Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

Out of the darkness and into the light : a study of inauthentic and authentic speech

Introduction Man can be described as the being who shows himself in speech, and from birth to death is continually speaking. Communication is so close to us, so woven into our very being, that we have little understanding of the way it is constituted; for it is as hard to obtain distance from communication as it is to obtain distance from ourselves. All communication is not alike. There are two basic modesl of communication, the inauthentic and the authentic, between which there occurs a constant tension. It is in the inauthentic mode, points out Heidegger, that we find ourselves "proximately and for the most part"; 1. Being and Time, pg. 68 Dasein decides as to the way it will comport itself in taking up its task of having being as an issue for it. " •.• it~, in its very being 'choose' itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself or only "seem" to do so. But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic--that is, something of its own--can it have lost itself and not yet won itself." 2. therefore Heidegger also terms it "everydayness".2 Caught up in the world of everydayness, our speaking covers over and conceals3 our rootedness in being, leaving us in the darkness of untruth. The image of darkness may be inferred from Heidegger's use of the image of "clearing,,4 to depict being as 2. ibid. pg. 69 "Dasein's average everydayness, however, is not to be taken as a mere 'aspect'. Here too, and even in the mode of inauthenticity, the structure of existentiality lies ~ priori and here too Dasein's being is an issue for it in a definite way; and Dasein comports itself towards it the mode of average everydayness, even if this is only the mode of fleeing in the face of it and forgetfulness thereof." 3. ibid. pg. 59 "covering over" and "concealing" are 1;yays Dasein tries to flee its task of having being as an issue for itself. " ••• This being can be covered up so extensively that it becomes forgotten and no question arises about it or its meaning ••• n How everyday speaking accomplishes this will be taken up in detail in the second chapter which explores Dasein's everyday speech. 4. ibid, pg. 171 lI ••• we have in mind nothing other than the Existential - ontological structure of this entity (Dasein), that it is in such a way as to be its 'there'. To say that it is -' illuminated' [tlerleuchtet"] means that as Being-in-theworld it is cleared [gelichtetJ in itself7 not through any other entity, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing. Only for an entity which is eXistentially cleared in this way does what is present-at-hand become accessible in the light or hidden in the dark •••• " 3 dis-coveredness and truth. Our first task will be to explore the nature of communication in general and then to explore each of the modes manifested in turn. The structure of the inauthentic mode of communication can be explored by asking the following questions: What is this speaking about? Who is it that is speaking and who is spoken to? Does this speaking show man in his speech? The authentic mode is distinguished by the rarity with which we encounter it; as the inauthentic conceals, so the authentic reveals our rootedness in being. Yet this rarity makes it difficult to delineate its elusive structure clearly. Its constituent elements can be brought into focus by asking the same questions of this mode that we previously asked of the inauthentic mode. Our initial response to the disclosure of the authentic mode is to attempt to abandon the inauthentic mode and leave the darkness behind dwelling only in the "lighted place". All through the ages, some men pushing this to extreme, have, upon uncovering their relatedness to being, experienced a deep longing to dwell in such a "place" of pure truth and oft times denigrated or attempted to exclude the everyday world. Such 4. flight is twice mistaken: first it atbempts to fix truth as unchanging and static and secondly, it opposes this to untruth which it seeks to abolish. This is both the wrong view of truth and the wrong view of untruth as Heidegger points out in The Origin of The-Work of Art: The Way-to-be of truth, i.e., of discoveredness, is under the sway of refusal. But this refusal is no lack or privation, as if truth could be simply discoveredness rid of all covers. If it could be that, it would no longer be itself . ••• Truth in its way-to-be is untruth.5 Pure light is not the nature of Being nor is pure unconcealedness possible for man. Failure to remember this is the failure to realize that communication destroys itself in such flight because it no longer maintains the contingency of its task, i.e., the dis-closedness of being. We are reminded of the strong attraction this flight from darkness held for Plato. Light, truth and Being are all beyond the darkness and have nothing to do with it. In Book VII of the R~public, Socrates' explanation of the Allegory of the Cave to Glaucon points to a decided preference men have for the "lighted place". 5. The Origin Of The Work Of Art, pg. 42 5. Come then, I said, and join me in this further thought, and do not be surprised that those who attained to this height are not willing to occupy themselves with the affairs of men, but their souls ever feel the upward urge and yearning for that sojourn above. For this, I take it, is likely if in this point too the likeliness of our image holds. 6 Despite the attraction to pure truth, human communication is more complex than putting down one mode of communication and picking up another. Due to the fact that we are always on the way, the title of my thesis will have to be amended: OUT OF THE DARKNESS AND INTO THE LIGHT--AGAIN AND AGAIN. It must be this way because this is what it means to be human. This is the point made by Mephisto to Faust in pointing out that man, standing between God and the devil, needs both darkness and light: Er findet sich in einem ewigen Gl~t Uns hat er in die Finsternis gebracht, Und euch taugt einzig Tag und Nacht. 7 6. Republic z (517 c & d) It should be noted however, that while the philosopherking must be compelled to return to the cave for purely political reasons, once he has taken adequate view of the "brightest region of being" he has the full truth and his return to darkness adds nothing to the truth. 7. Faust, pg. 188 6. This thesis proposes to examine the grounds that give rise to communication, uncovering the structure of its inauthentic and authentic modes and paying close attention to tpeir interrelationship and to their relationship to language as "the house of Being": language that both covers and opens up man's rootedness in Being, transforming him as he moves along his way, taking up his "ownmost task" of becoming who he is. roots. He is the being who shows himself inn that reflects his forgetfulness or remembrance of his rootedness in being. Man comes into an already existent world and is addressedl through things in the world which are c

