Crimea one year after Russian annexation. EPC Policy Brief, 24 March 2015

On 18 March 2014, the Lower House of the Russian Parliament approved a Treaty to annex the Ukrainian Black Sea Peninsula of Crimea by 443 to 1 votes. This act violated Ukraine's sovereignty, representing a fundamental breach of international law; the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the terms of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, whereby the nuclear arsenal stationed on Ukraine's territory after the collapse of the Soviet Union was relinquished in exchange for security assurances of its sovereign territorial integrity. Russia, the US, France and the UK all signed. The annexation also violated a number of bilateral agreements between Ukraine and Russia. Russia's actions were immediately condemned by the international community. A 13 March European Parliament Resolution "firmly condemns Russia's act of aggression in invading Crimea, which is an inseparable part of Ukraine and recognised as such by the Russian Federation".

Game of zones. The quest for influence in Europe’s neighbourhood. Egmont Paper No. 67, June 2014

Introduction. Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and subsequent meddling in Ukraine does not constitute a game-changer. It is just a reminder that at least since the war with Georgia in 2008 Russia has been and still is playing the same game: a “game of zones”, aimed at (re)establishing an exclusive sphere of influence. Many of us Europeans had forgotten that, or had pushed it to the back of our minds, preferring to believe that we were not engaged in a zero-sum game in our eastern neighbourhood. While we were dealing with Ukraine, we tended also to forget the crises still going on in our southern neighbourhood, in Libya, Mali, Syria and now Iraq. Spilling over from Syria, extremist militias may establish their own “zone” in the Middle East, which would de-stabilize the entire region. In order to prevent that game-changer from materializing, another game-changer may be necessary: a rapprochement with Iran. Europe must assume responsibility for security in its entire neighbourhood, both east and south. The challenge is great – but so are Europe’s means.

Western Strategic Poverty: The Ukrainian Crisis and the New World Order. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 Special Issue, March 2014

From Introduction. The Ukrainian crisis, which deepened in February with the invasion of the Crimean peninsula by Russia, has exposed a serious poverty of strategy and leadership from Europe and the US. Such a lack of strategic vision in responding to the Ukrainian crisis, considered by Nicholas Burns among others, as one of the greatest crises in Europe since 1991, diverges between the European Union and the US. It is undeniable that the western leadership is unable to get its act together. In the US, the perpetual fratricide between the republicans and democrats over anything is affecting the development and implementation of sound foreign policies, while in the EU, there is no clear European leadership emerging, neither from the 28 Member States nor the High Representative and Presidents of the Council and Commission. The EU is once again facing its perpetual policy of risk aversion. On the one hand, the US remains conflicted in identifying its identity in this post-liberal world order, while the EU difficulty faces the inevitable limitation of its soft power. With a West in crisis, no decent strategy and/or policy to unravel, or at least contain, the Ukrainian crisis can emerge in this axiomatic moment with the making of the new world order.

The South Caucasus - Between integration and fragmentation

The South Caucasus is situated at the intersection of Eurasia’s major transport and energy corridors, making it an important geostrategic region. Traditional regional actors Iran, Turkey and Russia have jostled for influence and power in the region for centuries, and are now faced with competition from the EU, China, the US and NATO. Although Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have been independent for more than two decades, they still continue to feel the sway, and sometimes threat, of external actors. As a response, the three South Caucasus states have chosen very different geostrategic paths since the collapse of the Soviet Union, leaving the region more fragmented and volatile than ever. In this book, various authors offer a deep and broad understanding of the developments in the South Caucasus, analyse the different foreign trajectories that each of the three state is following, and highlight the impact of external actors’ policies.

The War republics in the Donbas one year after the outbreak of the conflict. OSW Commentary Number 174, 17 June 2015

