Optimal contracting with private information on cost expectation and variability

We study the screening problem that arises in a framework where, initially, the agent is privately informed about both the expected production cost and the cost variability and, at a later stage, he learns privately the cost realization. The speci c set of relevant incentive constraints, and so the characteristics of the optimal mechanism, depend nely upon the curvature of the principal s marginal surplus function as well as the relative importance of the two initial information problems. Pooling of production levels is optimally induced with respect to the cost variability when the principal's knowledge imperfection about the latter is sufficiently less important than that about the expected cost.

Where is the economics in spatial econometrics?

Spatial econometrics has been criticized by some economists because some model specifications have been driven by data-analytic considerations rather than having a firm foundation in economic theory. In particular this applies to the so-called W matrix, which is integral to the structure of endogenous and exogenous spatial lags, and to spatial error processes, and which are almost the sine qua non of spatial econometrics. Moreover it has been suggested that the significance of a spatially lagged dependent variable involving W may be misleading, since it may be simply picking up the effects of omitted spatially dependent variables, incorrectly suggesting the existence of a spillover mechanism. In this paper we review the theoretical and empirical rationale for network dependence and spatial externalities as embodied in spatially lagged variables, arguing that failing to acknowledge their presence at least leads to biased inference, can be a cause of inconsistent estimation, and leads to an incorrect understanding of true causal processes.

Transaction Costs and Institutions

This paper proposes a simple framework for understanding endogenous transaction costs - their composition, size and implications. In a model of diversification against risk, we distinguish between investments in institutions that facilitate exchange and the costs of conducting exchange itself. Institutional quality and market size are determined by the decisions of risk averse agents and conditions are discussed under which the efficient allocation may be decentralized. We highlight a number of differences with models where transaction costs are exogenous, including the implications for taxation and measurement issues.

Comparing the early research performance of PhD graduates in labor economics in Europe and the USA

This paper analyzes the early research performance of PhD graduates in labor economics, addressing the following questions: Are there major productivity differences between graduates from American and European institutions? If so, how relevant is the quality of the training received (i.e. ranking of institution and supervisor) and the research environment in the subsequent job placement institution? The population under study consists of labor economics PhD graduates who received their degree in the years 2000 to 2005 in Europe or the USA. Research productivity is evaluated alternatively as the number of publications or the quality-adjusted number of publications of an individual. When restricting the analysis to the number of publications, results suggest a higher productivity by graduates from European universities than from USA universities, but this difference vanishes when accounting for the quality of the publication. The results also indicate that graduates placed at American institutions, in particular top ones, are likely to publish more quality-adjusted articles than their European counterparts. This may be because, when hired, they already have several good acceptances or because of more focused research efforts and clearer career incentives.

The economics of power and control

John Hardman Moore outlines his joint research with Oliver Hart, looking at the economics of power and control and the foundations of contractual incompleteness

Cost-effectiveness analysis in Chagas' disease vectors control interventions

After a large scale field trial performed in central Brazil envisaging the control of Chagas' disease vectors in an endemic area colonized by Triatoma infestans and T. sordida the cost-effectiveness analysis for each insecticide/formulation was performed. It considered the operational costs and the prices of insecticides and formulations, related to the activity and persistence of each one. The end point was considered to be less than 90% of domicilliary unitis (house + annexes) free of infestation. The results showed good cost-effectiveness for a slow-release emulsifiable suspension (SRES) based on PVA and containing malathion as active ingredient, as well as for the pyrethroids tested in this assay-cyfluthrin, cypermethrin, deltamethrin and permethrin.

An Optimised Illustrative Investment Model Of The Economics Of Integrated Returns From CCS Deployment In The UK/UKCS

NORTH SEA STUDY OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 118

The Economics of CO2-EOR Cluster Developments in the UK Central North Sea/ Outer Moray Firth

NORTH SEA STUDY OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 123

A Futuristic Least-cost Optimisation Model of CO2 Transportation and Storage in the UK/UK Continental Shelf

NORTH SEA STUDY OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 112

A balance of questions: what can we ask of climate change economics?

The standard approach to the economics of climate change, which has its best known implementation in Nordhaus's DICE and RICE models (well described in Nordhaus's 2008 book, A Question of Balance) is not well equipped to deal with the possibility of catastrophe, since we are unable to evaluate a risk averse representative agent's expected utility when there is any signi cant probability of zero consumption. Whilst other authors attempt to develop new tools with which to address these problems, the simple solution proposed in this paper is to ask a question that the currently available tools of climate change economics are capable of answering. Rather than having agents optimally choosing a path (that differs from the recommendations of climate scientists) within models which cannot capture the essential features of the problem, I argue that economic models should be used to determine the savings and investment paths which implement climate targets that have been suggested in the physical science literature.

