Efficient taxation of multi-national enterprises in the European Union. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 5/2003

Current arrangements for multi-national company taxation in EU are plagued by severe conceptual and administrative problems, leading to high compliance costs, considerable uncertainty and ample room for abuse. Integration is amplifying these difficulties. There are two possible approaches in designing an efficient trans-border corporate tax system for the European Union. The first is to consolidate the EU-wide operations of MNEs, using an agreed common base as the reference variable, and then to apportion this total tax base using some presumptive indicators of activity in each tax jurisdiction – hence, implicitly, of the likely benefits stemming from each location. The apportionment formula should respect requisites of neutrality between productive factors and forms of corporate financing. A radically different approach is also available that offers considerable advantages in terms of efficiency, simplicity and decentralisation, including full administrative autonomy of national tax authorities. It entails abandoning corporate income as the relevant tax base and taxing at a moderate rate some agreed measure of business activity such as company value added, sales or employment. These are the variables usually considered in formula apportionment, but they would apply directly without having first to go through the complications of EU-wide consolidation based on a common-base definition. Reference to a broad base, with no exemptions or deductions, would allow to set low statutory rates.

Influence of the Common Agricultural Policy and Heterogeneous Land Quality on Land Rent and Land Allocation. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 38, March 2013

Against the background of the current discussion about the EU’s common agricultural policy (CAP) after 2013, the question of the impact of government support on land prices is crucially important. Validation of the CAP’s success also hinges on a proper assessment of a choice of policy instruments. This study therefore has the objective of investigating on a theoretical basis the effects of different government support measures on land rental prices and land allocation. The different measures under consideration are the price support, area payments and decoupled single farm payments (SFPs) of the CAP. Our approach evaluates the potential impact of each measure based on a Ricardian land rent model with heterogeneous land quality and multiple land uses. We start with a simple model of one output and two inputs, where a Cobb-Douglas production technology is assumed between the two factors of land and non-land inputs. In a second step, an outside option is introduced. This outside option, as opposed to land use of the Ricardian type, is independent of land quality. The results show that area payments and SFPs become fully capitalised into land rents, whereas in a price support scheme the capitalisation depends on per-acreage productivity. Moreover, in a price support scheme and a historical model, the capitalisation is positively influenced by land quality. Both area payments and price supports influence land allocation across different uses compared with no subsidies, where the shift tends to be larger in an area payment scheme than in a price support scheme. By contrast, SFPs do not influence land allocation.

European Policy Uses of International Comparisons of Academic Achievement. ACES Working Papers, 2012

International large-scale assessments (ILSAs) and the resulting ranking of countries in key academic subjects have become increasingly significant in the development of global performance indicators and national level reforms in education. As one of the largest international surveys, the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) has had a considerable impact on the world of international comparisons of education. Based on the results of these assessments, claims are often made about the relative success or failure of education systems, and in some cases, such as Germany or Japan, ILSAs have sparked national level reforms (Ertl, 2006; Takayama, 2007, 2009). In this paper, I offer an analysis of how PISA is increasingly used as a key reference both for a regional2 entity like the European Union (EU) and for national level performance targets in the example of Spain (Breakspear, 2012). Specifically, the paper examines the growth of OECD and EU initiatives in defining quality education, and the use of both EU benchmarks and PISA in defining the education indicators used in Spain to measure and set goals for developing quality education. By doing so, this paper points to the role of the OECD and the EU in national education systems. It therefore adds to a body of literature pointing to the complex relationship between international, regional, and national education policy spaces (cf. Dale & Robertson, 2002; Lawn & Grek, 2012; Rizvi & Lingard, 2009).

