977 resultados para Weak Isometry
Resumo:
We quantify the long-time behavior of a system of (partially) inelastic particles in a stochastic thermostat by means of the contractivity of a suitable metric in the set of probability measures. Existence, uniqueness, boundedness of moments and regularity of a steady state are derived from this basic property. The solutions of the kinetic model are proved to converge exponentially as t→ ∞ to this diffusive equilibrium in this distance metrizing the weak convergence of measures. Then, we prove a uniform bound in time on Sobolev norms of the solution, provided the initial data has a finite norm in the corresponding Sobolev space. These results are then combined, using interpolation inequalities, to obtain exponential convergence to the diffusive equilibrium in the strong L¹-norm, as well as various Sobolev norms.
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In this paper we analyze the existence of spatial autocorrelation at a local level in Catalonia using variables such as urbanisation economies, population density, human capital and firm entries. From a static approach, our results show that spatial autocorrelation is weak and diminishes as the distance between municipalities increases. From a dynamic approach, however, spatial autocorrelation increased over the period we analysed. These results are important from a policy point of view, since it is essential to know how economic activities are spatially concentrated or disseminated. Key words: spatial autocorrelation, municipalities. JEL classification: R110, R120
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We study manager-employee interactions in experiments set in a corporate environment where payoffs depend on employees coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak-link game. In the absence of managerial intervention subjects invariably slip into coordination failure. To overcome a history of coordination failure, managers have two instruments at their disposal, increasing employees' financial incentives to coordinate and communication with employees. We find that communication is a more effective tool than incentive changes for leading organizations out of performance traps. Examining the content of managers' communication, the most effective messages specifically request a high effort, point out the mutual benefits of high effort, and imply that employees are being paid well.
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Many organizations suffer poor performance because its members fail to coordinate on efficient patterns of behavior. In previous research, we have shown that financial incentives can be used to find a way out of such performance traps. Here we examine the sensitivity of this result to the ability of people to observe others' choices. Our experiments are set in a corporate environment where subjects' payoffs depend on coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by the employees of an experimental firm is a weak-link game. Treatments vary along two dimensions. First, subjects either start with low financial incentives for coordination, which typically leads to coordination failure, and then are switched to higher incentives or start with high incentives, which typically yield effective coordination, and are switched to low incentives. Second, as the key treatment variable, subjects either observe the effort levels chosen by all employees in their experimenta
Resumo:
Many organizations suffer poor performance because individuals within the organization fail to coordinate on efficient patterns of behavior. Using controlled laboratory experiments, we study how financial incentives can be used to find a way out of such performance traps. Our experiments are set in a corporate environment where subjects' payoffs depend on coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak-link game. In an initial phase, the benefits of coordination are low relative to the cost of increased effort. Play in this initial phase typically converges to an inefficient outcome with employees failing to coordinate at high effort levels. The experimental design then explores the effects of varying the financial incentives to coordinate at a higher effort level. We find that an increase in the benefits of coordination leads to improved coordination, but, surprisingly, large increases have no more impact than small increases. Once subj
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We consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule that has played a central role in the analysis of the problem is the so-called uniform rule. Chun (2001) proves that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying Pareto optimality, no-envy, separability, and continuity (with respect to the social endowment). We obtain an alternative characterization by using a weak replication-invariance condition, called duplication-invariance, instead of continuity. Furthermore, we prove that Pareto optimality, equal division lower bound, and separability imply no-envy. Using this result, we strengthen one of Chun's (2001) characterizations of the uniform rule by showing that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying Pareto optimality, equal división lower bound, separability, and either continuity or duplication-invariance.