More than one year since the first pro-Russian moves in the Donbas, separatists have taken control of parts of the Donbas and Luhansk oblasts but are still unable to form truly functioning administrative structures. The exercise of power by the central administration of the so-called ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ (DPR) and ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ (LPR) is restricted to resolving problems as they arise, while administration proper is the prerogative of the local authorities reporting to them which had been performing this function before the conflict broke out. The way the situation is developing and the fact that access to information is restricted make it difficult to determine the structure of the separatist government in more detail, precisely how it is organised, and what the internal hierarchy is like. The overriding goal of the governments of the DPR and the LPR is to maintain and develop their military potential. In effect, the lives of the so-called republics are subordinate to military goals. The Donbas separatism is a conglomerate of different groups of interests, with Russia at the fulcrum. Its representatives set the main tactical and strategic goals and thus have a decisive influence on the development of the situation in the region. Individual separatist groupings come into conflict, and some oligarchs linked to the former Party of Regions circles have also been making attempts to maintain their influence. The struggle between individual groups of interest is intensifying as the situation on the war front becomes calmer. Since the situation has temporarily stabilised after the seizure of Debaltseve, the central governments of the DPR and the LPR have made attempts to expand their influence, combating armed criminals who are outside their control and that of Russia. The civilian population is taking the brunt of the devastation caused by the war and the increasing militarisation of the region. Despite the fact that the intensity of the fighting on the war front is falling, worsening humanitarian problems are causing refugees to continue their flight from the territories controlled by the separatists. 2 million people have fled the conflict zone since the beginning of the war: 1.3 million of them have found shelter in other regions of Ukraine, and more than 700,000 have left for Russia. The region has also sustained great economic losses – most mines have been either destroyed or closed, many industrial plants have restricted or completely discontinued their production, and many firms have been taken over by force. In effect, the region has seen an economic downturn.

Ukraine’s wartime nationalism. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 179, 28.08.2015

From the Introduction. The Euromaidan revolution and the war in Donbas that followed it have brought about deep changes in the way Ukrainian citizens think and have led to a rapid transformation of how people view the concept of national community. It began to be increasingly common for proponents of nationalism to refer to solidarity with the state instead of referring to the nation understood as an ethnic community, as they had previously done. This is due to the fact that an entire young generation has matured which takes the Ukrainian state for granted, but also because in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict most Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine have opted for Ukraine.

The migration of Ukrainians in times of crisis. OSW COMMENTARY Number 187, 2015-10-19

Before the Russian annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, the scale of labour outward migration of Ukrainians had been characterised by a slight downward trend. Back in 2014, an increase in the number of Ukrainians who migrated to Russia was observed, although no similar increase was recorded for EU countries (excluding Poland). The year 2015 brought a more rapid surge in the number of Ukrainians migrating to the EU, again mainly to Poland. Due to the lack of current EU-wide data, estimates can be made based only on data compiled by national statistical offices in countries which are the most popular with Ukrainian migrants. In Poland, as of October 2015 Ukrainians held 52,000 valid residence cards. Much greater migration dynamics have been observed in the case of temporary migration – the number of declarations which enable an individual to take up a temporary job in Poland, issued in the first half of 2015, was a staggering 400,000. This means a more than twofold increase – in the whole of 2014 372,000 declarations were issued to Ukrainian citizens. No similar increase has so far been observed in other EU states, including Italy and the Czech Republic, which have always been popular destinations for Ukrainian migration. In late 2014, 233,000 Ukrainian migrants were registered in Italy (in late 2013 the figure was 191,000), whereas in the Czech Republic the number of Ukrainian migrants remains stable – 104,000 in June 2015.

2016 already puts its mark on the economic map of Europe. CEPS Essay No. 22/8 January 2016

The start of 2016 brought highly symbolic changes to the trade policy map of Europe between the EU- and Russian-led blocs, as the EU’s Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with Ukraine entered into force provisionally, while Russia moved in precisely the opposite direction by scrapping its free trade agreement with Ukraine. However the ongoing changes go far wider and deeper. The energy sector and major industries see disengagement between Ukraine and Russia, and Russia’s share in Ukrainian trade is falling substantially. New transport corridors with China may offer synergies with trade opportunities for all three DCFTA states, with Georgia first in line. Visa liberalisation for the entire DCFTA space is now firmly in prospect. Divergent macroeconomic trends between a recovering eurozone and recession in Russia will accentuate the changes in trade structures. A better organisation of the pan-European economic space is surely desirable, but prospects for links between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union remain problematic.

