Signaling in political budget cycles: How far are you willing to go?

This paper analyzes how heterogeneity in two dimensions, competency and character, a¤ects political budget cycles. Competency is the e¢ciency in running the government. Character is the degree of opportunism. In this expanded space, previous results in the literature on the separating nature of the signaling equilibrium hold if heterogeneity in opportunism is low. With high heterogeneity in opportunism, no separating equilibrium exists. Rather, the equilibrium is partially pooling: only extreme types can be distinguished.

Reelection incentives and political corruption : evidence from Brazil’s municipal audit reports

This paper uses a unique dataset of political corruption, constructed from municipal audit reports obtained from Brazil’s randomized anti-corruption program, to test whether reelection incentives affect the level of rent extraction of incumbent politicians. In order to identify reelection incentives, we use the existence of a term limit in Brazil’s municipal elections. We find that in municipalities where mayors are in their second and final term, there is significantly more corruption compared to similar municipalities where mayors are in their first-term. In particular, in municipalities with second-term mayors there is, on average, R$188,431 more diversion of resources and the incidence of irregularities is 23% higher. We also find more pronounced effects where the costs of rent-extraction are lower (municipalities without media and judicial presence), and the density of pivotal voters is higher (more political competition). Finally, we show that first-term mayors, while less corrupt, have a larger incidence of poor administration suggesting that there may exist a trade-off between corruption and quality in public good provision.

2014 World Cup live blog: political protestor invades field at US vs Belgium

Retirado do Vice News.

Risky business: social media metrics and political risk analysis

A quantificação do risco país – e do risco político em particular – levanta várias dificuldades às empresas, instituições, e investidores. Como os indicadores econômicos são atualizados com muito menos freqüência do que o Facebook, compreender, e mais precisamente, medir – o que está ocorrendo no terreno em tempo real pode constituir um desafio para os analistas de risco político. No entanto, com a crescente disponibilidade de “big data” de ferramentas sociais como o Twitter, agora é o momento oportuno para examinar os tipos de métricas das ferramentas sociais que estão disponíveis e as limitações da sua aplicação para a análise de risco país, especialmente durante episódios de violência política. Utilizando o método qualitativo de pesquisa bibliográfica, este estudo identifica a paisagem atual de dados disponíveis a partir do Twitter, analisa os métodos atuais e potenciais de análise, e discute a sua possível aplicação no campo da análise de risco político. Depois de uma revisão completa do campo até hoje, e tendo em conta os avanços tecnológicos esperados a curto e médio prazo, este estudo conclui que, apesar de obstáculos como o custo de armazenamento de informação, as limitações da análise em tempo real, e o potencial para a manipulação de dados, os benefícios potenciais da aplicação de métricas de ferramentas sociais para o campo da análise de risco político, particularmente para os modelos qualitativos-estruturados e quantitativos, claramente superam os desafios.

Estado, estado-nação e formas de intermediação social

This paper, first, situates the nation-state historically, as a product of the capitalist revolution. Second, it distinguishes the state (the law system and the organization that guarantees it) from the nation-state or country (the territorial political unit formed by a nation, a state and a territory). Third, it defines nation, civil society and class coalitions, understanding that they are forms of society politically organized, which role is to act as intermediary between society and the state. Fourth, it uses these concepts plus the ones of relative autonomy and of anteriority to understand the ever changing relation between the state and society, where in early moments the state or its elites assumed the lead, and later, as democratization takes place, the protagonist role changed gradually to the people. The paper emphasizes the class coalitions, and argues that behind the two basic forms or economic and political organization of capitalism – developmentalism and economic liberalism – there are the correspondent class coalitions

Betting on winner: the effect of local elections on corporate political activity outcomes

How can managers successfully access political rents by way of corporate political strategies (CPA)? Existing research has suggested several endogenous factors that correlate with CPA outcomes. I offer a more robust solution to this problem. Drawing on insights from the perspective of CPA as exchanges between firms and political decision-makers, and from the special interest politics of political economy, I develop and test a causal mechanism that links local elections, legislative bargaining and access to political rents at the national level. I conducted a natural experiment using regression discontinuity design and propensity score matching in municipal elections in Brazil to show that firms enjoy superior access to subsidized financing from the state-owned national development bank (BNDES) when they decide to invest in municipalities whose winning mayoral candidate is coalition-aligned with the national ruler. This effect fades away fades away as the level of competition in the local election decreases. The evidence implies that when managers bet on national coalition-aligned winners in close local elections, they positively affect CPA outcomes. I extend the exchange-based typology of corporate political strategies by offering a novel possibility of targeting voters with financial inducements, which I call a private local development strategy. Finally, these results show that firms exchange their project-execution capabilities for superior access to subsidized financing.