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The A. described on December 14, 1951, his first culture of acid-fast bacillus isolated from nasal mucus of a leprous girl. in this paper the A. describes two new strains of acid-fast bacilli gotten also from nasal mucus of other two leprous girls, L3 cases. The first patient (layse S) had her mucus treated by petroff's method on December 16, 1952 and sown onto three tubes of loewenstein medium and in glycerin broth. After two weeks incubation at 37°C all three tubes of Loewenstein showed many punctiforme and pin-head yellowish colonies, whose microscopic examination proved to be of a pure acid-fast bacillus culture. This sample inoculated in rats and mice produced, after 55 days incubation, small tumors from which the culture was easily recovered. On April, 9, 1953 a new sample of nasal mucus of the same patient was sown in three tubes of Loewenstein. After two weeks incubation at 37°C all 3 tubes showed germination of small yellowish colonies of acid-fast bacilli. Within four months being gotten two samples of identical cultures in all smeared tubes of Loewenstein medium sown, proved that such cultures were not an ordinary ambient contamination. Second patient: - Maria N. After various sowing of different kinds of material from her, february 26, 1953 her nasal mucus treated by soda and sown onto Loewenstein medium, after 25 days incubation showed in only one tube, one small round colony, at first white, becoming creamy after three months. Transplants in various media grew at first slowly and after 2 or 3 generations grew faster. The "Layse" strain produced pellicle in glycerin broth and Dubos medium; the "Maria N." strain did not produce as yet. Both strains (Layse I and II, and Maria N.) gave weak positive Dubos test in half-an-hour and negative after 24 hours reading. Both were strongly positive when stained by Gram, Ziehl-Neelsen and Fontes methods. Both strains gave also positive fluoroscopy. These cultures are being studied. The A. concludes that, according to his experience, the slower growing cultures of acid-fast bacilli isolated from leprosy material, are the more suitable for experimental work. Aknowledgement. The A. thanks to Miss MARIA DE LOURDES SANTANA for her valuable collaboration in the studies of the described cultures.
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The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate another agent to misrepresent his preference and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of efficient, strategy-proof, and weak replacement monotonic rules. In addition, we identify the functional form of all bribe-proof and tops-only rules.
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How should an equity-motivated policy-marker allocate public capital (infrastructure) across regions. Should it aim at reducing interregional differences in per capita output, or at maximizing total output? Such a normative question is examined in a model where the policy-marker is exclusively concerned about personal inequality and has access to two policy instruments. (i) a personal tax-transfer system (taxation is distortionary), and (ii) the regional allocation of public investment. I show that the case for public investment as a significant instrument for interpersonal redistribution is rather weak. In the most favorable case, when the tax code is constrained to be uniform across regions, it is optimal to distort the allocation of public investment in favor of the poor regions, but only to a limited extent. The reason is that poor individuals are relatively more sensitive to public trans fers, which are maximized by allocating public investment efficiently. If! the tax code can vary across regions then the optimal policy may involve an allocation of public investment distorted in favor of the rich regions.
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The reversals of Mitsuda's reactions induced by BCG have been objected to based on the possiblem interference of other determination causes of the phenomenon: tuberculous primo-infections, communicants of unsuspected leprosy, revearsals due to other causes, such as anti-diphteric and anti-tetanic vaccination, etc. In order to study the problem, we have used Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), which were reared in isolation, in an attempt to avoid the referred to interferences. Prior to the experiments, all animals were tested and found negative to radiograph, tuberculin and lepromin tests and were then submitted to the application of BCG vaccine (from 1 to 3 days old), in different doses and by different via. At different times, after the application of BCG, they were again submitted to the radiographic, tuberculin and lepromin tests. In the tables I to IV the experiences were summarised. From the experiments, the following conclusions were reached: 1 - From 12 Rhesus that received BCG 11 showed reversals of the Mitsuda reaction (91.7%). 2 - These reverseals took place both in tests effected shortly after BCG (from 6 days to 2 months), and tests effected much later (from 7 to 12 months after BCG). 3 - Some differences were found in the results, according to the dosis and the application via of the BCG. a) - The testicular and peritonela via (0,02g) were the only that determined strong positive Mitsuda's reactions (+++). b) - By oral via, animals that received high dosis (0.6g and 1.2 g), there resulted uniform and regular reversals, even though of low intensity (+); but from those who got small doses (0.2 g.) one showed no reversals in all tests, and the other presented reversals in the 2nd and 3rd tests only, also with low positivity (+). 4) In the 2nd and 3rd Mitsuda's reactions in the same animals, positivity was always precocious (generally within 48 hours), one getting the impression that there occurs a sensibilization of the animal body by the antigen with the repetition of the tests, even though the intensity of the reaction always remains the same. This precocious reaction (Fernandez type) occurs both shortly and long time after the application of the BCG. Its precocity depends not of the antigen only because the first Mitsuda's reaction after the BCG application occurs after some time and seems not influenced by the control lepromin test effected on the Rhesus before the BCG. 5) On the control group, the animals which received a.a.f. bacilli suspensions (Mycobacterium sp.; M. avium, and M. smegmatis), did not show reverseals of the Mitsuda's reaction. Two Rhesus, however, which received dead BCG (120ºC autoclave 1 hour), one intradermically (0.006 g) and the other orally (1.2 g), did both present reversals of the Mitsuda's reaction, with weak positivity (+). In all animals of the control-group, the allergic reactions were found negative. 6) Strong local inflammatory reactions were observed in the Rhesus that had received living BCG by intradermal via, and in the one submitted to multipunctures, there occurred the formation of a large caseous abcess. 7) The allergic tuberculinic and infratuberculinic reactions appeared dissociated from the Mitsuda's reactions: sometimes they are more precocious, occurring before of the lepromin test; on other occasions they disappear, when the Mitsuda's reactions still persist; and finally, they may be absent, when the latter occur, especially after the oral application of the BCG. 8) In Rhesus which received BCG by testicular and peritonela via, in the infratuberculinic test (0.1 ml of total BCG extract), besides the classic answer, which occurs between 48 and 96 hours, one could observe a delayed answer (15 to 20 days), represented by a non-erythematous nodule, which persists for 11-14 days.
