The Private and fiscal returns to schooling and the effect of public policies on private incentives to invest in education: a general framework and some results for the EU

This paper develops a comprehensive framework for the quantitative analysis of the private and fiscal returns to schooling and of the effect of public policies on private incentives to invest in education. This framework is applied to 14 member states of the European Union. For each of these countries, we construct estimates of the private return to an additional year of schooling for an individual of average attainment, taking into account the effects of education on wages and employment probabilities after allowing for academic failure rates, the direct and opportunity costs of schooling, and the impact of personal taxes, social security contributions and unemployment and pension benefits on net incomes. We also construct a set of effective tax and subsidy rates that measure the effects of different public policies on the private returns to education, and measures of the fiscal returns to schooling that capture the long-term effects of a marginal increase in attainment on public finances under conditions that approximate general equilibrium.

The Timing of labor demand

We examine the timing of firms' operations in a formal model of labor demand. Merging a variety of data sets from Portugal from 1995-2004, we describe temporal patterns of firms' demand for labor and estimate production-functions and relative labor-demand equations. The results demonstrate the existence of substitution of employment across times of the day/week and show that legislated penalties for work at irregular hours induce firms to alter their operating schedules. The results suggest a role for such penalties in an unregulated labor market, such as the United States, in which unusually large fractions of work are performed at night and on weekends.

Tourism and urban transport: holding demand pressure under supply constraints

Scholars and local planners are increasingly interested in tourism contribution to economic and social development. To this regard, several European cities lead the world rankings on tourist arrivals, and their governments have promoted tourism activity. Mobility is an essential service for tourists visiting large cities, since it is a crucial factor for their comfort. In addition, it facilitates the spread of benefits across the city. The aim of this study is to determine whether city planners respond to this additional urban transport demand pressure by extending supply services. We use an international database of European cities. Our results confirm that tourism intensity is a demand enhancing factor on urban transport. Contrarily, cities do not seem to address this pressure by increasing service supply. This suggests that tourism exerts a positive externality on public transport since it provides additional funding for these services, but it imposes as well external costs on resident users because of congestion given supply constraints.

The Macroeconomics of the labor market: three fundamental views

We distinguish and assess three fundamental views of the labor market regarding the movements in unempoyment: (i) the frictionless equilibrium view; (ii) the chain reaction theory, or prolonged adjustment view; and (iii) the hysteresis view. While the frictionless view implies a clear compartmentalization between the short- and long-run, the hysteresis view implies that all the short-run fluctuations automatically turn into long-run changes in the unemployment rate. We assert the problems faced by these conceptions in explaining the diversity of labor market experiences across the OECD labor markets. We argue that the prolonged adjustment view can overcome these problems since it implies that the short, medium, and long runs are interrelated, merging with one another along an intertemporal continuum.

Changes in the demand for private medical insurance following a shift in tax incentives

The 1998 Spanish reform of the Personal Income Tax eliminated the 15% deduction for private medical expenditures including payments on private health insurance (PHI) policies. To avoid an undesirable increase in the demand for publicly funded health care, tax incentives to buy PHI were not completely removed but basically shifted from individual to group employer-paid policies. In a unique fiscal experiment, at the same time that the tax relief for individually purchased policies was abolished, the government provided for tax allowances on policies taken out through employment. Using a bivariate probit model on data from National Health Surveys, we estimate the impact of said reform on the demand for PHI and the changes occurred within it. Our findings suggest that the total probability of buying PHI was not significantly affected. Indeed, the fall in the demand for individual policies (by 10% between 1997 and 2001) was offset by an increase in the demand for group employer-paid ones, so that the overall size of the market remained virtually unchanged. We also briefly discuss the welfare effects on the state budget, the industry and society at large.

Gastric supply manipulation to modulate ghrelin production and enhance vascularization to the cardia: proof of the concept in a porcine model.

