Report of committee for the form of quarter bills, 1778 December 12

This one-and-a-half page handwritten draft of a report on a folio-sized leaf outlines a six-point process for drafting and authorizing student quarter bills. The procedures consolidate the billing areas, detail the Treasurer's responsibilities, and expand the oversight of the President and Tutors. The report, dated December 12, 1778, is signed by President Samuel Langdon. The draft includes two differently worded versions of the sixth proposal, one of which is struck through.

Water-triggered spontaneous surface patterning in thin films of mexylaminotriazine molecular glasses

Surface patterning that occurs spontaneously during the formation of a thin film is a powerful tool for controlling film morphology at the nanoscale level because it avoids the need for further processing. However, one must first learn under which conditions these patterning phenomena occur or not, and how to achieve control over the surface morphologies that are generated. Mexylaminotriazine-based molecular glasses are small molecules that can readily form amorphous thin films. It was discovered that this class of materials can either form smooth films, or films exhibiting either dome or pore patterns. Depending on the conditions, these patterns can be selectively obtained during film deposition by spin-coating. It was determined that this behavior is controlled by the presence of water or, more generally, of a solvent in which the compounds are insoluble, and that the relative amount and volatility of this poor solvent determines which type of surface relief is obtained. Moreover, AFM and FT-IR spectroscopy have revealed that the thin films are amorphous independently of surface morphology, and no difference was observed at the molecular or supramolecular level. These findings make this class of materials and this patterning approach in general extremely appealing for the control of surface morphology with organic nanostructures.

Simbologia em realidade aumentada móvel

Tese de mestrado, Engenharia Informática (Sistemas de Informação), Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Ciências, 2016

Interpolação projetual : explorando o espaço de possibilidades entre a menor complexidade e o maior desempenho

Tese de doutoramento, Belas-Artes (Design de Equipamento), Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Belas-Artes, 2016

Encadrement juridique des monnaies numériques : bitcoin et autres cryptomonnaies

Les informations relatives aux cryptomonnaies sont susceptibles de changer à l'avenir tant cette matière est nouvelle et encore peu ancrée dans le droit. Ce mémoire est une réflexion sur l'essor du Bitcoin et des cryptomonnaies à leurs débuts, alors même que le droit cherche à s'accaparer ces nouvelles technologies, à les intégrer dans son système préexistant.

Rôle de l'isoforme p35 de la chaîne invariante humaine dans la formation et le transport de complexes de CMH II

La présentation antigénique par les molécules de classe II du complexe majeur d’histocompatibilité (CMH II) est un mécanisme essentiel au contrôle des pathogènes par le système immunitaire. Le CMH II humain existe en trois isotypes, HLA-DP, DQ et DR, tous des hétérodimères composés d’une chaîne α et d’une chaîne β. Le CMH II est entre autres exprimé à la surface des cellules présentatrices d’antigènes (APCs) et des cellules épithéliales activées et a pour fonction de présenter des peptides d’origine exogène aux lymphocytes T CD4+. L’oligomérisation et le trafic intracellulaire du CMH II sont largement facilités par une chaperone, la chaîne invariante (Ii). Il s’agit d’une protéine non-polymorphique de type II. Après sa biosynthèse dans le réticulum endoplasmique (ER), Ii hétéro- ou homotrimérise, puis interagit via sa région CLIP avec le CMH II pour former un complexe αβIi. Le complexe sort du ER pour entamer son chemin vers différents compartiments et la surface cellulaire. Chez l’homme, quatre isoformes d’Ii sont répertoriées : p33, p35, p41 et p43. Les deux isoformes exprimées de manière prédominante, Iip33 et p35, diffèrent par une extension N-terminale de 16 acides aminés portée par Iip35. Cette extension présente un motif de rétention au réticulum endoplasmique (ERM) composé des résidus RXR. Ce motif doit être masqué par la chaîne β du CMH II pour permettre au complexe de quitter le ER. Notre groupe s’est intéressé au mécanisme du masquage et au mode de sortie du ER des complexes αβIi. Nous montrons ici que l’interaction directe, ou en cis, entre la chaîne β du CMH II et Iip35 dans une structure αβIi est essentielle pour sa sortie du ER, promouvant la formation de structures de haut niveau de complexité. Par ailleurs, nous démontrons que NleA, un facteur de virulence bactérien, permet d’altérer le trafic de complexes αβIi comportant Iip35. Ce phénotype est médié par l’interaction entre p35 et les sous-unités de COPII. Bref, Iip35 joue un rôle central dans la formation des complexes αβIi et leur transport hors du ER. Ceci fait d’Iip35 un régulateur clef de la présentation antigénique par le CMH II.

Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh: unfrozen conflicts between Russia and the West. OSW Special Report, 9 July 2008

The Southern Caucasus is the site of three armed conflicts with separatist backgrounds, which have remained unsolved for years: the conflicts in Georgia's Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Azerbaijan's conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (including the areas around Nagorno-Karabakh which were seized by Armenian separatists in the course of the war). Neither Georgia nor Azerbaijan have had any control over the disputed areas since the early 1990s. Both states are simultaneously in conflict with the separatists' informal patrons, respectively Russia and Armenia. After over a decade of relative peace during which the conflicts remained frozen, tension has recently risen considerably: in the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, large-scale fighting may break out in the coming months, whereas in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh and the Azeri-Armenian conflict, such a threat may materialise within the next five years. The current formula for politically resolving the conflicts is ineffective and close to exhaustion, and the prospect of any alternative peace plans being developed is rather distant. The conflicts in the Southern Caucasus are of increasing concern to the West, mainly because of the Western actors' constantly growing political and economic involvement in Georgia and Azerbaijan (including support for reforms and development of the gas and oil transmission infrastructures), as well as its less intensive commitments in Armenia. An outbreak of open fighting over the separatist regions would destabilise the Southern Caucasus, largely undoing the results of the actions which the EU, NATO and the USA have taken in the region in recent years. Moreover, the situation in the Southern Caucasus, especially the separatisms themselves, have in fact become an element in the wider geopolitical game between the West and Russia. For Russia, the stakes are maintaining its influence in the region, and for the West, demonstrating its ability to effectively promote democracy and economic modernisation in the countries bordering it.

Ever further from Moscow. Russia's stance on Central Asia. OSW Study 48/2014

The post-Soviet countries of Central Asia are important for Moscow as a potential source of danger; as a site of its relationships with China, the West and the Islamic world; and not least as a space covered by Russia’s integration initiatives. Since the collapse of the USSR, Russian influence in this region has undergone a far-reaching erosion. The Kremlin’s consistent actions to build up the Eurasian Union, as well as the threat of destabilisation in region after the ISAF operation in Afghanistan winds up in 2014, have slowed down this process, although it is unlikely to be reversed. The current ‘state of possession’ (i.e. the instruments and assets which Russia possesses) still ensures Moscow a minimum level of control over the region, which means that the activity of other global players is limited. This situation may change in tandem with a rise in their ambitions, especially with the possible involvement of China in the field of ‘hard’ security.

A captive island. Kaliningrad between Moscow and the EU. OSW Study 41/2012

The Kaliningrad region can be called a 'captive island', because of its specific geopolitical location - it is part of the Russian legal, political and economic space, yet it is geographically separated from the rest of the Russian Federation, and it is particularly open to co-operation with its neighbours in the European Union. Moscow is trying to compensate the region for its separation, offering it financial support and economic privileges.At the same time, it is sensitive to any potential challenges to Russia's territorial integrity - and the centre's desire for control over the region often limits the latter's potential for cooperation and internal development. This report presents the situation in the region, and is intended to help develop a model for its effective regional co-operation with its EU neighbours.

Russian sanctions against Moldova. Minor effects, major potential. OSW COMMENTARY No. 152, 2014-11-06

