On the Relationship between Market Power and Bank Risk Taking

We analyse risk-taking behaviour of banks in the context of spatial competition. Banks mobilise unsecured deposits by offering deposit rates, which they invest either in a prudent or a gambling asset. Limited liability along with high return of a successful gamble induce moral hazard at the bank level. We show that when the market power is low, banks invest in the gambling asset. On the other hand, for sufficiently high levels of market power, all banks choose the prudent asset to invest in. We further show that a merger of two neighboring banks increases the likelihood of prudent behaviour. Finally, introduction of a deposit insurance scheme exacerbates banks’ moral hazard problem.

"Public on the outside, private on the inside": the organizational hybridization, sense of belonging and identity strategies of the employees of a public unemployment insurance fund in Switzerland

A number of studies show that New Public Management reforms have altered the current identity benchmarks of public officials, particularly by hybridizing values or management practices. However, existing studies have largely glossed over the sense of belonging of officials when their organization straddles the concerns of public service and private enterprise, so that the boundary between public and private sector is blurred. The purpose of this article is precisely to explore this sense of belonging in the context of organizational hybridization. It does so by drawing on the results of research conducted among the employees of a public unemployment insurance fund in Switzerland. On the one hand, the analysis shows how much their markers of belonging are hybrid, multiple and constructed in negative terms (with regard to the State), while indicating that the working practices of the employees point to an identity that is nevertheless closely bound with the public sector. On the other hand, the analysis shows that the organization plays strategically with its State status, by exploiting either its private or public identity in line with the needs related to its external image. The article concludes with a discussion of the results highlighting the strategic functionality of the hybrid identity of the actors.

Harmful competition in the insurance markets

There is a general presumption that competition is a good thing. In this paper we show that competition in the insurance markets can be bad and that adverse selection is in general worse under competition than under monopoly. The reason is that monopoly can exploit its market power to relax incentive constraints by cross-subsidization between different risk types. Cream-skimming behavior, on the contrary, prevents competitive firms from using implicit transfers. In effect monopoly is shown to provide better coverage to those buying insurance but at the cost of limiting participation to insurance. Performing simulation for di erent distributions of risk, we find that monopoly in general performs (much) better than competition in terms of the realization of the gains from trade across all traders in equilibrium. However, most of the surplus is retained by the firm and, as a result, most individuals prefer competitive markets notwithstanding their performance is generally poorer than monopoly.

Multi-agent contracting with countervailing incentives and limited liability

We consider a principal who deals with a privately informed agent protected by limited liability in a correlated information setting. The agent's technology is such that the fixed cost declines with the marginal cost (the type), so that countervailing incentives may arise. We show that, with high liability, the first-best outcome can be effected for any type if (1) the fixed cost is non-concave in type, under the contract that yields the smallest feasible loss to the agent; (2) the fixed cost is not very concave in type, under the contract that yields the maximum sustainable loss to the agent. We further show that, with low liability, the first-best outcome is still implemented for a non-degenerate range of types if the fixed cost is less concave in type than some given threshold, which tightens as the liability reduces. The optimal contract entails pooling otherwise.

Prevalence of frailty indicators and association with socioeconomic status in middle-aged and older adults in a swiss region with universal health insurance coverage : a population-based cross-sectional study

Frailty prevalence in older adults has been reported but is largely unknown in middle-aged adults. We determined the prevalence of frailty indicators among middle-aged and older adults from a general Swiss population characterized by universal health insurance coverage and assessed the determinants of frailty with a special focus on socioeconomic status. Participants aged 50 and more from the population-based 2006-2010 Bus Santé study were included (N = 2,930). Four frailty indicators (weakness, shrinking, exhaustion, and low activity) were measured according to standard definitions. Multivariate logistic regressions were used to determine associations. Overall, 63.5%, 28.7%, and 7.8% participants presented no frailty indicators, one frailty indicator, and two or more frailty indicators, respectively. Among middle-aged participants (50-65 years), 75.1%, 22.2%, and 2.7% presented 0, 1, and 2 or more frailty indicators. The number of frailty indicators was positively associated with age, hypertension, and current smoking and negatively associated with male gender, body mass index, waist-to-hip ratio, and serum total cholesterol level. Lower income level but not education was associated with higher number of frailty indicators. Frailty indicators are frequently encountered in both older and middle-aged adults from the Swiss general population. Despite universal health insurance coverage, household income is independently associated with frailty.

β-Glucan antigenemia assay for the diagnosis of invasive fungal infections in patients with hematological malignancies: a systematic review and meta-analysis of cohort studies from the Third European Conference on Infections in Leukemia (ECIL-3).