Introduction. Selective embolization of the left-gastric artery (LGA) reduces levels of ghrelin and achieves significant short-term weight loss. However, embolization of the LGA would prevent the performance of bariatric procedures because the high-risk leakage area (gastroesophageal junction [GEJ]) would be devascularized. Aim. To assess an alternative vascular approach to the modulation of ghrelin levels and generate a blood flow manipulation, consequently increasing the vascular supply to the GEJ. Materials and methods. A total of 6 pigs underwent a laparoscopic clipping of the left gastroepiploic artery. Preoperative and postoperative CT angiographies were performed. Ghrelin levels were assessed perioperatively and then once per week for 3 weeks. Reactive oxygen species (ROS; expressed as ROS/mg of dry weight [DW]), mitochondria respiratory rate, and capillary lactates were assessed before and 1 hour after clipping (T0 and T1) and after 3 weeks of survival (T2), on seromuscular biopsies. A celiac trunk angiography was performed at 3 weeks. Results. Mean (±standard deviation) ghrelin levels were significantly reduced 1 hour after clipping (1902 ± 307.8 pg/mL vs 1084 ± 680.0; P = .04) and at 3 weeks (954.5 ± 473.2 pg/mL; P = .01). Mean ROS levels were statistically significantly decreased at the cardia at T2 when compared with T0 (0.018 ± 0.006 mg/DW vs 0.02957 ± 0.0096 mg/DW; P = .01) and T1 (0.0376 ± 0.008mg/DW; P = .007). Capillary lactates were significantly decreased after 3 weeks, and the mitochondria respiratory rate remained constant over time at the cardia and pylorus, showing significant regional differences. Conclusions. Manipulation of the gastric flow targeting the gastroepiploic arcade induces ghrelin reduction. An endovascular approach is currently under evaluation.

Recruitment and retention incentives in health labour markets: an analysis of participation in NHS Scotland following Dental Vocational

This paper uses a unique individual level administrative data set to analyse the participation of health professionals in the NHS after training. The data set contains information on over 1,000 dentists who received Dental Vocational Training in Scotland between 1995 and 2006. Using a dynamic nonlinear panel data model, we estimate the determinants of post-training participation. We nd there is signi cant persistence in these data and are able to show that the persistence arises from state dependence and individual heterogeneity. This finding has implications for the structure of policies designed to increase participation rates. We apply this empirical framework to assess the accuracy of predictions for workforce forecasting, and to provide a preliminary estimate of the impact of one of the recruitment and retention policies available to dentists in Scotland.

Rebound and disinvestment effects in oil consumption and supply resulting from an increase in energy efficiency in the Scottish commercial transport sector

In this paper we use an energy-economy-environment computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Scottish economy to examine the impacts of an exogenous increase in energy augmenting technological progress in the domestic commercial Transport sector on the supply and use of energy. We focus our analysis on oil, as the main type of energy input used in commercial transport activity. We find that a 5% increase in energy efficiency in the commercial Transport sector leads to rebound effects in the use of oil-based energy commodities in all time periods, in the target sector and at the economy-wide level. However, our results also suggest that such an efficiency improvement may cause a contraction in capacity in the Scottish oil supply sector. This ‘disinvestment effect’ acts as a constraint on the size of rebound effects. However, the magnitude of rebound effects and presence of the disinvestment effect in the simulations conducted here are sensitive to the specification of key elasticities of substitution in the nested production function for the target sector, particularly the substitutability of energy for non-energy intermediate inputs to production.

NAVA enhances tidal volume and diaphragmatic electro-myographic activity matching: a Range90 analysis of supply and demand.

Neurally adjusted ventilatory assist (NAVA) is a ventilation assist mode that delivers pressure in proportionality to electrical activity of the diaphragm (Eadi). Compared to pressure support ventilation (PS), it improves patient-ventilator synchrony and should allow a better expression of patient's intrinsic respiratory variability. We hypothesize that NAVA provides better matching in ventilator tidal volume (Vt) to patients inspiratory demand. 22 patients with acute respiratory failure, ventilated with PS were included in the study. A comparative study was carried out between PS and NAVA, with NAVA gain ensuring the same peak airway pressure as PS. Robust coefficients of variation (CVR) for Eadi and Vt were compared for each mode. The integral of Eadi (ʃEadi) was used to represent patient's inspiratory demand. To evaluate tidal volume and patient's demand matching, Range90 = 5-95 % range of the Vt/ʃEadi ratio was calculated, to normalize and compare differences in demand within and between patients and modes. In this study, peak Eadi and ʃEadi are correlated with median correlation of coefficients, R > 0.95. Median ʃEadi, Vt, neural inspiratory time (Ti_ ( Neural )), inspiratory time (Ti) and peak inspiratory pressure (PIP) were similar in PS and NAVA. However, it was found that individual patients have higher or smaller ʃEadi, Vt, Ti_ ( Neural ), Ti and PIP. CVR analysis showed greater Vt variability for NAVA (p < 0.005). Range90 was lower for NAVA than PS for 21 of 22 patients. NAVA provided better matching of Vt to ʃEadi for 21 of 22 patients, and provided greater variability Vt. These results were achieved regardless of differences in ventilatory demand (Eadi) between patients and modes.