The Limits of political compromise: debt ceilings and political competition

We study the desirability of limits on the public debt and of political competition in an economy where political parties alternate in office. Due to rent-seeking motives, incumbents have an incentive to set public expenditures above the socially optimal level. Parties cannot commit to future policies, but they can forge a political compromise where each party curbs excessive spending when in office if it expects future governments to do the same. In contrast to the received literature, we find that strict limits on government borrowing can exacerbate political-economy distortions by rendering a political compromise unsustainable. This tends to happen when political competition is limited. Conversely, a tight limit on the public debt fosters a compromise that yields the efficient outcome when political competition is vigorous, saving the economy from immiseration. Our analysis thus suggests a legislative tradeoff between restricting political competition and constraining the ability of governments to issue debt.

The revenge of the market on the rentiers why neo-liberal reports of the end of history turned out to be premature

Starting from the perspective of heterodox Keynesian-Minskyian-Kindlebergian financial economics, this paper begins by highlighting a number of mechanisms that contributed to the current financial crisis. These include excess liquidity, income polarisation, conflicts between financial and productive capital, lack of intelligent regulation, asymmetric information, principal-agent dilemmas and bounded rationalities. However, the paper then proceeds to argue that perhaps more than ever the ‘macroeconomics’ that led to this crisis only makes analytical sense if examined within the framework of the political settlements and distributional outcomes in which it had operated. Taking the perspective of critical social theories the paper concludes that, ultimately, the current financial crisis is the outcome of something much more systemic, namely an attempt to use neo-liberalism (or, in US terms, neo-conservatism) as a new technology of power to help transform capitalism into a rentiers’ delight. And in particular, into a system without much ‘compulsion’ on big business; i.e., one that imposes only minimal pressures on big agents to engage in competitive struggles in the real economy (while inflicting exactly the opposite fate on workers and small firms). A key component in the effectiveness of this new technology of power was its ability to transform the state into a major facilitator of the ever-increasing rent-seeking practices of oligopolistic capital. The architects of this experiment include some capitalist groups (in particular rentiers from the financial sector as well as capitalists from the ‘mature’ and most polluting industries of the preceding techno-economic paradigm), some political groups, as well as intellectual networks with their allies – including most economists and the ‘new’ left. Although rentiers did succeed in their attempt to get rid of practically all fetters on their greed, in the end the crisis materialised when ‘markets’ took their inevitable revenge on the rentiers by calling their (blatant) bluff.

Why has productivity growth stagnated in most Latin American countries since the neo-liberal reforms?

Latin America’s economic performance since the beginning of neo-liberal reforms has been poor; this not only contrasts with its own performance pre-1980, but also with what has happened in Asia since 1980. I shall argue that the weakness of the region’s new paradigm is rooted as much in its intrinsic flaws as in the particular way it has been implemented. Latin America’s economic reforms were undertaken primarily as a result of the perceived economic weaknesses of the region — i.e., there was an attitude of ‘throwing in the towel’ vis-à-vis the previous state-led import substituting industrialisation strategy, because most politicians and economists interpreted the 1982 debt crisis as conclusive evidence that it had led the region into a cul-de-sac. As Hirschman has argued, policymaking has a strong component of ‘path-dependency’; as a result, people often stick with policies after they have achieved their aims, and those policies have become counterproductive. This leads to such frustration and disappointment with existing policies and institutions that is not uncommon to experience a ‘rebound effect’. An extreme example of this phenomenon is post-1982 Latin America, where the core of the discourse of the economic reforms that followed ended up simply emphasising the need to reverse as many aspects of the previous development (and political) strategies as possible. This helps to explain the peculiar set of priorities, the rigidity and the messianic attitude with which the reforms were implemented in Latin America, as well as their poor outcome. Something very different happened in Asia, where economic reforms were often intended (rightly or wrongly) as a more targeted and pragmatic mechanism to overcome specific economic and financial constraints. Instead of implementing reforms as a mechanism to reverse existing industrialisation strategies, in Asia they were put into practice in order to continue and strengthen ambitious processes of industrialisation.

Foreign support, internal political disputes and mass killings

This paper studies the incentives underlying the relations between foreign countries and rival domestic groups. It models the interaction in a infinitely-repeated game between these three players. The domestic groups bargain for a split of the domestic surplus and may engage in violent dispute for power and in unilateral mass killing processes. The foreign country may choose to support one of these groups in exchange for monetary transfers. The paper characterizes the parametric set in which strategies leading to no violent disputes nor mass killings are Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibra in the presence of foreign support, but not in its absence.

Spatial spillovers and political coordination in public health provision

We estimate the impact of the main unconditional federal grant (Fundo de Participaçãodos Municípios - FPM) to Brazilian municipalities as well as its spillover from the neighboring cities on local health outcomes. We consider data from 2002 to 2007 (Brollo et al, 2013) and explore the FPM distribution rule according to population brackets to apply a fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) using cities near the thresholds. In elasticity terms, we nd a reduction on infant mortality rate (-0.18) and on morbidity rate (- 0.41), except in the largest cities of our sample. We also nd an increase on the access to the main program of visiting the vulnerable families, the Family Health Program (Programa Sa ude da Família - PSF). The e ects are stronger for the smallest cities of our sample and we nd increase: (i) On the percentage of residents enrolled in the program (0.36), (ii) On the per capita number of PSF visits (1.59), and (iii) On the per capita number of PSF visits with a doctor (1.8) and nurse (2). After we control for the FPM spillover using neighboring cities near diferent thresholds, our results show that the reduction in morbidity and mortality is largely due to the spillover e ect, but there are negative spillover on preventive actions, as PSF doctors visits and vaccination. Finally, the negative spillover e ect on health resources may be due free riding or political coordination problems, as in the case of the number of hospital beds, but also due to to competition for health professionals, as in the case of number of doctors (-0.35 and -0.87, respectively), specially general practitioners and surgeons (-1.84 and -2.45).