BACKGROUND: Invasive fungal infections (IFIs) are life-threatening complications in patients with hemato-oncological malignancies, and early diagnosis is crucial for outcome. The compound 1,3-β-D-glucan (BG), a cell wall component of most fungal species, can be detected in blood during IFI. Four commercial BG antigenemia assays are available (Fungitell, Fungitec-G, Wako, and Maruha). This meta-analysis from the Third European Conference on Infections in Leukemia (ECIL-3) assessed the performance of BG assays for the diagnosis of IFI in hemato-oncological patients. METHODS: Studies reporting the performance of BG antigenemia assays for the diagnosis of IFI (European Organization for Research and Treatment of Cancer and Mycoses Study Group criteria) in hemato-oncological patients were identified. The analysis was focused on high-quality cohort studies with exclusion of case-control studies. Meta-analysis was performed by conventional meta-analytical pooling and bivariate analysis. RESULTS: Six cohort studies were included (1771 adult patients with 414 IFIs of which 215 were proven or probable). Similar performance was observed among the different BG assays. For the cutoff recommended by the manufacturer, the diagnostic performance of the BG assay in proven or probable IFI was better with 2 consecutive positive test results (diagnostic odds ratio for 2 consecutive vs one single positive results, 111.8 [95% confidence interval {CI}, 38.6-324.1] vs 16.3 [95% CI, 6.5-40.8], respectively; heterogeneity index for 2 consecutive vs one single positive results, 0% vs 72.6%, respectively). For 2 consecutive tests, sensitivity and specificity were 49.6% (95% CI, 34.0%-65.3%) and 98.9% (95% CI, 97.4%-99.5%), respectively. Estimated positive and negative predictive values for an IFI prevalence of 10% were 83.5% and 94.6%, respectively. CONCLUSIONS: Different BG assays have similar accuracy for the diagnosis of IFI in hemato-oncological patients. Two consecutive positive antigenemia assays have very high specificity, positive predictive value, and negative predictive value. Because sensitivity is low, the test needs to be combined with clinical, radiological, and microbiological findings.

A public key encryption based on third order linear sequences

Based on third order linear sequences, an improvement version of the Diffie-Hellman distribution key scheme and the ElGamal public key cryptosystem scheme are proposed, together with an implementation and computational cost. The security relies on the difficulty of factoring an RSA integer and on the difficulty of computing the discrete logarithm.

Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement

In the presence of cost uncertainty, limited liability introduces the possibility of default in procurement with its associated bank-ruptcy costs. When financial soundness is not perfectly observable, we show that incentive compatibility implies that financially less sound contractors are selected with higher probability in any feasible mechanism. Informational rents are associated with unsound financial situations. By selecting the financially weakest contractor, stronger price competition (auctions) may not only increase the probability of default but also expected rents. Thus, weak conditions are suffcient for auctions to be suboptimal. In particular, we show that pooling firms with higher assets may reduce the cost of procurement even when default is costless for the sponsor.

An Introduction to parametric and non-parametric models for bivariate positive insurance claim severity distributions

We present a real data set of claims amounts where costs related to damage are recorded separately from those related to medical expenses. Only claims with positive costs are considered here. Two approaches to density estimation are presented: a classical parametric and a semi-parametric method, based on transformation kernel density estimation. We explore the data set with standard univariate methods. We also propose ways to select the bandwidth and transformation parameters in the univariate case based on Bayesian methods. We indicate how to compare the results of alternative methods both looking at the shape of the overall density domain and exploring the density estimates in the right tail.

