Attitudes, stress and use of force in selected areas of Texas law enforcement

This research aimed to explore the extent to which police use of force was related to attitudes towards violence, agency type, and racism. Previous studies have found a culture of honor in the psychology of violence in the Southern United States. Were similar attitudes measurable among Texas professional line officers? Are there predictors of use of force?^ A self reported anonymous survey was administered to Texas patrol officers in the cities of Austin and Houston, and the Counties of Harris and Travis. A total of seventy-four questionnaires were used in the statistical analyses. Scales were developed measuring use of force, attitudes towards violence, and feelings on racism. Their relationship was examined.^ A regression model shows a strong and significant relationship between the officers' attitudes towards violence and the self-reported use of force. Further, agency type, municipal versus sheriff, also predicts use of force. Attitudes regarding race or racism, as measured by this study, were not predictive of use of force. ^

Border tax adjustments: Can energy and carbon taxes be adjusted at the border?

Will die Schweiz mit unilateralen energie- und klimapolitischen Massnahmen ambitionierte Ziele verfolgen, dann erfahren energieintensive Sektoren Nachteile im internationalen Wett- bewerb. Produktionsverlagerungen und „carbon leakage“ sind die Folgen, was nicht im Sinne der Schweizer Wirtschaft und der globalen Klimaziele ist. Mit Grenzausgleichsmassnahmen (BAM) kann die Schweiz ihre energieintensiven Betriebe nicht vor internationalen Wettbe- werbsnachteilen schützen. Weiter kommt hinzu, dass die Einführung von BAM aus rechtli- cher Sicht „riskant“ ist und bei einem Schweizer Alleingang mit hohen Vollzugshürden ge- rechnet werden muss. Für die Schweiz macht eine Einführung von BAM nur im Rahmen ei- ner grösseren Klimakoalition Sinn (bspw. zusammen mit der EU). Alternativen zu BAM sind die einfacher und autonom umsetzbaren Ausnahmeregelungen für energieintensive Betriebe oder Output-based-allocation-Systeme.

The mentalizing network orchestrates the impact of parochial altruism on social norm enforcement.

Parochial altruism - a preference for altruistic behavior towards ingroup members and mistrust or hostility towards outgroup members--is a pervasive feature in human society and strongly shapes the enforcement of social norms. Since the uniqueness of human society critically depends on the enforcement of norms, the understanding of the neural circuitry of the impact of parochial altruism on social norm enforcement is key, but unexplored. To fill this gap, we measured brain activity with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while subjects had the opportunity to punish ingroup members and outgroup members for violating social norms. Findings revealed that subjects' strong punishment of defecting outgroup members is associated with increased activity in a functionally connected network involved in sanction-related decisions (right orbitofrontal gyrus, right lateral prefrontal cortex, right dorsal caudatus). Moreover, the stronger the connectivity in this network, the more outgroup members are punished. In contrast, the much weaker punishment of ingroup members who committed the very same norm violation is associated with increased activity and connectivity in the mentalizing-network (dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, bilateral temporo-parietal junction), as if subjects tried to understand or justify ingroup members' behavior. Finally, connectivity analyses between the two networks suggest that the mentalizing-network modulates punishment by affecting the activity in the right orbitofrontal gyrus and right lateral prefrontal cortex, notably in the same areas showing enhanced activity and connectivity whenever third-parties strongly punished defecting outgroup members.

The Determinants of Personal Income Tax Progressivity Around the Globe

This paper utilizes a novel database collected by the authors to document features of the progressivity of personal income tax systems across 209 countries for the years 1980-2009. We measure progressivity in several ways. First, we associate it with the increase in effective average (marginal) tax rates between a wage of zero and ten times the average wage in a country. Second, we consider the curvature of the tax schedule expressed as the difference between the effective average (marginal) tax schedule from a wage of zero to ten times the average wage and a linear average tax schedule and, alternatively, the diference between the effective average (marginal) tax schedule from the minimum positive taxable income, to ten times the average wage as opposed to a linear average tax schedule. Moreover, the paper assesses patterns regarding the conditional correlation of country-specifc tax progressivity measures with a host of economic and political country-specific characteristics and find the labor supply elasticity and the income replacement rates for the unemployed to be key determinants of progressivity around the globe, in line with economic theory.

