Gender stereotypes in politics: what changes when a woman becomes the local political leader?

This study documents how the presence of a woman in an executive political role affects the gender stereotype of women in politics. We use Brazilian electoral data and restrict our focus to close mayoral races (using an RDD design) in which the top two candidates are of opposite sexes. Our most important result was a reduction in the number of candidates and votes for female mayoral candidates after a woman is elected, regardless of her eligibility status for reelection. This negative result is linked only to the position of mayor and not to other political positions (councilor, state or federal deputy). In addition, our results may be interpreted as evidence that voters do not use their update on women as local leaders to change their beliefs on women���s ability to run for other political positions. Finally, female mayors do not appear to have a role model effect on younger cohorts of women. We also note that our results are not influenced by differences in mayoral policies (generally and specifically for women), which could influence voters��� gender stereotypes.

The role of media networks in compensating political biases: evidence from radio networks in Brazil

A central question in political economy is how to incentivize elected socials to allocate resources to those that need them the most. Research has shown that, while electoral incentives lead central governments to transfer fewer funds to non-aligned constituencies, media presence is instrumental in promoting a better allocation of resources. This study evaluates how these two phenomena interact by analyzing the role of media in compensating political biases. In particular, we analyze how media presence, connectivity and ownership affect the distribution of federal drought relief transfers to Brazilian municipalities. We find that municipalities that are not aligned with the federal government have a lower probability of receiving funds conditional on experiencing low precipitation. However, we show that the presence of radio stations compensates for this bias. This effect is driven by municipalities that have radio stations connected to a regional network rather than by the presence of local radio stations. In addition, the effect of network-connected radio stations increases with their network coverage. These findings suggests that the connection of a radio station to a network is important because it increases the salience of disasters, making it harder for the federal government to ignore non-allies. We show that our findings are not explained by the ownership and manipulation of media by politicians.

Implicit corporate political activity and elite formation

Nesta tese, analisamos como a elite empresarial progressista criou a organiza����o da sociedade civil Rede Nossa S��o Paulo (RNSP), alcan��ando mudan��as institucionais significativas, permitindo assim a consolida����o da elite na esfera pol��tica. A pesquisa resultou em tr��s artigos. O primeiro artigo discute como a RNSP se tornou um forte ator pol��tico na cidade de S��o Paulo e tamb��m no Brasil. Para abordar esta quest��o, mostramos como a RNSP usou a hist��ria ret��rica para se tornar um ator central na esfera pol��tica. No segundo artigo, propomos o conceito de atividade pol��tica corporativa impl��cita (ICPA), complementar a atividade pol��tica corporativa. Conceituamos ICPA como elites empresariais em conjunto com organiza����es da sociedade civil agindo para influenciar o governo. Com os limites entre o governo, as empresas e organiza����es da sociedade civil difusos; entendemos que este conceito �� extremamente importante para chamar a aten����o e criar novos caminhos para a pesquisa sobre a influ��ncia das empresas no governo. No ��ltimo artigo, mostramos os micro fundamentos da ICPA. Especificamente, como as elites empresariais e corpora����es influenciam a RNSP e, indiretamente, o governo. Concluindo, contribu��mos para a literatura sobre a influ��ncia das empresas no governo e na esfera p��blica indiretamente, por meio de organiza����es da sociedade civil. Teoricamente, estendemos a literatura de teoria institucional, hist��ria e poder

Political budget cycles in a fiscal federation : the effect of partisan voluntary transfers

This article first presents an econometric study suggesting that intergovernmental transfers to Brazilian municipalities are strongly partisan motivated. In light of that stylized fact, it develops an extension to Rogoff (1990)���s model to analyze the effect of partisan motivated transfers into sub-national electoral and fiscal equilibria. The main finding is that important partisan transfers may undo the positive selection aspect of political budget cycles. Indeed, partisan transfers may, on one hand, eliminate the political budget cycle, solving a moral hazard problem, but, on the other hand, they may retain an incompetent incumbent in office, bringing about an adverse selection problem.

Rent dissipation, political viability and the strategic adoption of free trade agreements

This paper studies the political viability of free trade agreements (FTAs). The key element of the analysis is the ���rent dissipation��� that these arrangements induce: by eliminating intra-bloc trade barriers, an FTA reduces the incentives of the local firms to lobby for higher external tariffs, thereby causing a reduction of the rents created in the lobbying process. The prospect of rent dissipation moderates the governments��� willingness to participate in FTAs; they will support only arrangements that are ���substantially��� welfare improving, and no FTA that reduces welfare. Rent dissipation also implies that the prospects of political turnover may create strategic reasons for the formation of FTAs. Specifically, a government facing a high enough probability of losing power may want to form a trade bloc simply to ���tie the hands��� of its successor. An FTA can affect the likelihood of political turnover as well. If the incumbent party has a known bias toward special interests, it may want to commit to less distortionary policies in order to reduce its electoral disadvantage; the rent dissipation effect ensures that an FTA can serve as the vehicle for such a commitment. In nascent/unstable democracies, the incumbent government can use a free trade agreement also to reduce the likelihood of a dictatorial takeover and to ���consolidate��� democracy ��� a finding that is consistent with the timing of numerous accessions to and formations of preferential arrangements.