The UN General Assembly Resolution on Access to Legal Aid in Criminal Proceedings - an Example for Europe. IES Policy Brief Issue 2013/04 • May 2013

Summary. The EU’s attempts to adopt an EU-wide instrument on the right to access to legal aid in criminal proceedings have not been successful so far. The important issue was originally part of Measure C of the Roadmap for criminal procedural rights,1 but due to political difficulties legal aid was dropped from the agenda. However, on a different plane agreement was reached on this topic as the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has adopted the world’s first international instrument dedicated to access to legal aid in December 2012.2 This policy brief argues that the EU should carry on in the ‘spirit’ of these recent developments and adopt a directive providing suspects and defendants with access to legal aid. 1 Council Resolution of 30 November 2009 on a Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings, OJ C 295/1, 4 December 2009; hereafter will be referred to this Council Resolution as the ‘Roadmap’; for further information see M. Jimeno-Bulnes, ‘The EU Roadmap for Strengthening Procedural Rights of Suspected or Accused Persons in Criminal Proceedings’, 4 EUCrim (2009), 157-161. 2 United Nations Principles and Guidelines on Access to Legal Aid in Criminal Justice Systems, A/Res/67/187, 20 December 2012; from here on will be referred to this as the ‘Resolution’.

It’s not just Russia: Currency crisis in the Commonwealth of independent states. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2015/01, February 2015

The currency crisis that started in Russia and Ukraine during 2014 has spread to neighbouring countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The collapse of the Russian ruble, expected recession in Russia, the stronger US dollar and lower commodity prices have negatively affected the entire region, with the consequence that the European Union's entire eastern neighbourhood faces serious economic, social and political challenges because of weaker currencies, higher inflation, decreasing export revenues and labour remittances, net capital outflows and stagnating or declining GDP. •The crisis requires a proper policy response from CIS governments, the International Monetary Fund and the EU. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict in Donbass requires rapid resolution, as the first step to return Russia to the mainstream of global economic and political cooperation. Beyond that, both Russia and Ukraine need deep structural and institutional reforms. The EU should deepen economic ties with those CIS countries that are interested in a closer relationship with Europe. The IMF should provide additional assistance to those CIS countries that have become victims of a new regional contagion, while preparing for the possibility of more emerging-market crises arising from slower growth, the stronger dollar and lower commodity prices.

The ECB’s QE: Time to break the doom loop between banks and their governments. CEPS Policy Brief No. 328, March 2015

The recent crises have shown that the eurozone countries’ government debt is not immune to default. Applying a large-exposure requirement also to eurozone government debt would be a logical measure towards breaking the bank-government doom loop, given the low probability and high loss-given government default. But what would be the impact of the application of the large-exposure requirement on the banking sector as well as on government funding? This CEPS Policy Brief presents the results of a simulation exercise performed for 109 systemic banks in the eurozone, showing that their eurozone government debt portfolios would have to decrease by 3.2% or €63 billion, if a 50% of own-funds cap would be applied on large exposures. The eurozone central banks’ demand for sovereign bonds under the extended asset purchase programme further creates momentum to start gradually implementing the restriction.

European Central Bank quantitative easing: the detailed manual. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue 2015/02, March 2015

• The European quantitative easing programme, the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP), started on 9 March 2015 and will last at least until September 2016. Purchases will be composed of sovereign bonds and securities from European institutions and national agencies. • The European Central Bank Governing Council imposed limits to ensure that the Eurosystem will not breach the prohibition on monetary financing. However, these limits will constrain the size and duration of the programme, especially if it is sustained after September 2016. The possibility for national central banks to also buy national agency securities could alleviate this, but the small number of eligible agencies could limit their role as a back-up purchase. • The Eurosystem should find other eligible agencies, especially in countries in which public debt is small, or waive the limits for countries respecting the investment grade eligibility criteria. The same issue arises with European institutions: their number and outstanding debt securities are limited. The waiver of the limits proposed for sovereigns should be applied to institutions with high ratings. • The PSPP profits that will ultimately be repatriated to national treasuries will be small. This was to be expected, given current very low yields. Profits will also come from the major increase in reserves resulting from the implementation of QE, combined with the negative deposit rates on excess reserves at the ECB.

