Margulis' theory on division of labour in cells revisited

Division of labour is a marked feature of multicellular organisms. Margulis proposed that the ancestors of metazoans had only one microtubule organizing center (MTOC), so they could not move and divide simultaneously. Selection for simultaneous movement and cell division had driven the division of labour between cells. However, no evidence or explanation for this assumption was provided. Why could the unicellular ancetors not have multiple MTOCs? The gain and loss of three possible strategies are discussed. It was found that the advantage of one or two MTOC per cell is environment-dependent. Unicellular organisms with only one MTOC per cell are favored only in resource-limited environments without strong predatory pressure. If division of labour occurring in a bicellular organism just makes simultaneous movement and cell division possible, the possibility of its fixation by natural selection is very low because a somatic cell performing the function of an MTOC is obviously wasting resources. Evolutionary biologists should search for other selective forces for division of labour in cells.

Division of labor in frontal eye field neurons during presaccadic remapping of visual receptive fields.

Our percept of visual stability across saccadic eye movements may be mediated by presaccadic remapping. Just before a saccade, neurons that remap become visually responsive at a future field (FF), which anticipates the saccade vector. Hence, the neurons use corollary discharge of saccades. Many of the neurons also decrease their response at the receptive field (RF). Presaccadic remapping occurs in several brain areas including the frontal eye field (FEF), which receives corollary discharge of saccades in its layer IV from a collicular-thalamic pathway. We studied, at two levels, the microcircuitry of remapping in the FEF. At the laminar level, we compared remapping between layers IV and V. At the cellular level, we compared remapping between different neuron types of layer IV. In the FEF in four monkeys (Macaca mulatta), we identified 27 layer IV neurons with orthodromic stimulation and 57 layer V neurons with antidromic stimulation from the superior colliculus. With the use of established criteria, we classified the layer IV neurons as putative excitatory (n = 11), putative inhibitory (n = 12), or ambiguous (n = 4). We found that just before a saccade, putative excitatory neurons increased their visual response at the RF, putative inhibitory neurons showed no change, and ambiguous neurons increased their visual response at the FF. None of the neurons showed presaccadic visual changes at both RF and FF. In contrast, neurons in layer V showed full remapping (at both the RF and FF). Our data suggest that elemental signals for remapping are distributed across neuron types in early cortical processing and combined in later stages of cortical microcircuitry.

When deterrence works - and when it doesn't: a comparison of Sweden's prostitution law and UK's Dangerous Dogs Act

Many pieces of legislation have been implemented with the anticipation - or justification - that they will have a deterrent effect. Deterrence was clearly argued in the debate preceding the Swedish prostitution law prohibiting the purchase of sexual services, but less so regarding the Dangerous Dogs Act, which was a very rapid response to a particular moral panic. As it turned out, the Swedish law has had a deterrent effect on street prostitution in that 'respectable' buyers were deterred. It will be argued that it is this very 'respectability' that makes deterrence work in this case. Regarding the Dangerous Dogs Act, the owners of Pit Bulls and other banned breeds are not considered 'respectable' and the banning might have had the reversed effect - increasing the attraction of these dogs, rather than deterring the ownership. Apart from deterrence and its consequences, the rendering invisible of key actors - buyers and owners respectively - and the use of symbolic legislation to promote moral messages will also be considered. [From the Author]

Debating the division of labour in healthcare in France and England

As Larson (1990) states, professions are historically specific and ‘there is no pattern of social closure around an occupation that is not inflected by the latter’s past, its specific activity and typical context of performance or…the political context in which closure is obtained.’ Larson’s work focuses particularly on the differences between the establishment of professions in France, where there was considerable state intervention, with that in the US and UK, both of which were more market-oriented. This paper is based on data from an evaluation of a large European exchange programme of staff between Kent and Lille, from 2005 to 2008 and discusses the division of labour in healthcare between two occupational groups, medicine and nursing, in England and in France. This division of labour has been extensively discussed in the UK, particularly since from the mid 1990s the nursing role has been extended and innovations such as nurse prescribing have been introduced, whereas such extended roles have not been introduced in France. The paper draws particularly on interview data from mental health practitioners, in which it is argued that whilst the English nurses may on the surface seem to have a wider range of competences and autonomy, in reality they are more constrained, as they operate under protocols and therefore do not exercise professional judgement. Not only do these data illustrate the centrality of professional judgement in discussions about practice, they also demonstrate the circularity of many debates on extended roles.

The Role of Dignity in Equality Law: Lessons from Canada and South Africa

This paper examines the link made on occasion between the concept of dignity and substantive equality; it is further noted that dignity can have very different meanings in different contexts. While the notion of dignity does not often play a substantive role in the resolution of decisions, sometimes the underlying understanding of dignity does matter. However, in all cases, judges should avoid the temptation to rely on unarticulated value judgments or subjective notions of dignity. When judges make reference to dignity, they should articulate the values underpinning their conception of it.