The genesis of EC environmental principles. Research Paper in Law 7/2003

[From the Introduction]. The EC Treaty in its present version contains a number of environmental principles. The following contribution will try to retrace the origins of these principles in the EC Treaty and how they were developed by the EC institutions and in particular by the Commission. This discussion concerns the principles of integration[1], prevention[2] and precaution[3], the principle that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source[4] and the polluter-pays principle[ 5].

National Parliaments and their Role in European Integration: The EU’s Democratic Deficit in Times of Economic Hardship and Political Insecurity. Bruges Political Research Paper 28/2013

The article describes and assesses the role of national parliaments in EU legislation considering the reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. This is closely connected with the understanding and (political) application of the principle of subsidiarity. After an analysis of the possibilities and limitations of the relevant legal regulations in the post-Lisbon age, alternative ways for participation of national legislators on the European level are being scrutinized and proposed. The issue of democratic legitimization is also interconnected with the current political reforms being discussed in order to overcome the Euro Crisis. Finally, the authors argue that it does not make sense to include national parliaments in the existing legislative triangle of the EU, but instead to promote the creation of a new kind of supervisory body.

The start-up fund - an elegant treaty mechanism for sustaining defence capabilities. Security Policy Brief No. 48, June 2013

When the European Council meets in December, it will face a range of decisions which will lay the foundations for Europe's defence posture and role in the wider world for decades to come, perhaps even beyond the remainder of this century. The Lisbon Treaty has, for the first time, equipped the EU with the range of means to meet that role in practice. The question that remains to be answered is whether Europe's leaders have the political will to implement those means in full.

Déjà-vu (again): The Lisbon Treaty Referendum in Ireland. IHS Political Science Series No. 133, February 2013

There has been an increasing use of direct democracy in the form of referendums on aspects of European integration. Two such referendums have been held in Ireland in 2008 and 2009 with the outcome changing from a No to a Yes vote. This paper addresses the question of what explains the change in outcome in two referendums on essentially the same document. It will do so by looking at the role of the campaign in providing information and hence reducing uncertainty, the importance of issue frames and the impact of domestic considerations on vote choice. It is suggested that there has not been a change in underlying attitudes but a change in how the Irish electorate weighed the same factors differently at both referendums. In addition, a change in economic conditions at the time of the second referendum also had an effect on how voters decided the second time around.

Administrative Capacity for Effective Implementation of EU Law

Article 197 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union stipulates that effective implementation of Union law by the Member States shall be regarded as a matter of common interest. This article considers how Member States may improve their administrative capacity to apply EU law effectively. A law or policy is effectively implemented when it can be confirmed that its objectives, targets or results are actually achieved. It is proposed that effective implementation in the EU is a ‘collaborative project’. This is not only because Member States benefit when others correctly implement common rules, but also because they learn from the experiences of other Member States. It follows that the public authorities responsible for implementation of EU law need to benchmark their performance against that of their peers in other Member States and therefore need to develop the institutional capacity for assessing and adjusting their own performance.

What Does the Lisbon Treaty Change Regarding Subsidiarity within the EU Institutional Framework?

he principle of subsidiarity refers in general to the choice of the most suitable and efficient level for taking policy action. The European Union associates subsidiarity with the way of taking decisions ‘as closely as possible to the citizen’, as it is referred to in the EU treaties. Thus, ensuring the respect of subsidiarity within the EU legislative framework ensures that any EU action is justified when proposing draft legislative acts. The Lisbon Treaty establishes new mechanisms reinforcing subsidiarity control, both ex ante and ex post the EU legislative process, and by doing so, enhances mainly the role of the national parliaments (and to a lesser extent the regional parliaments) and the Committee of the Regions. But in the end, this is a way of ensuring legitimacy of the EU action as it is quite often questioned, especially in times of crisis. Years of practice will tell whether the words will join reality.