Multi-agent contracting with countervailing incentives and limited liability

We consider a principal who deals with a privately informed agent protected by limited liability in a correlated information setting. The agent's technology is such that the fixed cost declines with the marginal cost (the type), so that countervailing incentives may arise. We show that, with high liability, the first-best outcome can be effected for any type if (1) the fixed cost is non-concave in type, under the contract that yields the smallest feasible loss to the agent; (2) the fixed cost is not very concave in type, under the contract that yields the maximum sustainable loss to the agent. We further show that, with low liability, the first-best outcome is still implemented for a non-degenerate range of types if the fixed cost is less concave in type than some given threshold, which tightens as the liability reduces. The optimal contract entails pooling otherwise.

The Export Base Model with a Supply-Side Stimulus to the Export Sector

Paper delivered at the Western Regional Science Association Annual Conference, Sedona, Arizona, February, 2010.

The Distributional Consequences of Supply-Side Reforms in General Equilibrium

This paper addresses the issue on whether tax reforms consisten with lower public debt-to-GDP in the long-run can lead to a more efficient and equitable economy. To this end we solve a heterogeneous agent model comprised of a government, a representative capitalist and representative skilled and unskilled workers, under both rational expectations and adaptive learning. Our main ndings are that (i) reductions in capital taxation, while bene cial at the aggregate level, lead to increased inequality mainly due to the substitutability of un- skilled labour and capital; (ii) a fall in taxation for skilled labour is Pareto improving, which is largely explained by its complementarity with the other factor inputs; (iii) all agents would prefer increasing the tax rate on capital to increasing the tax rate on skilled and un- skilled labour since it leads to relatively lower welfare losses; and (iv) heterogeneity in initial beliefs under adaptive learning quantitatively matters for welfare.

Non-cooperative incentives to share knowledge in competitive environments

In this paper we study a model where non-cooperative agents may exchange knowledge in a competitive environment. As a potential factor that could induce the knowledge disclosure between humans we consider the timing of the moves of players. We develop a simple model of a multistage game in which there are only three players and competition takes place only within two stages. Players can share their private knowledge with their opponents and the knowledge is modelled as in uencing their marginal cost of e¤ort. We identify two main mechanisms that work towards knowledge disclosure. One of them is that before the actual competition starts, the stronger player of the rst stage of a game may have desire to share his knowledge with the "observer", be- cause this reduces the valuation of the prize of the weaker player of that stage and as a result his e¤ort level and probability of winning in a ght. Another mechanism is that the "observer" may have sometimes desire to share knowledge with the weaker player of the rst stage, because in this way, by increasing his probability of winning in that stage, he decreases the probability of winning of the stronger player. As a result, in the second stage the "observer" may have greater chances to meet the weaker player rather than the stronger one. Keywords: knowledge sharing, strategic knowledge disclosure, multistage contest game, non-cooperative games

A labor market with targeted wage offers

We model a market for highly skilled workers, such as the academic job market. The outputs of firm-worker matches are heterogeneous and common knowledge. Wage setting is synchronous with search: firms simultaneously make one personalized o¤er each to the worker of their choice. With large frictions (delay costs), efficient coordination is not possible, but for small frictions efficient matching with Diamond-type monopsony wages is an equilibrium.

Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives

The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analyzed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used. Journal of Economic Literature classiffication numbers: D82, J21, L13, L22. Keywords: Cournot Competition, Contract Delegation, Moral Hazard, Entry, Market Size, Wage Cost.