891 resultados para Castells, Manuel: The information society and welfare state


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In the past few years, libraries have started to design public programs that educate patrons about different tools and techniques to protect personal privacy. But do end user solutions provide adequate safeguards against surveillance by corporate and government actors? What does a comprehensive plan for privacy entail in order that libraries live up to their privacy values? In this paper, the authors discuss the complexity of surveillance architecture that the library institution might confront when seeking to defend the privacy rights of patrons. This architecture consists of three main parts: physical or material aspects, logical characteristics, and social factors of information and communication flows in the library setting. For each category, the authors will present short case studies that are culled from practitioner experience, research, and public discourse. The case studies probe the challenges faced by the library—not only when making hardware and software choices, but also choices related to staffing and program design. The paper shows that privacy choices intersect not only with free speech and chilling effects, but also with questions that concern intellectual property, organizational development, civic engagement, technological innovation, public infrastructure, and more. The paper ends with discussion of what libraries will require in order to sustain and improve efforts to serve as stewards of privacy in the 21st century.

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Recently, two international standard organizations, ISO and OGC, have done the work of standardization for GIS. Current standardization work for providing interoperability among GIS DB focuses on the design of open interfaces. But, this work has not considered procedures and methods for designing river geospatial data. Eventually, river geospatial data has its own model. When we share the data by open interface among heterogeneous GIS DB, differences between models result in the loss of information. In this study a plan was suggested both to respond to these changes in the information envirnment and to provide a future Smart River-based river information service by understanding the current state of river geospatial data model, improving, redesigning the database. Therefore, primary and foreign key, which can distinguish attribute information and entity linkages, were redefined to increase the usability. Database construction of attribute information and entity relationship diagram have been newly redefined to redesign linkages among tables from the perspective of a river standard database. In addition, this study was undertaken to expand the current supplier-oriented operating system to a demand-oriented operating system by establishing an efficient management of river-related information and a utilization system, capable of adapting to the changes of a river management paradigm.

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Recent efforts toward a world with freer trade, like WTO/GATT or regional Preferential Trade Agreements(PTAs), were put in doubt after McCallum's(1995) finding of a large border effect between US and Canadian provinces. Since then, there has been a great amount of research on this topic employing the gravity equation. This dissertation has two goals. The first goal is to review comprehensively the recent literature about the gravity equation, including its usages, econometric specifications, and the efforts to provide it with microeconomic foundations. The second goal is the estimation of the Brazilian border effect (or 'home-bias trade puzzle') using inter-state and international trade flow data. It is used a pooled cross-section Tobit model. The lowest border effect estimated was 15, which implies that Brazilian states trade among themselves 15 times more than they trade with foreign countries. Further research using industry disaggregated data is needed to qualify the estimated border effect with respect to which part of that effect can be attributed to actual trade costs and which part is the outcome of the endogenous location problem of the firm.

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In this paper a competitive general equilibrium model is used to investigate the welfare and long run allocation impacts of privatization. There are two types of capital in this model economy, one private and the other initially public ("infrastructure"), and a positive externality due to the latter is assumed. A benevolent government can improve upon decentralized allocation internalizing the externality, but it introduces distortions in the economy through the finance of its investments. It is shown that even making the best case for public action - maximization of individuals' welfare, no• operation inefficiency and free supply to society of infrastructure services - privatization is welfare improving for a large set of economies. Hence, arguments against privatization based solely on under-investment are incorrect, as this maybe the optimal action when the financing of public investment are considered. When operation inefficiency is introduced in the public sector, gains from privatization are much higher and positive for most reasonable combinations of parameters .

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Em uma conjuntura de expansão urbana, intensificação do consumo, mudança climática e escassez de petróleo, o tema das mobilidades assume inquestionável importância econômica, social e ambiental. O seminário internacional "Mobilidades Urbanas: Alicerces para Pesquisas Transnacionais" volta-se, por um lado, para a fomentação do debate em torno do paradigma das novas mobilidades - envolvendo mobilidade espacial e socioeconômica, entre outras - e de sua aplicabilidade no contexto brasileiro; por outro, para a capacitação de pesquisadores cujas investigações tematizam os processos de mobilidade social e espacial a partir de perspectivas comparativas e transnacionais.

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The main objective of this paper is to propose a novel setup that allows estimating separately the welfare costs of the uncertainty stemming from business-cycle uctuations and from economic-growth variation, when the two types of shocks associated with them (respectively,transitory and permanent shocks) hit consumption simultaneously. Separating these welfare costs requires dealing with degenerate bivariate distributions. Levis Continuity Theorem and the Disintegration Theorem allow us to adequately de ne the one-dimensional limiting marginal distributions. Under Normality, we show that the parameters of the original marginal distributions are not afected, providing the means for calculating separately the welfare costs of business-cycle uctuations and of economic-growth variation. Our empirical results show that, if we consider only transitory shocks, the welfare cost of business cycles is much smaller than previously thought. Indeed, we found it to be negative - -0:03% of per-capita consumption! On the other hand, we found that the welfare cost of economic-growth variation is relatively large. Our estimate for reasonable preference-parameter values shows that it is 0:71% of consumption US$ 208:98 per person, per year.