Russia has been Moldova’s main trade partner and Russian capital has accounted for a large part of its foreign investments, dominating in the energy and the banking sectors. Moreover, Russia has been a key job market for Moldovan expatriate workers. In the economic sphere, this is making Moldova unilaterally dependent on Russia. Moscow has been attempting to exploit this situation to put pressure on the authorities in Chișinău for quite some time. In recent months Russia has increasingly used instruments for exerting economic pressure on Moldova, as a means of responding to the current authorities’ pro-Western policy. A key element of this policy was Moldova’s signing on 27 June 2014 of the Association Agreement with the EU (which came into force on 1 September 2014). Over the last year, Russia has implemented a number of import restrictions on Moldovan goods. The aim of the Russian actions is to fuel social disappointment, and ultimately – to prevent the pro-European coalition currently in power from winning the parliamentary elections scheduled for 30 November 2014. Another aim might be to convince the Moldovan authorities to suspend the implementation of the Association Agreement – a plan openly put forward by Vladimir Putin during the CIS summit in Minsk on 10 October 2014. So far, however, the Russian economic sanctions have failed to produce the expected results. Support for the pro-European parties has been high, and there is little chance that the pro-Russian groups might achieve a parliamentary majority. It is not inconceivable, then, that in the upcoming months Moscow might decide to resort to other, more potent instruments of economic pressure such as speculation on the financial market, carried out as part of its de facto control over the banking sector. Another possibility is further tightening of trade restrictions, issuing expatriate workers from Russia or using Moldova’s dependence on Russian energy.

The Kremlin plays the immigration card. OSW Commentary No. 112, 2013-08-19

Russia is currently the world’s second most popular destination country for international migrants (second only to the United States). In recent years, Russia’s relatively high economic growth has attracted foreign workers from poorer neighbouring republics in Central Asia, as well as from Ukraine and Belarus. In the absence of a consistent immigration policy, the largescale influx of immigrants has become a major issue affecting social relations in Russia. The majority of Russians oppose the arrival of both foreign workers and internal migrants from Russia’s North Caucasus republics, claiming that their presence in Russia contributes to the escalation of ethnic and religious tensions, fuels organised crime and corruption, and increases competition on the labour market. As many as 70% of Russians are in favour of restricting the number of immigrants allowed into the country, calling on the government for a more stringent policy on immigration. Since the end of July the authorities have responded to these calls by carrying out a series of raids on markets and construction sites across Moscow, where most immigrants tend to find employment. The raids have led to arrests and deportations. However, these measures should not be seen as a serious attempt to deal with the problem of economic migrants in the capital, mainly because of the highly selective and staged nature of the crackdown. This, coupled with the timing of the initiative, might indicate that the raids are a part of an ongoing election campaign, particularly in the run-up to the Moscow mayoral elections scheduled for 8 September. By adopting anti-immigration rhetoric, the Kremlin is seeking both to garner support among Russian voters, who tend to be easily swayed by nationalist sentiments, and to steal the anti-immigration card from the opposition and its leader Alexei Navalny. The opposition has been calling for a clearer policy on this issue and has blamed the government for the current lack of control over migrant numbers, accusing the authorities of benefiting from the widespread corruption linked to immigration. In a broader context, the actions taken by the government are a response to the declining legitimacy of the current ruling elite. By attempting to address the immigration issue, the Kremlin is trying to restore its image as a government attentive to social problems and capable of solving them effectively.

Under the veneer of decentralisation. Ukraine's modernisation efforts stall due to lack of local government reform. OSW Commentary No. 102, 2013-02-12

President Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of Regions have been repeating the pledge to decentralise power in Ukraine and to give local government a greater decision-making role ever since the party appeared on the Ukrainian political scene. The implementation of this reform is crucial both for the economic recovery of Ukraine’s regions and the overall modernisation efforts of the Ukrainian state. At present relations between central government and the regions are regulated by Soviet-era legislation that fails to address the modern-day challenges facing Ukraine. The political elite in the country, including the opposition, appear to have reached consensus on the importance of the decentralisation reform. The first attempts to implement changes in this area were made in the late 1990s, followed by a comprehensive reform programme developed between 2007 and 2009 by Yulia Tymoshenko’s government. In 2012, the Constitutional Assembly under the President of Ukraine appointed a team of experts who drafted a document detailing the reform of local government and the territorial organisation of power1. The document envisages the implementation of what effectively are two major reforms: (1) an administrative-territorial reform, which would help consolidate the fragmented administrative structure, creating larger and more economically self-sufficient administrative units, and (2) local government reform, focusing on creating clearly defined powers for local authorities with a view to securing government funding for specific tasks delegated from central government. Nonetheless, despite these measures, and in spite of the rhetoric coming from President Yanukovych and other members of the Party of Regions, it seems unlikely that the reform will be implemented in the foreseeable future. A series of concrete political decisions taken by the president over the past three years indicate that Yanukovych has not abandoned his plan to build a highly centralised political system. This in turn limits the capacity to govern of local authorities and further restricts the sources of funding for Ukraine’s regions. This apparent resistance to change stems from the fact that by implementing the proposed reforms, the president and his political allies would be forced to relinquish much of their control over the political processes taking place in the country and would have to free up the distribution of budgetary resources between Kyiv and the regions. The implementation of the reform within the specified timeframe (i.e. by 2015) is also unlikely due to the upcoming presidential election and the deteriorating economic situation in Ukraine. Without a comprehensive reform of local government, however, Ukraine will be unable to undertake effective modernisation measures, which are key for the socio-economic development of the country’s regions.

