Hypoglycemia despite hyperglycemia. Is a cerebral glucose deficiency possible even with raised blood sugar levels?

Hypoglycemia represents the most frequent endocrinologic emergency situation in prehospital patient care. As the patients are usually unconscious on arrival of emergency medical personnel, often the only way to establish a diagnosis is by determination of the blood glucose concentration. However, even normoglycemic or hyperglycemic levels cannot definitively exclude the diagnosis of a previous hypoglycemia as the cause of the acute cerebral deficiency. Therefore, and especially in the case of insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus, a differential diagnosis should be considered. We report a case of emergency treatment of a hypoglycemic episode in a female patient with prolonged neuroglycopenia together with cerebrovascular dementia and Alzheimer's disease.

The tail plays a major role in the differing manoeuvrability of two sibling species of mouse-eared bats (Myotis myotis and Myotis blythii)

Two sympatrically occurring bat species, the greater mouse-eared bat (Myotis myotis (Borkhausen, 1797)) and the lesser mouse-eared bat (Myotis blythii (Tomes, 1857)) (Chiroptera, Vespertillionidae), share numerous similarities in morphology, roosting behaviour, and echolocation and are often difficult to distinguish. However, despite these similarities, their foraging behaviour is noticeably different. Our aim was to examine the extent to which these different foraging strategies reflect morphological adaptation. We assessed whether the morphology of the wing, body, and tail differed between M. myotis and M. blythii. In addition, in a laboratory experiment involving an obstacle course, we compared differences in manoeuvrability by relating them to our morphological measurements. The two species differed in their overall size, wing-tip shape, and tail-to-body length ratio. The generally smaller sized M. blythii performed better in the obstacle course and was therefore considered to be more manoeuvrable. Although differences in wing-tip shape were observed, we found the most important characteristic affecting manoeuvrability in both species to be the tail-to-body length ratio. Additionally, when we compared two bats with injured wing membranes with unharmed bats of the same species, we found no difference in manoeuvrability, even when the wing shape was asymmetric. We therefore postulate that morphometric differences between the two species in their overall size and, more importantly, in their tail-to-body length ratio are the main physical characteristics providing proof of adaptation to different foraging and feeding strategies.

Sēfer derek hay-yāšār : pērûš le-sēfer even bôḥān ...

hoṭ man eś nur in daiṭšn ... nai'i heroizgigebin ʿal-yedê ... Michl Šṭerin

Sēfer Qiṣṣûr Even Šelōmō : ... fil divre musar un hoiche injenim arois ginumen fun sefer Even Šelōmō ...

Digitalisat der Ausg. Wilna, [1875/76]

Sēfer Even Yiśrā'ēl : melammēd daʿat le-āv û-ven ...

mē-... Yaʿaqōv Yôsēf Ben- ... Mē'îr Sôfēr ... mim-medînat Elzus

Factorization and resummation for transverse thrust

We analyze transverse thrust in the framework of Soft Collinear Effective Theory and obtain a factorized expression for the cross section that permits resummation of terms enhanced in the dijet limit to arbitrary accuracy. The factorization theorem for this hadron-collider event-shape variable involves collinear emissions at different virtualities and suffers from a collinear anomaly. We compute all its ingredients at the one-loop order, and show that the two-loop input for next-to-next-to-leading logarithmic accuracy can be extracted numerically, from existing fixed-order codes.

Adenocarcinomas of the upper third of the rectum and the rectosigmoid junction seem to have similar prognosis as colon cancers even without radiotherapy, SAKK 40/78

Purpose To investigate the prognosis of adenocarcinomas of the upper third of the rectum and the rectosigmoid-junction without radiotherapy. Methods Patients from a multicenter randomized controlled trial from 1987–1993 on adjuvant chemotherapy for R0-resected colorectal cancers with stage I–III disease were retrospectively allocated: cancers of the lower two-thirds of the rectum (11 cm or less from anal-verge, Group A, n = 205), of the upper-third of the rectum and rectosigmoid-junction (>11–20 cm from anal-verge, Group B, n = 142), and of the colon (>20 cm from anal-verge, Group C, n = 378). The total mesorectal excision (TME) technique had not been introduced yet. The adjuvant chemotherapy turned out to be ineffective. None of the patients received neoadjuvant or adjuvant radiotherapy. Results The patients had a regular follow-up (median, 8.0 years). The 5-year disease-free survival (DFS) rate was 0.54 (95%CI, 0.47–0.60) in Group A, 0.68 (95%CI, 0.60–0.75) in Group B, and 0.69 (95%CI, 0.64–0.74) in Group C. The 5-year overall survival (OS) rate was 0.64 (95%CI, 0.57–0.71) in Group A, 0.79 (95%CI, 0.71–0.85) in Group B, and 0.77 (95%CI, 0.73–0.81) in Group C. Compared with Group C, patients in Group A had a significantly worse OS (hazard ratio [HR] for death 2.10) and a worse DFS (HR for relapse/death 1.93), while patients in Group B had a similar OS (HR 1.12) and DFS (HR 1.07). Conclusions Adenocarcinomas of the upper third of the rectum and the rectosigmoid-junction seem to have similar prognosis as colon cancers. Even for surgeons not familiar with the TME technique, preoperative radiotherapy may be avoided for most rectosigmoid cancers above 11 cm from anal-verge.