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Esta tese se dedica ao estudo de modelos de fixação de preços e suas implicações macroeconômicas. Nos primeiros dois capítulos analiso modelos em que as decisões das firmas sobre seus preços praticados levam em conta custos de menu e de informação. No Capítulo 1 eu estimo tais modelos empregando estatísticas de variações de preços dos Estados Unidos, e concluo que: os custos de informação são significativamente maiores que os custos de menu; os dados claramente favorecem o modelo em que informações sobre condições agregadas são custosas enquanto que as idiossincráticas têm custo zero. No Capítulo 2 investigo as consequências de choques monetários e anúncios de desinflação usando os modelos previamente estimados. Mostro que o grau de não-neutralidade monetária é maior no modelo em que parte da informação é grátis. O Capítulo 3 é um artigo em conjunto com Carlos Carvalho (PUC-Rio) e Antonella Tutino (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas). No artigo examinamos um modelo de fixação de preços em que firmas estão sujeitas a uma restrição de fluxo de informação do tipo Shannon. Calibramos o modelo e estudamos funções impulso-resposta a choques idiossincráticos e agregados. Mostramos que as firmas vão preferir processar informações agregadas e idiossincráticas conjuntamente ao invés de investigá-las separadamente. Este tipo de processamento gera ajustes de preços mais frequentes, diminuindo a persistência de efeitos reais causados por choques monetários.

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In this paper a competi tive general equilibrium model is used to investigate the welfare and long run allocation impacts of privatization. There are two types of capital in this model economy, one private and the other initially public ("infrastructure"), and a positive extemality due to the latter is assumed. A benevolent governrnent can improve upon decentralized allocation intemalizing the extemality, but it introduces distortions in the economy through the finance of its investments. It is shown that even making the best case for public action - maximization of individuais' welfare, no operation inefficiency and free supply to society of infrastructure services - privatization is welfare improving for a large set of economies. Hence, arguments against privatization based solely on under-investment are incorrect, as this maybe the optimal action when the financing of public investment are considered. When operation inefficiency is introduced in the public sector, gains from privatization are much higher and positive for most reasonable combinations of parameters.

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This paper evaluates how information asymmetry affects the strength of competition in credit markets. A theory is presented in which adverse selection softens competition by decreasing the incentives creditors have for competing in the interest rate dimension. In equilibirum, although creditors compete, the outcome is similar to collusion. Three empirical implications arise. First, interest rate should respond asymmetrically to changes in the cost of funds: increases in cost of funds should, on average, have a larger effect on interest rates than decreases. Second, aggressiveness in pricing should be associated with a worseing in the bank level default rates. Third, bank level default rates should be endogenous. We then verify the validity of these three empirical implications using Brazilian data on consumer overdraft loans. The results in this paper rationalize seemingly abnormallly high interest rates in unsecured loans.

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We analyze the stability of monetary regimes in a decentralized economy where fiat money is endogenously created, information about its value is imperfect, and agents only learn from their personal trading experiences. We show that in poorly informed economies, monetary stability depends heavily on the government's commitment to the long run value of money, whereas in economies where agents gather information more easily, monetary stability can be an endogenous outcome. We generate a dynamics on the acceptability of fiat money that resembles historical accounts of the rise and eventual colIapse of overissued paper money. Moreover, our results provide an explanation of the fact that, despite its obvious advantages, the widespread use of fiat money is a very recent development.

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EMAp - Escola de Matemática Aplicada

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This paper argues the euro zone requires a government banker that manages the bond market and helps finance country budget deficits. The euro solved Europe’s problem of exchange rate speculation by creating a unified currency managed by a single central bank, but in doing so it replaced the exchange rate speculation problem with bond market speculation. Remedying this requires a central bank that acts as government banker and maintains bond interest rates at sustainable levels. Because the euro is a monetary union, this must be done in a way that both avoids favoring individual countries and avoids creating incentives for irresponsible country fiscal policy that leads to “bail-outs”. The paper argues this can be accomplished via a European Public Finance Authority (EPFA) that issues public debt which the European Central Bank (ECB) is allowed to trade. The debate over the euro’s financial architecture has significant political implications. The current neoliberal inspired architecture, which imposes a complete separation between the central bank and public finances, puts governments under continuous financial pressures. That will make it difficult to maintain the European social democratic welfare state. This gives a political reason for reforming the euro and creating an EPFA that supplements the economic case for reform.

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My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.

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Seroprevalence of and risk factors for toxoplasmosis in sheep from different properties in the Jaboticabal microregion, São Paulo State, Brazil were determined. Antibodies to Toxoplasma gondii were found in sera of 52.0% of 488 sheep tested by indirect fluorescent antibody test (IFAT >= 64). T gondii seropositivity in sheep was significantly associated with gender of the sheep, pasturing system, contact with cats, and the use of mineral supplements and the type of feed. (C) 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.