The Party of Regions monopolises power in Ukraine. OSW Commentary No. 40, 2010-09-29

Since the Party of Regions took power in Ukraine, the process of strengthening the executive branch of government at the expense of the others, together with the instrumental use of the law, has been progressing steadily. By seeking to restrict criticism of the government, the ruling party is aiming at marginalisation of opposition groups and establishing informal control over the main media (largely by exerting pressure on their owners). The role of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) is growing, as it is used increasingly frequently to put pressure on Western-oriented NGOs. The government’s control over the judiciary is expanding. These trends had existed before the Party of Regions’ ascension to power, but they were much weaker, as the previous governments did not enjoy such a strong position or the ability to achieve their ends so efficiently. The Party of Regions is planning to take another step towards total power during the local elections scheduled for October 2010. The party is determined to establish control over the local self-governments; to this end, it has amended the legislation in a way which now undermines local civil initiatives. These changes not only illustrate the interests and political standpoint of the ruling elite; they also result from systemic reasons, and these are deeply rooted in the Soviet past. The present Ukrainian state has evolved through the evolutionary transformation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. As a result, the main features of the previous system have been sustained, including the weakness of the representative bodies and the instrumental use of the law. Twenty years into its independent development, Ukraine has developed a merely formal democracy, which is distant from EU standards.

The bear watches the dragon. The Russian debate on China. OSW Point of View Number 31, February 2013

Most participants in the Russian public debate seem to agree in their evaluation of the present condition of Russian-Chinese relations. There is awareness of increasing inequality between these two powers and Russia’s weakening position as compared to China.Those who share the optimistic view see co-operation with China as an opportunity for the Russian economy and a key element of Russia’s multi-directional foreign policy, an opportunity for Russia to avoid unilateral dependence on the West. The pessimists view the deepening co-operation with China through the prism of threats resulting from the increasing imbalance in bilateral relations. The greatest source of concern is the model of economic relations, which is often referred to as neo-colonial, where Russia’s role is reduced to that of a supplier of raw materials to China. The possible consequences are evaluated in different ways, ranging from the political subordination of Russian interests the Chinese ones to real loss of control over the Russian Far East. Those who share such views believe that Moscow should slow down its rapprochement with China and search for other partners in Eastern Asia, relations with whom could counterbalance the Chinese influence.

Support as a means of subordination. Russia's policy on Belarus. OSW Point of View Number 34, May 2013

Despite the conflicts and frictions in their bilateral relations, Russia has for years regularly invested in Belarus. Moscow’s support has become an important factor allowing the Belarusian economic model to continue, which in turn helps maintain the stability of the Belarusian political system. Russia's continued readiness to offer assistance to its neighbour reflects the importance Moscow attaches to Belarus.Belarus also features prominently in Moscow’s current policy objectives – especially with regard to the expansion of the Customs Union. The implementation of this project is seen as crucial in Russia, particularly in relation to Ukraine. For this reason, since 2011 we have been witnessing a rise in Russian aid for Belarus. In 2012, the support intensified and moved beyond purely financial help to include political assistance also. Russia’s support, however, has come at a price. Moscow’s long-term goal is to establish control over the Belarusian economy, which would also, in effect, allow the Kremlin to influence the way other areas of the Belarusian state are governed. As Minsk’s dependence on Russian support deepens, Alexander Lukashenko will ultimately have no choice but to gradually accede to Russia’s demands.