Signaling in political budget cycles: How far are you willing to go?

This paper analyzes how heterogeneity in two dimensions, competency and character, a��ects political budget cycles. Competency is the e��ciency in running the government. Character is the degree of opportunism. In this expanded space, previous results in the literature on the separating nature of the signaling equilibrium hold if heterogeneity in opportunism is low. With high heterogeneity in opportunism, no separating equilibrium exists. Rather, the equilibrium is partially pooling: only extreme types can be distinguished.

Reelection incentives and political corruption : evidence from Brazil���s municipal audit reports

This paper uses a unique dataset of political corruption, constructed from municipal audit reports obtained from Brazil���s randomized anti-corruption program, to test whether reelection incentives affect the level of rent extraction of incumbent politicians. In order to identify reelection incentives, we use the existence of a term limit in Brazil���s municipal elections. We find that in municipalities where mayors are in their second and final term, there is significantly more corruption compared to similar municipalities where mayors are in their first-term. In particular, in municipalities with second-term mayors there is, on average, R$188,431 more diversion of resources and the incidence of irregularities is 23% higher. We also find more pronounced effects where the costs of rent-extraction are lower (municipalities without media and judicial presence), and the density of pivotal voters is higher (more political competition). Finally, we show that first-term mayors, while less corrupt, have a larger incidence of poor administration suggesting that there may exist a trade-off between corruption and quality in public good provision.

2014 World Cup live blog: political protestor invades field at US vs Belgium

Retirado do Vice News.

Risky business: social media metrics and political risk analysis

A quantifica����o do risco pa��s ��� e do risco pol��tico em particular ��� levanta v��rias dificuldades ��s empresas, institui����es, e investidores. Como os indicadores econ��micos s��o atualizados com muito menos freq����ncia do que o Facebook, compreender, e mais precisamente, medir ��� o que est�� ocorrendo no terreno em tempo real pode constituir um desafio para os analistas de risco pol��tico. No entanto, com a crescente disponibilidade de ���big data��� de ferramentas sociais como o Twitter, agora �� o momento oportuno para examinar os tipos de m��tricas das ferramentas sociais que est��o dispon��veis e as limita����es da sua aplica����o para a an��lise de risco pa��s, especialmente durante epis��dios de viol��ncia pol��tica. Utilizando o m��todo qualitativo de pesquisa bibliogr��fica, este estudo identifica a paisagem atual de dados dispon��veis a partir do Twitter, analisa os m��todos atuais e potenciais de an��lise, e discute a sua poss��vel aplica����o no campo da an��lise de risco pol��tico. Depois de uma revis��o completa do campo at�� hoje, e tendo em conta os avan��os tecnol��gicos esperados a curto e m��dio prazo, este estudo conclui que, apesar de obst��culos como o custo de armazenamento de informa����o, as limita����es da an��lise em tempo real, e o potencial para a manipula����o de dados, os benef��cios potenciais da aplica����o de m��tricas de ferramentas sociais para o campo da an��lise de risco pol��tico, particularmente para os modelos qualitativos-estruturados e quantitativos, claramente superam os desafios.

Betting on winner: the effect of local elections on corporate political activity outcomes

How can managers successfully access political rents by way of corporate political strategies (CPA)? Existing research has suggested several endogenous factors that correlate with CPA outcomes. I offer a more robust solution to this problem. Drawing on insights from the perspective of CPA as exchanges between firms and political decision-makers, and from the special interest politics of political economy, I develop and test a causal mechanism that links local elections, legislative bargaining and access to political rents at the national level. I conducted a natural experiment using regression discontinuity design and propensity score matching in municipal elections in Brazil to show that firms enjoy superior access to subsidized financing from the state-owned national development bank (BNDES) when they decide to invest in municipalities whose winning mayoral candidate is coalition-aligned with the national ruler. This effect fades away fades away as the level of competition in the local election decreases. The evidence implies that when managers bet on national coalition-aligned winners in close local elections, they positively affect CPA outcomes. I extend the exchange-based typology of corporate political strategies by offering a novel possibility of targeting voters with financial inducements, which I call a private local development strategy. Finally, these results show that firms exchange their project-execution capabilities for superior access to subsidized financing.

The Limits of political compromise: debt ceilings and political competition

We study the desirability of limits on the public debt and of political competition in an economy where political parties alternate in office. Due to rent-seeking motives, incumbents have an incentive to set public expenditures above the socially optimal level. Parties cannot commit to future policies, but they can forge a political compromise where each party curbs excessive spending when in office if it expects future governments to do the same. In contrast to the received literature, we find that strict limits on government borrowing can exacerbate political-economy distortions by rendering a political compromise unsustainable. This tends to happen when political competition is limited. Conversely, a tight limit on the public debt fosters a compromise that yields the efficient outcome when political competition is vigorous, saving the economy from immiseration. Our analysis thus suggests a legislative tradeoff between restricting political competition and constraining the ability of governments to issue debt.