Comprehensive school health : an ethnographic case study

The purpose of this ethnographic case study was to describe the characteristics of one school's Comprehensive School Health (CSH) initiative and to explore the experiences of school community members in order to gain an understanding of how one school embraced a Comprehensive School Health approach. An elementary school (grades Junior Kindergarten to six) in Burlington, Ontario was the research site for this study. Multiple methods of data collection (observations, document analysis, interviews) were used in keeping with the ethnographic and case study approach. The data were coded using both a deductive and then inductive process (Merriam, 1998). From a deductive perspective, the coding system and the subsequent identification of categories were based on a priori categories identified by using the elements of CSH based on the Comprehensive School Health Consensus Statement prepared by the Canadian Association of School Health and the research questions. Findings included the role that various school community members as well as the implementation of different programs and policies played in applying a CSH approach. The impact ofthe physical environment was described as well as successes and challenges related to the school's experience in implementing CSH. Three main themes emerged that characterized this school's experience. The first theme relates to the fundamental question about CSH which is the school community's understanding o/the concept. The second theme focused on positive school culture and the third and most diverse theme was that of capacity. Engaging in CSH is a complex and long-term undertaking involving both the school and greater community. Based on the experiences of this school's community members, recommendations address the different levels of influence on the health of children.

Active living in municipal parks and recreation : a case study

If quality of life is an important recreation outcome, then municipal parks and recreation management's efforts have to change because:· Over one-third of all the little kids in schools will be diabetic in their lifetime if the trends we are looking at continue. The average loss of life is about 15 years, and there is an average reduction in quality oflife by about 20 years (Jackson, 2007). This thesis is about municipal parks and recreation, an agency that controls and limits physical activity opportunity. It is also about active living; from an ecological perspective, a multi-disciplinary approach to incorporate physical activity into more 111 people's daily lives. In particular, this thesis examines one case --'. the Donutville Case - . with the intent of providing an explanation of how municipal parks and recreation can advance its management efforts to improve health outcomes of people suffering from daily physical activity deficits. More specifically, how can the tension between external and internal environments to municipal parks and recreation be better balanced to affect the change needed? Given that changing the current social reality is through making decisions, decision-making functions connected with systems theory helps identify how recreation authorities can more effectively influence environmental physical activity determinants. , Sallis et al.' (2006) ·social ecological model provides the a priori focus on active living decision-making. An integrated analogous emerging logic model is developed and presented as an efficacious strategy for how municipal parks and recreation decisionmakers can affect change. Keywords: physical activity, benefits outcomes, healthy livable community, quality of life, systems thinking, social ecological model, deci~ion-making, logic modeling, municipal parks and recreation, active living.

