Desarrollo de la zona costera: desarrollo y medio ambiente del Caribe en los aspectos costero y marítimo: programas y actividades posibles = Coastal area development: development and environment in the Caribbean coastal and marine aspects: possible programmes and activities

Incluye Bibliografía

Access of Latin American and Caribbean exports to the US market 2004-2005

Includes bibliography

Essays in Environmental Economics

This dissertation comprises four essays on the topic of environmental economics and industrial organization. In the first essay, we develop a two-country world differential game model with a polluting firm in each country to investigate the equilibrium of the game between firms when they decide to trade or not and to see under which conditions social welfare coincides with the market equilibrium. In the second essay, we built a model where firms strategically choose whether to participate in an auction/lottery to attain pollution permits, or instead invest in green R&D, to show that, somewhat counterintuitively, a desirable side effect of the auction is in fact that of fostering environmental R&D in an admissible range of the model parameters. The third essay investigates a second-best trade agreement between two countries when pollution spillovers are asymmetric to examine the strategic behavior of governments in using pollution taxes and tariffs under trade liberalization. The fouth essay studies the profitability of exogenous output constraint in a differential game model with price dynamics under the feedback strategies.

Risk appetite e risk tolerance: strumenti di supporto agli istituti di credito per l'assunzione di rischi in tempi di crisi

Negli ultimi anni l’attenzione di legislatori e degli Organi di Vigilanza, in base alle riforme regolamentari attivate in risposta alla crisi economica, si sono focalizzate sulle pratiche di risk management delle Banche, sottolineando l’importanza dei sistemi di controllo e gestione dei rischi. Il presente lavoro nasce con l’intento di analizzare e valutare le caratteristiche salienti del processo di assunzione e gestione dei rischi nel sistema economico finanziario attuale. Numerosi e autorevoli esperti, come gli operatori del Financial Stability Board , Institute of International Finance e Senior Supervisory Group, si sono espressi sulle cause della crisi finanziaria ed hanno sollevato dubbi circa la qualità delle azioni intraprese da alcuni manager, sulle loro politiche gestionali e sulla comprensione delle reali condizioni in cui versavano le loro Banche (in termini di esposizione ai rischi, report da aggregazione dati su performance aziendali e qualità dei dati aggregati) , si è ritenuto giusto dal punto di vista teorico approfondire in particolare i temi del Risk Appetite e Risk Tolerance, novità introdotte nelle diverse direttive e normative in risposta alle citate ed ambigue politiche di gestione ed assunzione rischi. I concetti, qui introdotti, di appetito e tolleranza al rischio conducono ad una ampia sfera di riferimento che guarda alla necessità di fissare degli obiettivi di rischio e loro limiti per poter meglio controllare e valutare la stabilità economica/finanziaria e stimare gli effetti di condizioni peggiorative (reali o soltanto teoriche, come gli stress test) sulla solvibilità e profittabilità delle Banche nazionali ed internazionali. Inoltre, ad integrazione di quanto precedentemente esposto sarà illustrata una survey sulla disclosure delle principali Banche europee in relazione alle informazioni sul Risk Appetite e sul Risk Tolerance.

Social Welfare and Behavioral Public Policies

In this work I discuss several key aspects of welfare economics and policy analysis and I propose two original contributions to the growing field of behavioral public policymaking. After providing a historical perspective of welfare economics and an overview of policy analysis processes in the introductory chapter, in chapter 2 I discuss a debated issue of policymaking, the choice of the social welfare function. I contribute to this debate by proposing an original methodological contribution based on the analysis of the quantitative relationship among different social welfare functional forms commonly used by policy analysts. In chapter 3 I then discuss a behavioral policy to contrast indirect tax evasion based on the use of lotteries. I show that the predictions of my model based on non-expected utility are consistent with observed, and so far unexplained, empirical evidence of the policy success. Finally, in chapter 4 I investigate by mean of a laboratory experiment the effects of social influence on the individual likelihood to engage in altruistic punishment. I show that bystanders’ decision to engage in punishment is influenced by the punishment behavior of their peers and I suggest ways to enact behavioral policies that exploit this finding.