Three Essays on the Formation and Impact of Economic Policy

Introduction In my thesis I argue that economic policy is all about economics and politics. Consequently, analysing and understanding economic policy ideally has at least two parts. The economics part, which is centered around the expected impact of a specific policy on the real economy both in terms of efficiency and equity. The insights of this part point into which direction the fine-tuning of economic policies should go. However, fine-tuning of economic policies will be most likely subject to political constraints. That is why, in the politics part, a much better understanding can be gained by taking into account how the incentives of politicians and special interest groups as well as the role played by different institutional features affect the formation of economic policies. The first part and chapter of my thesis concentrates on the efficiency-related impact of economic policies: how does corporate income taxation in general, and corporate income tax progressivity in specific, affect the creation of new firms? Reduced progressivity and flat-rate taxes are in vogue. By 2009, 22 countries are operating flat-rate income tax systems, as do 7 US states and 14 Swiss cantons (for corporate income only). Tax reform proposals in the spirit of the "flat tax" model typically aim to reduce three parameters: the average tax burden, the progressivity of the tax schedule, and the complexity of the tax code. In joint work, Marius Brülhart and I explore the implications of changes in these three parameters on entrepreneurial activity, measured by counts of firm births in a panel of Swiss municipalities. Our results show that lower average tax rates and reduced complexity of the tax code promote firm births. Controlling for these effects, reduced progressivity inhibits firm births. Our reading of these results is that tax progressivity has an insurance effect that facilitates entrepreneurial risk taking. The positive effects of lower tax levels and reduced complexity are estimated to be significantly stronger than the negative effect of reduced progressivity. To the extent that firm births reflect desirable entrepreneurial dynamism, it is not the flattening of tax schedules that is key to successful tax reforms, but the lowering of average tax burdens and the simplification of tax codes. Flatness per se is of secondary importance and even appears to be detrimental to firm births. The second part of my thesis, which corresponds to the second and third chapter, concentrates on how economic policies are formed. By the nature of the analysis, these two chapters draw on a broader literature than the first chapter. Both economists and political scientists have done extensive research on how economic policies are formed. Thereby, researchers in both disciplines have recognised the importance of special interest groups trying to influence policy-making through various channels. In general, economists base their analysis on a formal and microeconomically founded approach, while abstracting from institutional details. In contrast, political scientists' frameworks are generally richer in terms of institutional features but lack the theoretical rigour of economists' approaches. I start from the economist's point of view. However, I try to borrow as much as possible from the findings of political science to gain a better understanding of how economic policies are formed in reality. In the second chapter, I take a theoretical approach and focus on the institutional policy framework to explore how interactions between different political institutions affect the outcome of trade policy in presence of special interest groups' lobbying. Standard political economy theory treats the government as a single institutional actor which sets tariffs by trading off social welfare against contributions from special interest groups seeking industry-specific protection from imports. However, these models lack important (institutional) features of reality. That is why, in my model, I split up the government into a legislative and executive branch which can both be lobbied by special interest groups. Furthermore, the legislative has the option to delegate its trade policy authority to the executive. I allow the executive to compensate the legislative in exchange for delegation. Despite ample anecdotal evidence, bargaining over delegation of trade policy authority has not yet been formally modelled in the literature. I show that delegation has an impact on policy formation in that it leads to lower equilibrium tariffs compared to a standard model without delegation. I also show that delegation will only take place if the lobby is not strong enough to prevent it. Furthermore, the option to delegate increases the bargaining power of the legislative at the expense of the lobbies. Therefore, the findings of this model can shed a light on why the U.S. Congress often practices delegation to the executive. In the final chapter of my thesis, my coauthor, Antonio Fidalgo, and I take a narrower approach and focus on the individual politician level of policy-making to explore how connections to private firms and networks within parliament affect individual politicians' decision-making. Theories in the spirit of the model of the second chapter show how campaign contributions from lobbies to politicians can influence economic policies. There exists an abundant empirical literature that analyses ties between firms and politicians based on campaign contributions. However, the evidence on the impact of campaign contributions is mixed, at best. In our paper, we analyse an alternative channel of influence in the shape of personal connections between politicians and firms through board membership. We identify a direct effect of board membership on individual politicians' voting behaviour and an indirect leverage effect when politicians with board connections influence non-connected peers. We assess the importance of these two effects using a vote in the Swiss parliament on a government bailout of the national airline, Swissair, in 2001, which serves as a natural experiment. We find that both the direct effect of connections to firms and the indirect leverage effect had a strong and positive impact on the probability that a politician supported the government bailout.

Stability and change in party preferences.

This article analyses stability and volatility of party preferences using data from the Swiss Household-Panel (SHP), which, for the first time, allow studying transitions and stability of voters over several years in Switzerland. Analyses cover the years 1999- 2007 and systematically distinguish changes between party blocks and changes within party blocks. The first part looks at different patterns of change, which show relatively high volatility. The second part tests several theories on causes of such changes applying a multinomial random-effects model. Results show that party preferences stabilise with their duration and with age and that the electoral cycle, political sophistication, socio-structural predispositions, the household-context as well as party size and the number of parties each explain part of electoral volatility. Different results for withinand between party-block changes underlie the importance of that differentiation.

Party competition in regional elections: a framework for analysis

Whilst scholars have long recognised that processes of decentralisation create new regional arenas where distinct patterns of party competition are likely to emerge, there has been little systematic analysis of the dynamics of such competition. This working paper thus proposes a framework for analysing party competition between regional branches of state-wide parties, and autonomist parties, in regional arenas. Firstly, the different strategies political parties may adopt in response to their perceptions of voter preferences and to the strategies pursued by their competitors are identified. Secondly, different factors that impact on parties' strategic choices, and which may constrain a party's ability to select electorally optimal strategies in a given political context, are proposed.