Promoting the agenda for a social Economic and Monetary Union: Attention, credibility and coalition-building. Bruges Political Research Paper No. 37, November 2014

In the aftermath of the crisis, new instruments of economic governance have been adopted at the EU level. Until recently, these have been strongly dominated by what I assume to be the ECFIN coalition. However, at least since 2011, this coalition’s supremacy has been challenged by the competing coalition’s (EPSCO) willingness to rebalance the economic governance so that social concerns are better taken into account. Hence, drawing on the agenda-setting literature in the EU context, this working paper aims at retracing the process that has led to put this issue of the social dimension of the EMU on to the EU political agenda. Three hypotheses are made concerning the rise of this issue, the strategies employed by agenda-setters, and the policy subsystem of the economic governance. First, this study shows that the interest in this issue has been gradually fostered ‘from below’, at the level of the European Parliament and the European Commission. Second, due to its ‘high politics’ nature, this issue could only be initiated ‘from above’ (European Council) and then expanded to lower levels of decision-making (Commission). Specifically, DG EMPL has managed to attract attention to this issue and to build its credibility in dealing with it by strategically framing the issue and directing it towards the EPSCO venue. Finally, I analyze the outcome of this agenda-setting process by assessing to what extent the two new social scoreboards which form part of this social dimension have been taken into account during the 2014 European semester. The result of this analysis is that the new economic governance has not been genuinely rebalanced insofar as its dominant policy core remains that of the ECFIN coalition.

Beyond Cooperation and Competition: What Kind of Federalism for EU Social Policy? CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 00.7, December 2000

The EU has become a loose kind ofsocial federation, a fact that has not been adequately taken into account due to the peculiarities ofthe Maastricht strategy for monetary integration. Yet, a new approach to the economic theory offederalism is required ifone wants to analyze the most pressing issues ofEU social policy. The social insurance view of redistribution and stabilization provides for such an approach. This view supports laboratory federalism in which it is the role ofthe EU Commission to contain systems competition in order to preserve "stability in diversity." The role ofthe EU level would be to promote horizontal and vertical learning processes and to make sure that stability concerns ofthe EU are taken seriously by member countries' governments. The minimum requirements framework for social policy that the EU Commission has adopted must be taken as a point of departure, even though it is a less than satisfactory approach from this point of view. Laboratory standardization, in contrast, would not set specific minimum requirements but meta-standards that protect systems functions and safeguard against systems failures.

The harsh reality of Ukraine's fiscal arithmetic. Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2015/07, June 2015

Ukraine is struggling with both external aggression and the dramatically poor shape of its economy. The pace of political and institutional change has so far been too slow to prevent the deepening of the fiscal and balance-of-payments crises, while business confidence continues to be undermined. • Unfortunately, the 2015 International Monetary Fund Extended Fund Facility programme repeats many weaknesses of the 2014 IMF Stand-by Arrangement: slow pace of fiscal adjustment especially in the two key areas of energy prices and pension entitlements, lack of a comprehensive structural and institutional reform vision, and insufficient external financing to close the expected balance-of-payments gap and allow Ukraine to return to debt sustainability in the long term. • The reform process in Ukraine must be accelerated and better managed. A frontloaded fiscal adjustment is necessary to stabilise public finances and the balance-of-payments, and to bring inflation down. The international community, especially the European Union, should offer sufficient financial aid backed by strong conditionality, technical assistance and support to Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity.

The Fate of Greece in a ‘Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’: Lessons from a small island state. CEPS Hi-Level Brief, 19 June 2015 Friday, 19 June 2015

As the Greek debt drama reaches another supposedly decision point, Daniel Gros urges creditors (and indeed all policy-makers) to think about the long term and poses one key question in this CEPS High-Level Brief: What can be gained by keeping Greece inside the euro area at “whatever it takes”? As he points out, the US, with its unified politics and its federal fiscal transfer system, is often taken as a model for the Eurozone, and it is thus instructive to consider the longer-term performance of an area of the US which has for years been kept afloat by massive transfers, and which is now experiencing a public debt crisis. The entity in question is Puerto Rico, which is an integral part of the US in all relevant economic dimensions (currency, economic policy, etc.). The dismal fiscal and economic performance of Puerto Rico carries two lessons: 1) Keeping Greece in the eurozone by increasing implicit subsidies in the form of debt forgiveness might create a low-growth equilibrium with increasing aid dependency. 2) It is wrong to assume that, further integration, including a fiscal and political union, would be sufficient to foster convergence, and prevent further problems of the type the EU is experiencing with Greece.