Energy and weight reduction in hoisting systems with magnetic traction sheaves

At the Chair of Logistics Engineering, TU Dresden, a particular focus is research and development of magnetic traction sheaves. Therein the main fundamentals of these special sheaves are determined for applications in different fields such as elevators, several kinds of winches, hoists and cranes. In the current research project “energy balance of magnetic traction sheaves”, the dynamic behaviour of systems with magnetic traction sheaves was investigated. The research focused on theoretical and practical examinations of energy balance. Moreover, a new approach for dimensioning magnetic traction sheave systems is presented. It is a project of the Research Foundation Intralogistics / Material Handling and Logistics (IFL), which is funded through the AiF under the program of Industrial Collective Research for SMEs (IGF) by the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi).

Heterogeneity and time

Although heterogeneity and time are central aspects of economic activity, it was predominantly the Austrian School of economics that emphasized these two aspects. In this paper we argue that the explicit consideration of heterogeneity and time is of increasing importance due to the increasing environmental and resource problems faced by humankind today. It is shown that neo-Austrian capital theory, which revived Austrian ideas employing a formal approach in the 1970s, is not only well suited to address issues of structural change and of accompanying unemployment induced by technical progress but also can be employed for an encompassing ecological-economic analysis demanded by ecological economics. However, complexity, uncertainty, and real ignorance limit the applicability of formal economic analysis. Therefore, we conclude that economic analysis has to be supplemented by considerations of political philosophy. Copyright 2006 American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Inc..

Three essays on the concept of trust and its foundations

The present dissertation focuses on trust and comprises three empirical essays on the concept itself and its foundations. All three essays investigate trust as an expectation and rely on selfreport measures of trust. Whereas the first two chapters investigate social trust, the third chapter investigates political trust. Essentially, there are three related important debates to which the following chapters contribute. A first debate discusses problems with current selfreport measures. Scholars recently started to question whether standard trust questions really measure the same across countries and languages. Chapter 1 engages in this debate. Using data from Switzerland it studies whether different trust questions measure the same latent trust constructs across individuals belonging to three different culturallinguistic regions. The second debate concerns the socalled forms or dimensions of trust. Recently, scholars started investigating whether trust is a onedimensional construct, i.e. whether an individual's trust judgment differs for categories of trustees such as strangers, neighbors, family members and friends or not. Relying on confirmatory factor analysis Chapter 2 investigates whether individuals really do make a difference between different trustee categories and to what extent these judgments can be summarized into higherorder latent trust constructs. The third debate is concerned with causes of differences in trust across humans. Chapter 3 focuses on the role of laterlife experiences, more precisely victimization experiences and investigates their causal relationship with generalized social trust. Chapter 4 focuses on the impact of direct democratic institutions on the trust relationship between citizens and political authorities.

Corporate aging and investment decisions

Paper I: Corporate aging and internal resource allocation Abstract Various observers argue that established firms are at a disadvantage in pursuing new growth opportunities. In this paper, we provide systematic evidence that established firms allocate fewer resources to high-growth lines of business. However, we find no evidence of inefficient resource allocation in established firms. Redirecting resources from high-growth to low-growth lines of business does not result in lower profitability. Also, resource allocation towards new growth opportunities does not increase when managers of established firms are exposed to takeover and product market threats. Rather, it seems that conservative resource allocation strategies are driven by pressures to meet investors’ expectations. Our empirical evidence, thus, favors the hypothesis that established firms wisely choose to allocate fewer resources to new growth opportunities as external pressures force them to focus on efficiency rather than novelty (Holmström 1989). Paper II: Corporate aging and asset sales Abstract This paper asks whether divestitures are motivated by strategic considerations about the scope of the firm’s activities. Limited managerial capacity implies that exploiting core competences becomes comparatively more attractive than exploring new growth opportunities as firms mature. Divestitures help stablished firms free management time and increase the focus on core competences. The testable implication of this attention hypothesis is that established firms are the main sellers of assets, that their divestiture activity increases when managerial capacity is scarcer, that they sell non-core activities, and that they return the divestiture proceeds to the providers of capital instead of reinvesting them in the firm. We find strong empirical support for these predictions. Paper III: Corporate aging and lobbying expenditures Abstract Creative destruction forces constantly challenge established firms, especially in competitive markets. This paper asks whether corporate lobbying is a competitive weapon of established firms to counteract the decline in rents over time. We find a statistically and economically significant positive relation between firm age and lobbying expenditures. Moreover, the documented age-effect is weaker when firms have unique products or operate in concentrated product markets. To address endogeneity, we use industry distress as an exogenous nonlegislative shock to future rents and show that established firms are relatively more likely to lobby when in distress. Finally, we provide empirical evidence that corporate lobbying efforts by established firms forestall the creative destruction process. In sum, our findings suggest that corporate lobbying is a competitive weapon of established firms to retain profitability in competitive environments.

