987 resultados para Berth allocation problem


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License no. 145 of season 1872/73 made out to S.D. Woodruff for 35 ¾ square miles in berth no. 198, April 7, 1873.

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License no. 67 of season 1873/74 made out to S.D. Woodruff for 36 square miles in berth no. 192, June 13, 1873

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License no. 68 of season 1873/74 made out to S.D. Woodruff for 35 ¾ square miles in berth no. 198, June 13, 1873.

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License no. 11 of season 1874/75 made out to S.D. Woodruff for 35 ¾ square miles in berth no. 198, May 20, 1874.

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License no. 5 of season 1875/76 made out to S.D. Woodruff for 36 square miles in berth no. 192, June 1, 1875.

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License no. 2 of season 1886/87 made out to S.D. Woodruff for 36 square miles in berth no. 192, May 15, 1876.

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License no. 3 of season 1886/87 made out to S.D. Woodruff for 35 ¾ square miles in berth no. 198, May 15, 1876

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License no. 7 of season 1877/78 made out to S.D. Woodruff for 35 ¾ square miles in berth no. 198, May 31, 1877.

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License no. 6 of season 1877/78 made out to S.D. Woodruff for 36 square miles in berth no.192, May 31, 1877.

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License no. 87 of season 1879/80 made out to S.D. Woodruff for 36 square miles in berth no. 192, June 3, 1879.

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License no. 26 of season 1880/81 made out to S.D. Woodruff for 36 square miles in berth no. 192, May 27, 1880.

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A group of agents located along a river have quasi-linear preferences over water and money. We ask how the water should be allocated and what money transfers should be performed. We are interested in efficiency, stability (in the sense of the core), and fairness (in a sense to be defined). We first show that the cooperative game associated with our problem is convex : its core is therefore large and easily described. Next, we propose the following fairness requirement : no group of agents should enjoy a welfare higher than what it could achieve in the absence of the remaining agents. We prove that only one welfare vector in the core satisfies this condition : it is the marginal contribution vector corresponding to the ordering of the agents along the river. We discuss how it could be decentralized or implemented.

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We study the problem of locating two public goods for a group of agents with single-peaked preferences over an interval. An alternative specifies a location for each public good. In Miyagawa (1998), each agent consumes only his most preferred public good without rivalry. We extend preferences lexicographically and characterize the class of single-peaked preference rules by Pareto-optimality and replacement-domination. This result is considerably different from the corresponding characterization by Miyagawa (2001a).

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We consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning k indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences, we characterize the class of uniform probabilistic rules by Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy. We also show that in this characterization no-envy cannot be replaced by anonymity. When agents are strictly risk averse von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility maximizers, then we reduce the problem of assigning k identical objects to a problem of allocating the amount k of an infinitely divisible commodity.