8 percent; thata 10 percent increase of total factor productivity of a country's neighborsraises its total factor productivity by 6 percent; and that a 2 percentannual growth rate of labor productivity can be explained as an endogenousresponse to an exogenous 0.2 percent annual growth rate of total factorproductivity in the steady--state.

Parental altruism under imperfect information: Theory and evidence

Can we reconcile the predictions of the altruism model of the familywith the evidence on intervivos transfers in the US? This paper expandsthe altruism model by introducing e ?ort of the child and by relaxingthe assumption of perfect information of the parent about the labormarket opportunities of the child. First, I solve and simulate a modelof altruism under imperfect information. Second, I use cross-sectionaldata to test a prediction of the model: Are parental transfers especiallyresponsive to the income variations of children who are very attached tothe labor market? The results suggest that imperfect information accountsfor several patterns of intergenerational transfers in the US.

A multicenter phase II study (SAKK 36/06) of single-agent everolimus (RAD001) in patients with relapsed or refractory mantle cell lymphoma

Introduction: Mantle cell lymphoma (MCL) accounts for 6% of all B-cell lymphomas and is in most cases an incurable disease. It is characterized by the translocation t(11;14) leading to Cyclin D1 over-expression. Cyclin D1 is downstream of the mammalian target of rapamycin (mTOR) threonine kinase and can be effectively blocked by mTOR inhibitors. We set out to define the single agent activity of the orally available mTOR inhibitor everolimus in a prospective, multicentre trial in patients with relapsed or refractory MCL (NCT00516412).Methods: Eligible patients with confirmed relapsed or refractory MCL received everolimus 10 mg for 28 days (one cycle) for a total of 6 cycles or until disease progression. The primary endpoint was the best objective response (OR) with adverse reactions, time to progression (TTP), time to treatment failure, response duration and molecular response as secondary endpoints.Results: A total of 36 patients with 35 evaluable patients at a median age of 69 years (range 40 to 85 years) from 19 centers were enrolled between August 2007 and January 2010. Treatment was generally well tolerated with anemia (11%), thrombocytopenia (11%), neutropenia (8%), diarrhea (3%) and fatigue (3%) being the most frequent complications of CTC grade 3 or higher. The OR rate was 20% (95% CI: 8-37%) with 2 complete remissions (CR) and 5 partial response (PR), stable disease (SD) 48% and progression disease (PD) 28%. At a median follow-up of 6 months, TTP was 5.45 months (95% CI: 2.8-8.2 months) for the entire population and 10.6 months for the 18 patients receiving 6 or more cycles of treatment. Three patients achieved a lasting complete molecular response when assessed in the peripheral blood.Conclusion: This study demonstrates that single agent everolimus is well tolerated and has anti-lymphoma activity including lasting molecular responses. Further studies of everolimus either in combination with chemotherapy or as single agent for maintenance treatment are warranted in MCL.