Three Essays on Age and Firm Performance

Old captains at the helm: Chairman age and firm performance Urs Waelchli and Jonas Zeller December, 2012 This paper examines whether the chairmen of the board (COBs) impose their life-cycles on the firms over which they preside. Using a large sample of unlisted firms we find a robust negative relation between COB age and firm performance. COBs age much like ‘ordinary’ people. Their cognitive abilities deteriorate and they experience significant shifts in motivation. Deteriorating cognitive abilities are the main driver of the performance effect that we observe. The results imply that succession planning problems in unlisted firms are real. Mandatory retirement age clauses cannot solve these problems. Corporate Aging around the World Jonas Zeller January, 2014 This paper examines whether firms internationally age as US firms do (Loderer, Stulz, and Wälchli, 2013). Using a large panel, I find that Tobin’s Q monotonically falls with firm Age across all nineteen countries in the sample. The decrease varies across countries but is generally extremely robust and economically significant. ROA, sales growth, and market share decrease over a firm’s lifetime in most countries as well. Furthermore, older firms reduce their capital expenditures and R&D outlays. Instead, they distribute more cash to their shareholders. Overall, the results suggest that corporate aging is not confined to the US but is a genuine phenomenon that affects listed firms worldwide. This evidence supports the hypothesis that corporate aging is driven by managers who optimally focus on managing their assets in place and neglect the development of growth opportunities. I finally ask whether the managers’ choice and with it the magnitude of the decline in Tobin’s Q is a function of country-level institutional settings. I find that most notably firms age faster in countries where employees are relatively well protected by labor regulation. Is employment protection the fountain of corporate youth? Claudio Loderer, Urs Wälchli, Jonas Zeller* September 2014 Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2012, 2013) find that employment protection legislation (EPL) encourages innovation. We argue that this effect should be particularly strong in mature firms. We would therefore also expect EPL to boost growth opportunities. Using the natural Experiment created by the staggered passage of changes in EPL across seventeen countries, we find evidence that employment protection legislation does indeed stimulate Innovation efforts, especially in mature firms. The effect is stronger in countries in which patents are owned by the firm and in the context of regular contracts. Consistent with that, EPL encourages risk taking. Overall, however, there is Little evidence that the effect of EPL on innovation effort translates into higher firm value, not even in mature firms. EPL does motivate employees in those firms to put in a greater effort, as evidenced by stronger sales growth. Yet it also increases costs, reduces profitability, and depresses Tobin’s Q ratios in all firms, especially the mature ones, possibly because of the rigidities that characterize these firms [Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli (2014)].