Mindfulness: An Ancient Wisdom for the Reconceptualisation of Modern Education in the Complex World

Exploring the new science of emergence allows us to create a very different classroom than how the modern classroom has been conceptualised under the mentality of efficiency and output. Working on the whole person, and not just the mind, we see a shift from the epistemic pillars of truth to more ontological concerns as regards student achievement in our post-Modern and critical discourses. It is important to understand these shifts and how we are to transition our own perception and mentality not only in our research methodologies but also our approach to conceptualisations of issues in education and sustainability. We can no longer think linearly to approach complex problems or advocate for education and disregard our interconnectedness insofar as it enhances our children’s education. We must, therefore, contemplate and transition to a world that is ecological and not mechanical, complex and not complicated—in essence, we must work to link mind-body with self-environment and transcend these in order to bring about an integration toward a sustainable future. A fundamental shift in consciousness and perception may implicate our nature of creating dichotomous entities in our own microcosms, yet postmodern theorists assume, a priori, that these dualities can be bridged in naturalism alone. I, on the other hand, embrace metaphysics to understand the implicated modern classroom in a hierarchical context and ask: is not the very omission of metaphysics in postmodern discourse a symptom from an education whose foundation was built in its absence? The very dereliction of ancient wisdom in education is very peculiar indeed. Western mindfulness may play a vital component in consummating pragmatic idealism, but only under circumstances admitting metaphysics can we truly transcend our limitations, thereby placing Eastern Mindfulness not as an ecological component, but as an ecological and metaphysical foundation.

Autonomy and Relatedness in Mainland Chinese Adolescents: Social or Personal? Accommodation or Distinctiveness?

Three studies comprised the current research program, in which the major goals were to propose and validate empirically the proposed two-level (universal and culture-specific) model of both autonomy and relatedness, as well as to develop reliable and valid measures for these two constructs. In Study 1, 143 mainland Chinese adolescents were asked open-ended questions about their understanding of autonomy and relatedness in three social contexts (peer, family, school). Chinese youth’s responses captured universal and culturally distinctive forms of autonomy (personal vs. social) and relatedness (accommodation vs. distinctiveness), according to a priori criteria based on the theoretical frameworks. Also, scenarios designed to reflect culture-specific forms of autonomy and relatedness suggested their relevance to Chinese adolescents. With a second sample of 201 mainland Chinese youth, in Study 2, the obtained autonomy and relatedness descriptors were formulated into scale items. Those items were subject to refinement analyses to examine their psychometric properties and centrality to Chinese youth. The findings of Study 1 scenarios were replicated in Study 2. The primary goal of Study 3 was to test empirically the proposed two-level (universal and culture-specific) models of both autonomy and relatedness, using the measures derived from Studies 1 and 2. A third sample of 465 mainland Chinese youth completed a questionnaire booklet consisting of autonomy and relatedness scales and scenarios and achievement motivation orientations measures. A series of confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) autonomy and relatedness measurement models (first-order and second-order), as well as structural models linking culture-specific forms of autonomy and relatedness and achievement motivation orientations, were conducted. The first-order measurement models based on scale and scenario scores consistently confirmed the distinction between personal autonomy and social autonomy, and that of accommodation and distinctiveness. Although the construct validity of the two culture-specific forms of autonomy gained additional support from the structural models, the associations between the two culture-specific forms of relatedness and achievement motivation orientations were relatively weak. In general, the two-level models of autonomy and relatedness were supported in two ways: conceptual analysis of scale items and second-order measurement models. In addition, across the three studies, I explored potential contextual and sex differences in Chinese youth’s endorsement of the diverse forms of autonomy and relatedness. Overall, no substantial contextual variability or sex differences were found. The current research makes an important theoretical contribution to the field of developmental psychology in general, and autonomy and relatedness in particular, by proposing and testing empirically both universal and culture-specific parts of autonomy and relatedness. The current findings have implications for the measurement of autonomy and relatedness across social contexts, as well as for socialization and education practice.

Teaching Adolescents to Think and Act Responsibly Through Narrative Film-making: A Qualitative Study

