Corruption, governance and collective sanctions: : can a wicked problem be tamed?

Tackling a problem requires mostly, an ability to read it, conceptualize it, represent it, define it, and then applying the necessary mechanisms to solve it. This may sound self-evident except when the problem to be tackled happens to be “complex, “ “ill-structured,” and/or “wicked.” Corruption is one of those kinds of problems. Both in its global and national manifestations it is ill-structured. Where it is structural in nature, endemic and pervasive, it is perhaps even wicked. Qualities of the kind impose modest expectations regarding possibilities of any definitive solution to this insidious phenomenon. If so, it may not suffice to address the problem of corruption using existing categories of law and/or good governance, which overlook the “long-term memory” of the collective and cultural specific dimensions of the subject. Such socio-historical conditions require focusing on the interactive and self-reproducing networks of corruption and attempting to ‘subvert’ that phenomenon’s entire matrix. Concepts such as collective responsibility, collective punishment and sanctions are introduced as relevant categories in the structural, as well as behavioral, subversion of some of the most prevalent aspects of corruption. These concepts may help in the evolving of a new perspective on corruption fighting strategies.

Globalization, Agency, and Institutional Innovation: The Rise of Public-Private Partnerships in Global Governance

Public and private actors increasingly cooperate in global governance, a realm previously reserved for states and intergovernmental organizations (IOs). This trend raises fascinating theoretical questions. What explains the rise in public-private institutions and their role in international politics? Who leads such institutional innovation and why? To address the questions, this paper develops a theory of the political demand and supply of public-private institutions and specifies the conditions under which IOs and non-state actors would cooperate, and states would support this public-private cooperation. The observable implications of the theoretical argument are evaluated against the broad trends in public-private cooperation and in a statistical analysis of the significance of demand and supply-side incentives in public-private cooperation for sustainable development. The study shows that public-private institutions do not simply fill governance gaps opened by globalization, but cluster in narrower areas of cooperation, where the strategic interests of IOs, states, and transnational actors intersect.

The Impact of Land Use Patterns and Watershed Characteristics on China Lake, Kennebec County, Maine

China Lake is located in Kennebec County, Maine. Since 1983 the lake has suffered from yearly algal blooms as a result of the addition of excess nutrients. The nutrient load was amplified by erosion within the watershed. Erosion varies widely depending on a number of factors, including the slope of the land, the type of soil, and the way the land is being used. Certain land use types have a high potential to add nutrients to the environment, while others may help absorb excess nutrients and prevent erosion and runoff into the lake. A comprehensive examination of the China Lake watershed was completed using GIS to calculate the erosion potential for the entire area, taking into account past and present land use patterns. This information will help the towns around the lake to make informed decisions about future development and land management.

The Relationship Between Watershed Boundaries and Elevation in Maine

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