The ‘Lisbonisation’ of the European Parliament: Assessing progress, shortcomings and challenges for democratic accountability in the area of freedom, security and justice. CEPS Paper on Liberty and Security in Europe No. 58, September 2013

This paper examines the performance of the European Parliament in EU AFSJ law and policy-making from the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty until the end of the first half of 2013. The paper situates the EP in the new post-Lisbon institutional setting, documenting its transition to ‘AFSJ decision-maker’, and its new powers to shape and make policy covering the EU’s internal and external security agenda. While the paper finds that the EP has become an active co-owner of the EU AFSJ post-Lisbon, with the Parliament demonstrating a dynamic adjustment to its new post-Lisbon role and powers, the authors identify a set of new developments and challenges that have arisen in the conduct of democratic accountability by the EP in the AFSJ since 2009, which call for critical reflection ahead of the new parliamentary term 2014-2019 and the post-2014 phase of the EU’s AFSJ.

The Future Organisation of the European Courts. Research Papers in Law, 2/2005

From the Introduction. According to Article 220 of the EC Treaty, the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance (hereinafter CFI) “each within its jurisdiction, shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of [the EC] Treaty the law is observed”. The “pre-Nice” allocation of jurisdiction between the two Community courts can be summarized as follows. At Court of Justice level, mention should first of all be made of references for a preliminary ruling. A national court, in a case pending before it, can - or in some circumstances must - refer to the Court of Justice a question relating to the interpretation of provisions of the EC Treaty or of secondary Community law, or relating to the validity of provisions of secondary Community law.1 Moreover, the Court of Justice ensures the observance of the law in the context of actions for annulment or failure to act brought before it by the Community institutions, the European Central Bank (hereinafter ECB) and the Member States.2 These actions concern, respectively, the legality of an act of secondary Community law and the legality of the failure of the institution concerned to adopt such act. The Court of Justice also has jurisdiction in actions brought by the Commission or by a Member State relating to the infringement of Community law by a Member State (hereinafter infringement actions)3 and in actions relating to compensation for non-contractual damage brought by Member States against the Community.4 Finally, as regards the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, mention should be made of appeals which can be lodged on points of law only against rulings of the CFI.5

The Convention on the Future of Europe: Extended Working Group or Constitutional Assembly? Research Papers in Law, 4/2005

From the Introduction. “We are a Convention. We are not an Intergovernmental Conference because we have not been given a mandate by Governments to negotiate on their behalf the solutions which we propose. We are not a Parliament because we are not elected by citizens to draft legislative texts. […] We are a Convention. What does this mean? A Convention is a group of men and women meeting for the sole purpose of preparing a joint proposal. […] It is a task modest in form but immense in content, for if it succeeds in accordance with our mandate, it will light up the future of Europe”.1 In his speech inaugurating the Convention process on 26 February 2002 in Brussels, Convention President VALÉRY GISCARD D’ESTAING raises three issues: first, he refers to the Convention’s nature and method; second, he talks of the Convention’s aim and output; and, third, he evokes the Convention’s historic and symbolic significance. All three aspects have been amply discussed in the past two years by politicians and academics analysing whether the Convention’s purpose and instruments differ fundamentally from those of previous reform rounds; whether the input into and output of the Convention process qualitatively improves European Treaty revision; and whether the Convention as an institution lived up to its symbolic and normative load, reflected in comparisons with “Philadelphia” or references to a “constitutional moment”.2

From Structure to Substance: Has the Constitutional Treaty improved the Chances for a Common Foreign and Security Policy? Research Papers in Law, 6/2005

From the Introduction. A common foreign and security policy for the European Union is an issue of the day. While most academic and many political observers believe that it would be in the interest of the Union to have a common policy, there is quite some disagreement as to how this is to be achieved and whether it should be accomplished in an assured and regular manner or whether it should come about on an ad hoc basis only when it is in the clear interest of all member states at any particular time. In other words, is a common foreign policy to be a fundamental characteristic of the Union or is it to be an occasional occurrence when advantageous and convenient, the ‘C’ in CFSP – as one observer has sarcastically commented – standing not for ‘Common’ but for ‘Convenient’?2

Environmental judgements by the Court of Justice and their duration. Research Papers in Law, 4/2008

From the Introduction. Little attention is paid, until now, to the duration of environmental procedures under Articles 226 and 228 EC Treaty, though these procedures are the only instrument at the disposal of the European Commission to enforce the application of EC environmental law1. Indeed, the Commission itself has no possibility to impose a fine or a penalty payment against a Member State, or to withhold sums under the Structural Funds, where a Member State persistently infringes Community environmental law. Rather, the Commission is obliged to first issue a Letter of Formal Notice against a Member State which infringes Community law. Where the infringement is not repaired, the Commission may issue a Reasoned Opinion against the Member State, and if also this does not lead to the compliance with EC law, it may appeal to the Court of Justice2.