Iranian-Saudi tensions: the energy dimension. EPC Policy Brief, 9 February 2016

Following the execution of Saudi Shiite cleric Nimr Baqer al-Nimr, the deep rooted rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia entered a new phase in January 2016. While the main objective for both countries still is regional hegemony, the Iranian-Saudi competition takes many different forms and shapes, and also extends into the field of energy. In this Policy Brief, David Ramin Jalilvand gives a detailed analysis of the energy-related aspects of the Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry and its possible consequences for Europe’s energy market; both countries hold giant hydrocarbon reserves, so European energy will probably be affected by their competition in several regards; increased oil supplies will be available for the European market, while the cycle of low oil prices will be prolonged. According to Jalilvand, this is a mixed blessing; Europe’s energy import bill will be reduced, but its indigenous production will suffer, while Russia’s role in European natural gas will only continue to grow.

Cautious and rotational – US military engagement on NATO’s eastern flank. OSW Commentary NUMBER 216 | 05.07.2016

The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 put a stop to the gradual scaling down of US military engagement in Europe, a policy that the United States had pursued since the end of the Cold War. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict became a watershed for the US perceptions of European security as Washington started to see the threat of a conflict between Russia and a NATO member as more probable. The United States decided that – despite the mounting challenges in the Pacific region and its involvement in conflicts in the Middle East – it had to invest more in European security. The US has stepped up the intensity of joint drills with the allies and the activities of its forces in Europe. However, its support for the allies has been subject to various limitations and should be treated as a political signal to Moscow, rather than an element in a broader strategy. The future of the policy of strengthening the eastern flank will depend on the outcome of the US presidential elections in November and on developments in the bilateral relations between Washington and Moscow.

Validation of the Swiss methane emission inventory by atmospheric observations and inverse modelling

Atmospheric inverse modelling has the potential to provide observation-based estimates of greenhouse gas emissions at the country scale, thereby allowing for an independent validation of national emission inventories. Here, we present a regional-scale inverse modelling study to quantify the emissions of methane (CH₄) from Switzerland, making use of the newly established CarboCount-CH measurement network and a high-resolution Lagrangian transport model. In our reference inversion, prior emissions were taken from the "bottom-up" Swiss Greenhouse Gas Inventory (SGHGI) as published by the Swiss Federal Office for the Environment in 2014 for the year 2012. Overall we estimate national CH₄ emissions to be 196 ± 18 Gg yr⁻¹ for the year 2013 (1σ uncertainty). This result is in close agreement with the recently revised SGHGI estimate of 206 ± 33 Gg yr⁻¹ as reported in 2015 for the year 2012. Results from sensitivity inversions using alternative prior emissions, uncertainty covariance settings, large-scale background mole fractions, two different inverse algorithms (Bayesian and extended Kalman filter), and two different transport models confirm the robustness and independent character of our estimate. According to the latest SGHGI estimate the main CH₄ source categories in Switzerland are agriculture (78 %), waste handling (15 %) and natural gas distribution and combustion (6 %). The spatial distribution and seasonal variability of our posterior emissions suggest an overestimation of agricultural CH₄ emissions by 10 to 20 % in the most recent SGHGI, which is likely due to an overestimation of emissions from manure handling. Urban areas do not appear as emission hotspots in our posterior results, suggesting that leakages from natural gas distribution are only a minor source of CH₄ in Switzerland. This is consistent with rather low emissions of 8.4 Gg yr⁻¹ reported by the SGHGI but inconsistent with the much higher value of 32 Gg yr⁻¹ implied by the EDGARv4.2 inventory for this sector. Increased CH₄ emissions (up to 30 % compared to the prior) were deduced for the north-eastern parts of Switzerland. This feature was common to most sensitivity inversions, which is a strong indicator that it is a real feature and not an artefact of the transport model and the inversion system. However, it was not possible to assign an unambiguous source process to the region. The observations of the CarboCount-CH network provided invaluable and independent information for the validation of the national bottom-up inventory. Similar systems need to be sustained to provide independent monitoring of future climate agreements.