Islam and the Legal Enforcement of Morality

Over sixty years ago, British high court judge Patrick Devlin and legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart fought out a famous debate over the legal enforcement of morality, which was generated by the question whether homosexuality should be legalized or not. Jurists agree that this debate was won by Hart, also evidenced in the fact that the state has since been retreating from its previous role of moral watchdog. I argue in this paper that the two most conflicted and essentially unresolved issues in the integration of Islam, the regulation of the female body and of free speech, have reopened this debate anew, pushing the liberal state toward the legal regulation of morality, thus potentially putting at risk its liberalness. I use the Hart-Devlin debate as a template for comparing and contrasting the Muslim quest for restricting free speech with the host-society quest for restricting the Islamic veil. Accordingly, there is a double threat to liberalism, which this paper brings into view in tandem, one originating from Islam and another from a hypertrophied defense of liberalism.

Mandatory communication skills training for oncologists: enforcement does not substantially impact satisfaction.

PURPOSE Even though there is evidence that both patients and oncology clinicians are affected by the quality of communication and that communication skills can be effectively trained, so-called Communication Skills Trainings (CSTs) remain heterogeneously implemented. METHODS A systematic evaluation of the level of satisfaction of oncologists with the Swiss CST before (2000-2005) and after (2006-2012) it became mandatory. RESULTS Levels of satisfaction with the CST were high, and satisfaction of physicians participating on a voluntary or mandatory basis did not significantly differ for the majority of the items. CONCLUSIONS The evaluation of physicians' satisfaction over the years and after introduction of mandatory training supports recommendations for generalized implementation of CST and mandatory training for medical oncologists.

Norm enforcement in the city revisited: An international field experiment of altruistic punishment, norm maintenance, and broken windows

In laboratory experiments, people are willing to sanction norms at a cost—a behavioral tendency called altruistic punishment. However, the degree to which these findings can be generalized to real-world interactions is still debated. Only a small number of field experiments have been conducted, and initial results suggest that punishment is less frequent outside of the lab. This study replicates one of the first field experiments on altruistic punishment and builds ties to research on norm compliance and the broken windows theory. The original study addressed the enforcement of the anti-littering norm in Athens. We replicate this study in Bern, Zurich, and New York City. As an extension, we investigate how the experimental context (clean vs littered) impacts social norm enforcement. As a second extension, we investigate how opportunity structure impacts the maintenance of the anti-littering norm. Findings indicate that norms are universally enforced, although significantly less than in the standard laboratory experiment,and that enforcement is significantly more common in Switzerland than in New York. Moreover, individuals prefer more subtle forms of enforcement to direct punishment. We also find that enforcement is less frequent in littered than in clean contexts, suggesting that broken windows might not only foster deviant behavior but also weaken informal social control. Finally, we find that opportunity structure can encourage people to maintain norms, as indicated by the fact that people are more likely to voluntarily pick up litter when it is closer to a trash bin.

Special Tax Treatment as Trade Policy: A Database on Export Processing and Special Economic Zones

Many countries treat income generated via exports favourably, especially when production takes places in special zones known as export processing zones (EPZs). EPZs can be defined as specific, geographically defined zones or areas that are subject to special administration and that generally offer tax incentives, such as duty‐free imports when producing for export, exemption from other regulatory constraints linked to import for the domestic market, sometimes favourable treatment in terms of industrial regulation, and the streamlining of border clearing procedures. We describe a database of WTO Members that employ special economic zones as part of their industrial policy mix. This is based on WTO notification and monitoring through the WTO’s trade policy review mechanism (TPRM), supplemented with information from the ILO, World Bank, and primary sources. We also provide some rough analysis of the relationship between use of EPZs and the carbon intensity of exports, and relative levels of investment across countries with and without special zones.

Criminal Solicitation, Entrapment, and the Enforcement of Law

This paper examines the optimal use of criminal solicitation as a law enforcement strategy. The benefits are greater deterrence of crime (due to the greater likelihood of apprehension), and the savings in social harm as some offenders are diverted away from committing actual crimes through solicitation. The costs are the expense of hiring undercover cops and the greater likelihood of punishment. The optimal use of solicitation balances these factors. The paper also examines the justification for the entrapment defense, which exonerates those caught in a criminal solicitation but who otherwise had no predisposition to commit a crime.