Decentralisation of EC Competition Law Enforcement and General Principles of Community Law. Research Papers in Law, 4/2004

From the Introduction. By virtue of Council Regulation No. 1/2003, as of 1st May 2004 the full application of EC competition law will be entrusted to national competition authorities (hereinafter NCAs) and national courts. The bold reform of EC competition law enforcement adheres to the system of executive federalism1 which characterises the EC legal system. The repartition of competences within the Community allocates implementation of Community law mainly at Member States level. Pursuant to Article 10 EC, they are responsible for the implementation of the measures which have been adopted at Community level for the achievement of the objectives specified in the EC Treaty. Consequently, the attainment of the Community objectives depends very much upon the cooperation of national authorities, which act in accordance with their own national procedural rules.2 The various national procedural rules present themselves as conduits through which Community law is implemented and enforced. While as a rule Community law is not designed to alter national procedural rules, the Community legal order cannot afford to leave national procedural rules untouched when they are liable to hamper the effective application of Community law....For reason of space, this contribution intends only to highlight some aspects of Regulation No. 1/2003 with regard to which general principles of Community law are able to condition national procedural rules.

The Common Agricultural Policy: The Future of the CAP and why real reform will never happen. EUMA Paper Vol. 6 No. 7, May 2010

This paper sets out to examine the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union from its inception to present day 1. Specifically, this paper seeks to answer the following questions: (1) What long-term effects, if any, did the circumstances surrounding, and leading up to the formation of the CAP have; (2) What have internal and external responses been to the CAP; (3) How has the CAP responded to major events both internally (within the European Union), and externally (internationally); (4) What affect does the recently implemented Lisbon Treaty2 have on the CAP, and (5) What is the future of the CAP and CAP reform? In order to answer these questions this paper begins with the contention that the CAP is in fact the largest and strongest driving force of EU expansion. In support of this proposition, this paper first examines the circumstances and events leading to the creation of the CAP in the European Community. Second, this paper examines what long-term effects the circumstances surrounding the CAP’s inception have had on the policy, particularly calling attention to the disproportionate Franco-German CAP benefits. Third, the paper then examines how the CAP has responded to historical events that have had significant effects on the European community, particularly EU expansion, the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, and the recent worldwide economic crisis. Finally, this paper examines common criticisms of and conflicts surrounding the CAP, both internally and externally, and argues that CAP reform, at least within the current institutional framework of the European Union, can never truly occur.

The Theory of Interhybridity: Socio-political Dimensions and Migration Experiences of Post-communist Western Balkan States

The Western Balkans integration within the EU has started a legal process which is the rejection of former communist legal/political approaches and the transformation of former communist institutions. Indeed, the EU agenda has brought vertical/horizontal integration and Europeanization of national institutions (i.e. shifting power to the EU institutions and international authorities). At this point, it is very crucial to emphasize the fact that the Western Balkans as a whole region has currently an image that includes characteristics of both the Soviet socialism and the European democracy. The EU foreign policies and enlargement strategy for Western Balkans have significant effects on four core factors (i.e. Schengen visa regulations, remittances, asylum and migration as an aggregate process). The convergence/divergence of EU member states’ priorities for migration policies regulate and even shape directly the migration dynamics in migrant sender countries. From this standpoint, the research explores how main migration factors are influenced by political and judicial factors such as; rule of law and democracy score, the economic liberation score, political and human rights, civil society score and citizenship rights in Western Balkan countries. The proposal of interhybridity explores how the hybridization of state and non-state actors within home and host countries can solve labor migration-related problems. The economical and sociopolitical labor-migration model of Basu (2009) is overlapping with the multidimensional empirical framework of interhybridity. Indisputably, hybrid model (i.e. collaboration state and non-state actors) has a catalyst role in terms of balancing social problems and civil society needs. Paradigmatically, it is better to perceive the hybrid model as a combination of communicative and strategic action that means the reciprocal recognition within the model is precondition for significant functionality. This will shape social and industrial relations with moral meanings of communication.