Puerto Rico and Greece: A Tale of two defaults in a monetary union. CEPS High-Level Brief. 18 June 2015, Update 30 June 2015

It is widely argued that the problems of Greece in the eurozone derive not only from mistakes made by successive Greek governments, but from deep-seated problems with the design of the euro area. The euro area is judged to be incomplete because it does not have any fiscal shock absorbers, nor a federal transfer system, and, according to many, it has imposed senseless austerity on the country. The US, by contrast, is often held up as an example of a complete monetary union in this type of problem could not arise. However, the working of the US is much less perfect than it appears from afar. The ‘genuine’ economic and monetary union, which undoubtedly exists in the US, also has problems in dealing with low-performing states in terms of productivity and governance. Puerto Rico exemplifies these difficulties and shows that in such an integrated area similar problems, including a fiscal crisis can arise. Both Puerto Rico and Greece are very special and extreme cases within their respective unions, but the strength of a system can be measured by how it deals with these cases.

Flashlight Europe N°6–June 2015. Waiting for the Five Presidents’ Report on the Future of the Monetary Union: What do we need to know?

At the European Summit on 25-26 June Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission, will be presenting a report on the future of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). It has been drawn up by the presidents of the EU Commission, the European Council, the European Central Bank, the European Parliament, and the Eurogroup, and is a sequel to the “Four Presidents’ Report” on the same topic that was compiled without the participation of the President of the European Parliament and presented in 2012. In this Flashlight we provide answers to key questions about the forthcoming report.

Belarus at a crossroads. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue 2016/02 January 2016

Highlights: • Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Belarus has maintained a largely non-market economic system. This did not prevent rapid growth of its economy over a sustained period up to 2011. However, the period of economic growth in Belarus seems to be over.The factors that underpinned Belarus’s growth, mainly the beneficial external environment, have gradually disappeared. As a result, the country is confronted by the need to start the far-reaching programme of market-oriented economic reforms and macroeconomic stabilisation which it tried to avoid for so long. Reform will not be easy, economically and politically. • The potential hardship facing Belarus could be at least partly cushioned by external assistance, in the first instance from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. However, the IMF has relatively fresh memories of the failure of its 2009-10 Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with Belarus, which provided substantial balance-of payments support, but which was derailed by its too-narrow focus on monetary and fiscal quantitative performance criteria, and by insufficient reform commitment on the Belarusian side. Other donors, such as the European Union, might be reluctant to offer assistance as long as Belarus does not improve its poor human rights record and start some political reforms.

The European Central Bank’s quantitative easing programme: limits and risks. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue 2016/04, February 2016

The European Central Bank (ECB) has made a number of significant changes to the original guidelines of its quantitative easing (QE) programme since the programme started in January 2015. These changes are welcome because the original guidelines would have rapidly constrained the programme’s implementation. The changes announced expand the universe of purchasable assets and give some flexibility to the ECB in the execution of its programme. However, this might not be enough to sustain QE throughout 2017, or if the ECB wishes to increase the monthly amount of purchases in order to provide the necessary monetary stimulus to the euro area to bring inflation back to 2 percent. To increase the programme’s flexibility, the ECB could further alter the composition of its purchases. The extension of the QE programme also raises some legitimate questions about its potential adverse consequences. However, the benefits of this policy still outweigh its possible negative implications for financial stability or for inequality. The fear that the ECB’s credibility will be undermined because of its QE programme also seems to be largely unfounded. On the contrary, the primary risk to the ECB’s credibility is the risk of not reaching its 2 percent inflation target, which could lead to expectations becoming disanchored.