The current qualitative study examined an adapted version of the psychoeducational program, Teaching Adolescents to Think and Act Responsibly: The EQUIP Approach (DiBiase, Gibbs, Potter, & Blount, 2012). The adapted version, referred to as the EQUIP – Narrative Filmmaking Program, was implemented as a means of character education. The purpose of this study was three-fold: 1) to examine how the EQUIP – Narrative Film-making Program influenced student’s thoughts, feelings, and behaviours; 2) to explore the students’ and the teacher’s perception of their experience with the program; and 3) to assess whether or not the integrated EQUIP – Narrative Film-making Program addressed the goals of Ontario’s character education initiative. Purposive sampling was used to select one typical Grade 9 Exploring Technologies class, consisting of 15 boys from a Catholic board of education in the southern Ontario region. The EQUIP – Narrative Film-making Program required students to create moral narrative films that first portrayed a set of self-centered cognitive distortions, with follow-up portrayals of behavioural modifications. Before, during, and after intervention questionnaires were administered to the students and teacher. The student questionnaires invited responses to a set of cognitive distortion vignettes. In addition, data was collected through student and teacher interviews, and researcher observation protocol reports. Initially the data was coded according to an a priori set of themes that were further analyzed according to emotion and values coding methods. The results indicated that while each student was unique in his thoughts, feelings, and behavioural responses to the cognitive distortion vignettes after completing the EQUIP program, the overall trends showed students had a more positive attitude, with a decreased proclivity for antisocial behaviour and self-serving cognitive distortion portrayed in the vignettes. Overall, the teacher and students’ learning experiences were mainly positive and the program met the learning expectations of Ontario’s character education initiative. Based on these results of the present study, it is recommended that the EQUIP – Narrative Film-making Program be further evaluated through quantitative research and longitudinal study.

Aversion Analysis

In this paper : a) the consumer’s problem is studied over two periods, the second one involving S states, and the consumer being endowed with S+1 incomes and having access to N financial assets; b) the consumer is then representable by a continuously differentiable system of demands, commodity demands, asset demands and desirabilities of incomes (the S+1 Lagrange multiplier of the S+1 constraints); c) the multipliers can be transformed into subjective Arrow prices; d) the effects of the various incomes on these Arrow prices decompose into a compensation effect (an Antonelli matrix) and a wealth effect; e) the Antonelli matrix has rank S-N, the dimension of incompleteness, if the consumer can financially adjust himself when facing income shocks; f) the matrix has rank S, if not; g) in the first case, the matrix represents a residual aversion; in the second case, a fundamental aversion; the difference between them is an aversion to illiquidity; this last relation corresponds to the Drèze-Modigliani decomposition (1972); h) the fundamental aversion decomposes also into an aversion to impatience and a risk aversion; i) the above decompositions span a third decomposition; if there exists a sure asset (to be defined, the usual definition being too specific), the fundamental aversion admits a three-component decomposition, an aversion to impatience, a residual aversion and an aversion to the illiquidity of risky assets; j) the formulas of the corresponding financial premiums are also presented.

Methods to Estimate Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Models

This paper employs the one-sector Real Business Cycle model as a testing ground for four different procedures to estimate Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models. The procedures are: 1 ) Maximum Likelihood, with and without measurement errors and incorporating Bayesian priors, 2) Generalized Method of Moments, 3) Simulated Method of Moments, and 4) Indirect Inference. Monte Carlo analysis indicates that all procedures deliver reasonably good estimates under the null hypothesis. However, there are substantial differences in statistical and computational efficiency in the small samples currently available to estimate DSGE models. GMM and SMM appear to be more robust to misspecification than the alternative procedures. The implications of the stochastic singularity of DSGE models for each estimation method are fully discussed.

Bayesian Analysis for a Theory of Random Consumer Demand: The Case of Indivisible Goods

McCausland (2004a) describes a new theory of random consumer demand. Theoretically consistent random demand can be represented by a \"regular\" \"L-utility\" function on the consumption set X. The present paper is about Bayesian inference for regular L-utility functions. We express prior and posterior uncertainty in terms of distributions over the indefinite-dimensional parameter set of a flexible functional form. We propose a class of proper priors on the parameter set. The priors are flexible, in the sense that they put positive probability in the neighborhood of any L-utility function that is regular on a large subset bar(X) of X; and regular, in the sense that they assign zero probability to the set of L-utility functions that are irregular on bar(X). We propose methods of Bayesian inference for an environment with indivisible goods, leaving the more difficult case of indefinitely divisible goods for another paper. We analyse individual choice data from a consumer experiment described in Harbaugh et al. (2001).

The Progressivity of Equalization Payments in Federations

We investigate the conditions under which an inequality averse and additively separable welfarist constitution maker would always choose to set up a progressive equalization payments scheme in a federation with local public goods. A progressive equalization payments scheme is defined as a list of per capita net (possibly negative) subsidies - one such net subsidy for every jurisdiction - that are decreasing with respect to jurisdictions per capita wealth. We examine these questions in a setting in which the case for progressivity is a priori the strongest, namely, all citizens have the same utility function for the private and the public goods, inhabitants of a given jurisdiction are all identical, and they are not able to move across jurisdictions. We show that the constitution maker favors a progressive equalization payments scheme for all distributions of wealth and all population sizes if and only if its objective function is additively separable between each jurisdiction’s per capita wealth and number of inhabitants. When interpreted as a mean of order r social welfare function, this condition is shown to be equivalent to additive separability of the individual’s indirect utility function with respect to wealth and the price of the public good. Some implications of this restriction to the case where the individual’s direct utility function is additively separable are also derived.