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Consider a Riemannian manifold equipped with an infinitesimal isometry. For this setup, a unified treatment is provided, solely in the language of Riemannian geometry, of techniques in reduction, linearization, and stability of relative equilibria. In particular, for mechanical control systems, an explicit characterization is given for the manner in which reduction by an infinitesimal isometry, and linearization along a controlled trajectory "commute." As part of the development, relationships are derived between the Jacobi equation of geodesic variation and concepts from reduction theory, such as the curvature of the mechanical connection and the effective potential. As an application of our techniques, fiber and base stability of relative equilibria are studied. The paper also serves as a tutorial of Riemannian geometric methods applicable in the intersection of mechanics and control theory.
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Recently a number of mainstream papers have treated the rise of democracy in 19th century Europe and its instability in Latin America in an eminently Marxist fashion. This paper sets out their implications for Marxist thought. With respect to Europe, Marx's emphasis on political action backed by the threat of violence is vindicated but his justification for socialism is not. With respect to Latin America, the unequal distribution of wealth is the cause of political instability that is, in turn, the root cause of mass poverty. In addition it is possible to explain some of the paradoxical characteristics of neo-liberalism and to make a weak argument for socialism in spite of its rejection in Europe.
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We study how the heterogeneity of agents affects the extent to which changes in financial incentives can pull a group out of a situation of coordination failure. We focus on the connections between cost asymmetries and leadership. Experimental subjects interact in groups of four in a series of weak-link games. The treatment variable is the distribution of high and low effort cost across subjects. We present data for one, two and three low-cost subjects as well as control sessions with symmetric costs. The overall pattern of coordination improvement is common across treatments. Early coordination improvements depend on the distribution of high and low effort costs across subjects, but these differences disappear with time. We find that initial leadership in overcoming coordination failure is not driven by low-cost subjects but by subjects with the most frequent cost. This conformity effect can be due to a kind of group identity or to the cognitive simplicity of acting with identical others.
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We analyze the two-dimensional parabolic-elliptic Patlak-Keller-Segel model in the whole Euclidean space R2. Under the hypotheses of integrable initial data with finite second moment and entropy, we first show local in time existence for any mass of "free-energy solutions", namely weak solutions with some free energy estimates. We also prove that the solution exists as long as the entropy is controlled from above. The main result of the paper is to show the global existence of free-energy solutions with initial data as before for the critical mass 8 Π/Χ. Actually, we prove that solutions blow-up as a delta dirac at the center of mass when t→∞ keeping constant their second moment at any time. Furthermore, all moments larger than 2 blow-up as t→∞ if initially bounded.
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Variational steepest descent approximation schemes for the modified Patlak-Keller-Segel equation with a logarithmic interaction kernel in any dimension are considered. We prove the convergence of the suitably interpolated in time implicit Euler scheme, defined in terms of the Euclidean Wasserstein distance, associated to this equation for sub-critical masses. As a consequence, we recover the recent result about the global in time existence of weak-solutions to the modified Patlak-Keller-Segel equation for the logarithmic interaction kernel in any dimension in the sub-critical case. Moreover, we show how this method performs numerically in one dimension. In this particular case, this numerical scheme corresponds to a standard implicit Euler method for the pseudo-inverse of the cumulative distribution function. We demonstrate its capabilities to reproduce easily without the need of mesh-refinement the blow-up of solutions for super-critical masses.