Salience and Asymmetric Judgments of Physical Distance

Previous research has shown that distance estimates made from memory are often asymmetric. Specifically, when A is a prominent location (a land-mark) and B is not, people tend to recall a longer distance from A to B than from B to A. Results of two experiments showed that asymmetric judgments of distance are not restricted to judgments made from memory but occur also for judgments made when all relevant visual cues are still present. Furthermore, results indicated that situational salience is sufficient to produce asymmetric judgments and that distinctiveness (such as in the case of architectural landmarks) is not necessary.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Wernicke Encephalopathy: a Future Problem Even After Sleeve Gastrectomy? A Systematic Literature Review.

Wernicke encephalopathy (WE) is a serious complication of bariatric surgery with significant morbidity and mortality. A few cases have been reported in the literature, mainly in patients after a Roux-en-Y gastric bypass. Since sleeve gastrectomy (SG) has become a more established and popular bariatric procedure, WE is expected to appear more frequently after SG. We performed a literature review on WE after SG, and 13 cases have been found to be sufficiently documented. The risk of WE needs to be considered in patients with a prolonged vomiting episode and any type of neurological symptoms, independent of the presence of any surgical complications.

Concise Asymmetric Synthesis and Pharmacological Characterization of All Stereoisomers of Glutamate Transporter Inhibitor TFB-TBOA and Synthesis of EAAT Photoaffinity Probes

Glutamate is the major excitatory neurotransmitter in the mammalian brain. Its rapid clearance after the release into the synaptic cleft is vital in order to avoid toxic effects and is ensured by several transmembrane transport proteins, so-called excitatory amino acid transporters (EAATs). Impairment of glutamate removal has been linked to several neurodegenerative diseases and EAATs have therefore received increased attention as therapeutic targets. O-benzylated L-threo-β-hydroxyaspartate derivatives have been developed previously as highly potent inhibitors of EAATs with TFB-TBOA ((2S,3S)-2-amino-3-((3-(4-(trifluoromethyl)benzamido)benzyl)oxy)succinic acid) standing out as low-nanomolar inhibitor. We report the stereoselective synthesis of all four stereoisomers of TFB-TBOA in less than a fifth of synthetic steps than the published route. For the first time, the inhibitory activity and isoform selectivity of these TFB-TBOA enantio- and diastereomers were assessed on human glutamate transporters EAAT1-3. Furthermore, we synthesized potent photoaffinity probes based on TFB-TBOA using our novel synthetic strategy.

Antidumping as Strategic Trade Policy Under Asymmetric Information

In the last two decades, trade liberalization under GATT/WTO has been partly offset by an increase in antidumping protection. Economists have argued convincingly that this is partly due to the inclusion of sales below cost in the definition of dumping during the GATT Tokyo Round. The introduction of the cost- based dumping definition gives regulating authorities a better opportunity to choose protection according to their liking. This paper investigates the domestic government's antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework where the foreign firm's cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. To induce truthful revelation, the government can design a tariff schedule, contingent on firms' cost reports, accompanied by a threat to collect additional information for report verification (i.e., auditing) and, in case misreporting is detected, to set penalty duties. We show that depending on the concrete assumptions, the domestic government may not only be able to extract the true cost information, but also succeeds in implementing the full-information, governmental welfare-maximizing duty. In this case, the antidumping framework within GATT/WTO does not only offer the means to pursue strategic trade policy disguised as fair trade policy, but it also helps overcome the informational problems with regard to correctly determining the optimal strategic trade policy.

Asymmetric Information, Tax Evasion and Alternative Instruments of Government Revenue

Using a pure-exchange overlapping generations model, characterized with tax evasion and information asymmetry between the government (the social planner) and the financial intermediaries, we try and seek for the optimal tax and seigniorage plans, derived from the welfare maximizing objective of the social planner. We show that irrespective of whether the economy is characterized by tax evasion, or asymmetric information, a benevolent social planner, maximizing welfare and simultaneously financing the budget constraint, should optimally rely on explicit rather than implicit taxation.

Search, Seizure and (False?) Arrest: An Analysis of Fourth Amendment Remedies when Police can Plant Evidence

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures in criminal investigations. The Supreme Court has interpreted this to require that police obtain a warrant prior to search and that illegally seized evidence be excluded from trial. A consensus has developed in the law and economics literature that tort liability for police officers is a superior means of deterring unreasonable searches. We argue that this conclusion depends on the assumption of truth-seeking police, and develop a game-theoretic model to compare the two remedies when some police officers (the bad type) are willing to plant evidence in order to obtain convictions, even though other police (the good type) are not (where this type is private information). We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the asymmetric-information game between the police and a court that seeks to minimize error costs in deciding whether to convict or acquit suspects. In this framework, we show that the exclusionary rule with a warrant requirement leads to superior outcomes (relative to tort liability) in terms of truth-finding function of courts, because the warrant requirement can reduce the scope for bad types of police to plant evidence