Macroemesures in Computable General Equilibrium Models: a Probabilistic Treatment with an Application to Morocco.

With the help of an illustrative general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Moroccan Economy, we test for the significance of simulation results in the case where the exact macromesure is not known with certainty. This is done by computing lower and upper bounds for the simulation resukts, given a priori probabilities attached to three possible closures (Classical, Johansen, Keynesian). Our Conclusion is that, when there is uncertainty on closures several endogenous changes lack significance, which, in turn, limit the use of the model for policy prescriptions.

La fragmentation du droit international: vers un changement de paradigme ?

Un résumé en anglais est également disponible.

La monnaie en droit : nature d'une abstraction outre fondée : essai dialectique et logique sur la dualité dans la catégoricité juridique et sur l'abstraction d'hérédité monétaire

"Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Docteur en droit (LL.D.)"

Théorèmes d'existence pour des systèmes d'équations différentielles et d'équations aux échelles de temps.

Nous présentons dans cette thèse des théorèmes d’existence pour des systèmes d’équations différentielles non-linéaires d’ordre trois, pour des systèmes d’équa- tions et d’inclusions aux échelles de temps non-linéaires d’ordre un et pour des systèmes d’équations aux échelles de temps non-linéaires d’ordre deux sous cer- taines conditions aux limites. Dans le chapitre trois, nous introduirons une notion de tube-solution pour obtenir des théorèmes d’existence pour des systèmes d’équations différentielles du troisième ordre. Cette nouvelle notion généralise aux systèmes les notions de sous- et sur-solutions pour le problème aux limites de l’équation différentielle du troisième ordre étudiée dans [34]. Dans la dernière section de ce chapitre, nous traitons les systèmes d’ordre trois lorsque f est soumise à une condition de crois- sance de type Wintner-Nagumo. Pour admettre l’existence de solutions d’un tel système, nous aurons recours à la théorie des inclusions différentielles. Ce résultat d’existence généralise de diverses façons un théorème de Grossinho et Minhós [34]. Le chapitre suivant porte sur l’existence de solutions pour deux types de sys- tèmes d’équations aux échelles de temps du premier ordre. Les résultats d’exis- tence pour ces deux problèmes ont été obtenus grâce à des notions de tube-solution adaptées à ces systèmes. Le premier théorème généralise entre autre aux systèmes et à une échelle de temps quelconque, un résultat obtenu pour des équations aux différences finies par Mawhin et Bereanu [9]. Ce résultat permet également d’obte- nir l’existence de solutions pour de nouveaux systèmes dont on ne pouvait obtenir l’existence en utilisant le résultat de Dai et Tisdell [17]. Le deuxième théorème de ce chapitre généralise quant à lui, sous certaines conditions, des résultats de [60]. Le chapitre cinq aborde un nouveau théorème d’existence pour un système d’in- clusions aux échelles de temps du premier ordre. Selon nos recherches, aucun résultat avant celui-ci ne traitait de l’existence de solutions pour des systèmes d’inclusions de ce type. Ainsi, ce chapitre ouvre de nouvelles possibilités dans le domaine des inclusions aux échelles de temps. Notre résultat a été obtenu encore une fois à l’aide d’une hypothèse de tube-solution adaptée au problème. Au chapitre six, nous traitons l’existence de solutions pour des systèmes d’équations aux échelles de temps d’ordre deux. Le premier théorème d’existence que nous obtenons généralise les résultats de [36] étant donné que l’hypothèse que ces auteurs utilisent pour faire la majoration a priori est un cas particulier de notre hypothèse de tube-solution pour ce type de systèmes. Notons également que notre définition de tube-solution généralise aux systèmes les notions de sous- et sur-solutions introduites pour les équations d’ordre deux par [4] et [55]. Ainsi, nous généralisons également des résultats obtenus pour des équations aux échelles de temps d’ordre deux. Finalement, nous proposons un nouveau résultat d’exis- tence pour un système dont le membre droit des équations dépend de la ∆-dérivée de la fonction.