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Implications of Longterm Diameter-Limit Harvesting: Effects on Radial Growth of Red Spruce (Picea rubens) and Genetic Diversity of White Pine (Pinus strobus)

For over 3 centuries, diameter-limit harvesting has been a predominant logging method in the northeastern United States. Silvicultural theory asserts that such intensively selective harvesting can lead to genetic degradation. A decrease in softwood productivity has recently been reported in Maine - has a long history of dysgenic selection degraded the genetic resources of Maine softwoods, contributing to a decrease in growth and productivity? This study examines two aspects of potential implications of diameter-limit harvesting: effects on residual phenotypes of red spruce and impacts on genetic diversity of white pine. Radial growth of residual red spruce trees in stands experiencing 50 years of fixed diameter-limit harvesting was measured using annual increment rings and compared with residual red spruce trees in positive selection stands. Trees remaiaing after several rounds of diameter-limit harvesting exhibited sigdicantl y smaller radial sizes throughout their lives, and displayed significantly slower growth rates for the first 80 years of measured growth. These results strongly suggest that the largest and fastest-growing genotypes and their respective gene complexes determining good radial growth have been removed from the diameter-limit stand. Dysgenic selection can be observed in fixed diarneter-limit stands, resulting in a diminished genetic resource and decreased residual stand value. To examine more direct genetic implications of long-term diameter-limit harvesting, microsatellite DNA markers were implemented to study genetic diversity of eastern white pine in Maine. Three age groups of trees were studied: mature trees older than 200 years, juvenile trees 5-30 years old, and embryos. Trees were genotyped at 10 microsatellite loci. Overall genetic diversity levels of eastern white pine in Maine were extremely high, with an average observed heterozygosity of 0.762. Genetic differentiation was minimal among and between all three age groups, although an excess of heterozygotes was shown in the mature and juvenile groups that was not reflected in the embryo group, which actually had a slight heterozygote deficiency. Allele frequencies did not differ significantly between age groups, but did reveal more rare and low frequency alleles in the embryo groups than in the mature group. Overall, low frequency alleles comprise the largest portion of alleles in the sample population, with no common alleles evident overall. These results suggest that significant genetic degradation has either not occurred for white pine, or that the results of dysgenic selection have not yet emerged. It is clear, however, that selective harvesting could result in a loss of low frequency alleles, which are a primary reserve of evolutionary potential in a species. Implications of these studies affect industrial forestry, regional economics, and ecological concerns for the northeast. Long-term diameter-limit harvesting can lead to a degradation of residual phenotypes, and an overall decrease in stand quality. Potentially, a loss of low frequency, locally adapted alleles could result in a decrease of allelic richness and degradation of the regidnal genetic resource. Decreased genetic variation can lead to seriously limited evolutionary potential of species and ecosystems, particularly in rapidly changing environments. Based on these findings, I recommend a reassessment of any harvesting prescription that includes fixed diameter-limit removals, particularly for species that have low natural genetic diversity levels or a limited natural range, such as red spruce. Maintenance of a healthy genetic reserve can avoid effects of dysgenic harvesting.

Conversations between Anthropologists and Economists

Interdisciplinary citation patterns and other indicators of the flow and sharing of academic knowledge suggest that economists and anthropologists do not talk to each other. Previous studies of this puzzling trend have typically attributed the problem to methodological differences between the two disciplines. Although there are significant differences between economics and anthropology in behavioral assumptions and modes of inquiry, similar differences exist between them and other disciplines (some with much heavier volumes of cross-citations with economics or anthropology), suggesting that the source of the problem lies elsewhere. This paper considers the problem at a deeper level by examining systematic differences in the preferences, capabilities, and literary cultures of economists and anthropologists. Adopting a rhetorical perspective, I consider not the firms, households, or tribes as the principal objective of analysis in the two disciplines, but the conversations between these units. These conversations (through non-verbal as well as verbal media) can be grouped into two genres, based on the type of problem they aim to solve. Those in the first genre aim to solve the problem of interest--how to align the incentives of the parties involved. Those in the second genre deal with the problem of knowledge--how to align localized, and dispersed information. Economists are interested and capable of dealing with primarily, if not exclusively, the first genre, and anthropologists focus on the second. This difference has far reaching consequences for how economists and anthropologists conduct their own scholarly conversations with their own colleagues, why they are having difficulty talking to each other across disciplinary boundaries, and what can be done to change the patterns of communication.