Adam Smith visto por Roberto Campos: a (re)criação do mito e as necessidades do capitalismo

This work aims at analyzing how Adam Smith, one of the founders of the liberal regime was seen by Roberto Campos, one of the patriarchs of Brazilian liberalism. In this sense, it will be shown how and why the legacy of Scotland was used to legitimize the new pattern of accumulation necessary to capitalism from the second half of the twentieth century on. So, it is the intention to make explicit that the changes in Campos discursive form are consistent with the requirements of capitalism in crisis and were fundamental in the creation of another common sense. To achieve these goals it will be assessed in what way the liberal rhetoric of the Brazilian, harmonized with foreign authors with the same vision, has become an important weapon to transform Smith into a myth in contrast to the political and economic criteria advocated by the same, but valuable to what Roberto Campos intended

A relação histórica entre democracia e liberalismo. Um diálogo crítico com Norberto Bobbio.

This work seeks to examine the historical relationships established between liberalism and democracy, questioning the apparent inseparability between the two ideologies. Methodologically construct a hypothetical dialogue with the Italian thinker Norberto Bobbio, one of the most important systematizers of liberal democracy, defending a theoretical and conceptual complementarity between the two ideologies. Following the Bobbio theoretical propose, it presents the political contributions of classical liberalism that the Italian thinker identify as logical and axiological antecedent of the modern democracy, naturalizing and universalizing the principles and ideals of classical liberalism. Going counter, it problematizes the political contributions of classical liberalism, emphasizing the tension between liberal theory and its practice, between the declared political principles and their translation into concrete historical reality, reserving rights and freedoms to property minority and severe restrictions to the majority. The critical analysis of classical liberalism allows questioning the privilege position that Bobbio reserves to the liberalism in the democracy history, to restore the important contribution of illiberal politics currents in the civil, political and social rights history, advocating the democracy with its social character, inclusive and participatory

O princípio constitucional da livre concorrência como instrumento de desenvolvimento socioeconômico

The freedom of concurrence, firstly conceived as a simple market fundament in productive systems that recognized the productive forces freedom of action, appears as a clear instrument of protection and fomentation of the market, recognizing the importance of the simultaneous existence of various economic forces such the proper capitalism reason of constitution. It has, thus, a directly role linked to the fundamental idea that the market and its productive forces needed of a protection against itself, because it exists inside the market situations and circumstances, provoked or not, that could prejudice and even annihilate the its existence and functioning, whilst a complex role of productive forces presents at all economic creation space. It was the primacy of the classic liberalism, the first phase of the capitalism. The Constitutions, in that historic moment, did not proclaim any interference at the economic scenario, simply because it recognized the existence of an economic freedom prepared to justify and guarantee the market forces, with its own rules. Based on the structural changes that occurred at the following historic moments, inside the constitutionally recognized capitalism, it was verified changes in the ambit of treatment of the freedom of concurrence principle that, in a progressive way, passes to present a configuration more concerned with socialist and developing ideas, as long as not only a market guarantee. It emerges a freedom of concurrence which aim is instrumental, in relation to its objectives and constitutional direction as a role, and not anymore stagnant and with isolated treatment, in special at the constitutional systems the present s clear aspects of social interventions and guarantor of fundamental rights more extensive and harmonious. That change is located at a space of state actuation much more ample and juridical important, this time comprehending the necessity of managing the productive scenario aiming to reach a national social and economic development effectively guarantor of fundamental rights for all citizens. Those Constitutions take as point of starting that the social and economic development, and not only anymore the economic growth, is the effective way for concretization of these rights. In that way it needs to be observed and crystallized by political and juridical tools that respect the ideological fundamental spirit of the Constitutional Charters. In that scenario that seeks for solutions of rights accomplishment, in special the social rights, the constitutional principle of freedom of concurrence has been seen as an instrument for reaching bigger values and directives, such as the social justice, which only can be real at a State that can implement a comprehensive and permanent social and economic development. The freedom of concurrence tries to valorize and defend something larger and consonant to the political values expressed in the Constitutional Charters with social character, which is the right to a social and economical sustainable development, guarantor of more clear and compromised collective benefits with social justice. The origin of that constitutional imposition is not only supported by vague orientations of the economic space, but as integrated to it, with basis formed of normative and principles posted and prepared to produce effects at the proper reason of the Constitution