(Table 2) Methane to ethane ratio, and d13C-methane at DSDP Hole 76-533

Natural gas hydrates are clathrates in which water molecules form a crystalline framework that includes and is stabilized by natural gas (mainly methane) at appropriate conditions of high pressures and low temperatures. The conditions for the formation of gas hydrates are met within continental margin sediments below water depths greater than about 500 m where the supply of methane is sufficient to stabilize the gas hydrate. Observations on DSDP Leg 11 suggested the presence of gas hydrates in sediments of the Blake Outer Ridge. Leg 76 coring and sampling confirms that, indeed, gas hydrates are present there. Geochemical evidence for gas hydrates in sediment of the Blake Outer Ridge includes (1) high concentrations of methane, (2) a sediment sample with thin, matlike layers of white crystals that released a volume of gas twenty times greater than its volume of pore fluid, (3) a molecular distribution of hydrocarbon gases that excluded hydrocarbons larger than isobutane, (4) results from pressure core barrel experiments, and (5) pore-fluid chemistry. The molecular composition of the hydrocarbons in these gas hydrates and the isotopic composition of the methane indicate that the gas is derived mainly from microbiological processes operating on the organic matter within the sediment. Although gas hydrates apparently are widespread on the Blake Outer Ridge, they probably are not of great economic significance as a potential, unconventional, energy resource or as an impermeable cap for trapping upwardly migrating gas at Site 533.

(Table 1) Crystal sizes of measured samples

Due to experimental difficulties grain size distributions of gas hydrate crystallites are largely unknown in natural samples. For the first time, we were able to determine grain size distributions of six natural gas hydrates for samples retrieved from the Gulf of Mexico and from Hydrate Ridge offshore Oregon from varying depths. High-energy synchrotron radiation provides high photon fluxes as well as high penetration depth and thus allows for investigation of bulk sediment samples. The gas hydrate crystallites appear to be (log-) normally distributed in the natural samples and to be of roughly globular shape. The mean grain sizes are in the range from 300-600 µm with a tendency for bigger grains to occur in greater depth, possibly indicating a difference in the formation age. Laboratory produced methane hydrate, starting from ice and aged for 3 weeks, shows half a log-normal curve with a mean value of ~40 µm. This one order-of-magnitude smaller grain sizes suggests that care must be taken when transposing grain-size sensitive (petro-)physical data from laboratory-made gas hydrates to natural settings.

(Table 1) Crystal sizes of measured samples from the Bush Hill region in the Gulf of Mexico and from ODP Leg 204 at the Hydrate Ridge offshore Oregon

The grain sizes of gas hydrate crystallites are largely unknown in natural samples. Single grains are hardly detectable with electron or optical microscopy. For the first time, we have used high-energy synchrotron diffraction to determine grain sizes of six natural gas hydrates retrieved from the Bush Hill region in the Gulf of Mexico and from ODP Leg 204 at the Hydrate Ridge offshore Oregon from varying depth between 1 and 101 metres below seafloor. High-energy synchrotron radiation provides high photon fluxes as well as high penetration depth and thus allows for investigation of bulk sediment samples. Gas hydrate grain sizes were measured at the Beam Line BW 5 at the HASYLAB/Hamburg. A 'moving area detector method', originally developed for material science applications, was used to obtain both spatial and orientation information about gas hydrate grains within the sample. The gas hydrate crystal sizes appeared to be (log-)normally distributed in the natural samples. All mean grain sizes lay in the range from 300 to 600 µm with a tendency for bigger grains to occur in greater depth. Laboratory-produced methane hydrate, aged for 3 weeks, showed half a log-normal curve with a mean grain size value of c. 40 µm. The grains appeared to be globular shaped.

(Table 1) Gravity and pressure within the Sleipner area relative to ones at the reference station in 2002 and 2005

At Sleipner, CO2 is being separated from natural gas and injected into an underground saline aquifer for environmental purposes. Uncertainty in the aquifer temperature leads to uncertainty in the in situ density of CO2. In this study, gravity measurements were made over the injection site in 2002 and 2005 on top of 30 concrete benchmarks on the seafloor in order to constrain the in situ CO2 density. The gravity measurements have a repeatability of 4.3 µGal for 2003 and 3.5 µGal for 2005. The resulting time-lapse uncertainty is 5.3 µGal. Unexpected benchmark motions due to local sediment scouring contribute to the uncertainty. Forward gravity models are calculated based on both 3D seismic data and reservoir simulation models. The time-lapse gravity observations best fit a high temperature forward model based on the time-lapse 3D seismics, suggesting that the average in situ CO2 density is about to 530kg/m**3. Uncertainty in determining the average density is estimated to be ±65 kg/m**3 (95% confidence), however, this does not include uncertainties in the modeling. Additional seismic surveys and future gravity measurements will put better constraints on the CO2 density and continue to map out the CO2 flow.