On the cost of rent-seeking by government bureaucrats in a Real-Business-Cycle framework

This paper studies the wasteful e ffect of bureaucracy on the economy by addressing the link between rent-seeking behavior of government bureaucrats and the public sector wage bill, which is taken to represent the rent component. In particular, public o fficials are modeled as individuals competing for a larger share of those public funds. The rent-seeking extraction technology in the government administration is modeled as in Murphy et al. (1991) and incorporated in an otherwise standard Real-Business-Cycle (RBC) framework with public sector. The model is calibrated to German data for the period 1970-2007. The main fi ndings are: (i) Due to the existence of a signi ficant public sector wage premium and the high public sector employment, a substantial amount of working time is spent rent-seeking, which in turn leads to signifi cant losses in terms of output; (ii) The measures for the rent-seeking cost obtained from the model for the major EU countries are highly-correlated to indices of bureaucratic ineffi ciency; (iii) Under the optimal scal policy regime,steady-state rent-seeking is smaller relative to the exogenous policy case, as the government chooses a higher public wage premium, but sets a much lower public employment, thus achieving a decrease in rent-seeking.

Moral Behaviour, Altruism and Environmental Policy

Free‐riding is often associated with self‐interested behaviour. However if there is a global mixed pollutant, free‐riding will arise if individuals calculate that their emissions are negligible relative to the total, so total emissions and hence any damage that they and others suffer will be unaffected by whatever consumption choice they make. In this context consumer behaviour and the optimal environmental tax are independent of the degree of altruism. For behaviour to change, individuals need to make their decisions in a different way. We propose a new theory of moral behaviour whereby individuals recognise that they will be worse off by not acting in their own self‐interest, and balance this cost off against the hypothetical moral value of adopting a Kantian form of behaviour, that is by calculating the consequences of their action by asking what would happen if everyone else acted in the same way as they did. We show that: (a) if individuals behave this way, then altruism matters and the greater the degree of altruism the more individuals cut back their consumption of a ’dirty’ good; (b) nevertheless the optimal environmental tax is exactly the same as that emerging from classical analysis where individuals act in self‐interested fashion.

Tracking cost savings from competitive tendering in the short and long run

A major initiative of the Thatcher and Major Conservative administrations was that public sector ancillary and professional services provided by incumbent direct service organisations [DSOs] be put out to tender. Analyses of this initiative, in the UK and elsewhere, found costs were often reduced in the short run. However, few if any studies went beyond the first round of tendering. We analyze data collected over successive rounds of tendering for cleaning and catering services of Scottish hospitals in order to assess the long term consequences of this initiative. The experience of the two services was very different. Cost savings for cleaning services tended to increase with each additional round of tendering and became increasingly stable. In accordance with previous results in the literature, DSOs produced smaller cost reductions than private contractors: probably an inevitable consequence of the tendering process at the time. Cost savings from DSOs tended to disappear during the first round of tendering, but they appear to have been more permanent in successive rounds. Cost savings for catering, on the other hand, tended to be much smaller, and these were not sustained.

A cost-benefit analisys of chagas disease control

Chagas disease transmission can be effetively interrupted by insecticidal control of its triatomine bug vectors. We present here a simple model comparing the costs and benefits of such a programme, designed to eliminate domestic populations of Triatoma infestans throughout its known area of distribution over the seven southernmost countries of Latin America. The model has been simplified to require only four financial estimates relating to the unit cost of housing spraying and benefits due to avoidance of premature death in the acute phase of the disease, avoidance of supportive treatment and care in the chronic phase of the disease, and avoidance of corrective digestive and cardiac surgery. Exceptfor these direct medical costs, al other potential benefits have been ignored. Nevertheless, the model shows that the direct financial benefits of such a programme would far outweigh the costs, and the project would support a remarkably high internal rate of return under the least optimistic estimates.

Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) : A pedagogical guide for decision makers in the public sector

This guide introduces Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), a performance measurement technique, in such a way as to be appropriate to decision makers with little or no background in economics and operational research. The use of mathematics is kept to a minimum. This guide therefore adopts a strong practical approach in order to allow decision makers to conduct their own efficiency analysis and to easily interpret results. DEA helps decision makers for the following reasons: - By calculating an efficiency score, it indicates if a firm is efficient or has capacity for improvement. - By setting target values for input and output, it calculates how much input must be decreased or output increased in order to become efficient. - By identifying the nature of returns to scale, it indicates if a firm has to decrease or increase its scale (or size) in order to minimize the average cost. - By identifying a set of benchmarks, it specifies which other firms' processes need to be analysed in order to improve its own practices.