Regnum Persicum Imperium Turcicum in Asia Russorum Provinciae ad Mare Caspium: aliaequae regiones finitimae, item Ponti Euxini, Maris Caspii, ac Sinus Persici novissimae ac fidelissimae delineationes

Reinero et Josua Ottens.

The Turkish Empire in Europe, Asia, and Africa: dividid into all its governments, together with the other territories that are tributary to it, as also the dominions of ye Emperor of Marocco [sic] according to the newest and most exact observations

by H. Moll.

Theatrum historicum ad annum Christi quadrigentesimũ: in quo tũ Imperii Romani tũ Barbarorum circumincolentium status ob oculos ponitur pars orientalis

Auctore Guillelmo Delisle.

Estats de l'Empire du grand Seigneur des Turcs en Europe, en Asie, et en Afrique divisé en tous ses Beglerbeglicz ou Gouvernements; où sont aussi remarqués les Estats qui luy sont tributaires: dressé sur les plus nouvelles relations à l'usage de Monseigneur le Duc de Bourgogne

par son très humble et très obéisant Serviteur H. Iaillot.

Kanunname Ticaret

Title from caption.

Kitāb al-Qānūn fī al-ṭibb

Treatise on the canon of medicine.

Tārīkh al-kāmil

lil-ʻalāmah Abī al-Ḥasan ʻAlī ibn Abī al-Karam Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn ʻAbd al-Karīm ibn ʻAbd al-Wāḥid al-Shaybānī al-maʻrūf bi-Ibn al-Athīr al-Jazarī al-mulaqqab bi-ʻIzz al-Dīn. Wa-bi-hāmishihi Tārīkh murūj al-dhahab wa-maʻādin al-jawhar / lil-Imām Abī al-Ḥasan ʻAlī ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Masʻūdī.

al- Majallah: wa-hiya taḥtawī ʻalá al-qawānīn al-sharʻīyah wa-al-aḥkām al-ʹadlīyah al-muṭābiqah lil-kutub al-fiqhīyah

ḥarrarathā lajnah muʼallafah min al-ʹulamāʼ al-muḥaqqiqīn wa-al-fuqahāʼ al-mudaqqiqīn wa-baʻda an waqaʻat ladá al-Bāb al-ʻĀlī mawqiʻ al-istiḥsān taʻallaqat al-irādah al-sanīyah bi-an takūna dustūr lil-ʻamal bihā.

Prof. C. Haussknecht's Routen im Orient 1865-1869: III. Kurdistan und Irak

nach dessen Originalskizzen redigirt von H. Kiepert.

The EU’s Sanctions against Syria: Conflict Management by Other Means. Security Policy Brief No. 38

Since May 2011, the EU has launched one of its most far reaching and sophisticated sanctions operations in support of the protests against the current regime in Syria. The present brief examines the measures wielded by the EU, its expected impact and its implications for the EU’s relations with its global partners. While seriously undermined by the lack of support of Russia, the sanctions are having a noticeable economic impact. Yet, the choice of measures is ill-suited to stop the bloodshed. The sanctions have also served to (re)define partnerships with other powers, both in the Middle-East and globally.

spotlight europe #2013/02-February 2012. Syria: from rebellion to all-out war

The situation in Syria at the beginning of 2013 could hardly be worse. Dead, wounded, refugees, a humanitarian disaster. President Assad is destroying his country and waging war against his own people. Russia and Iran back the regime. The West wants regime change without intervening militarily. The political opposition is now more united but overwhelmed with the situation at hand. The armed resistance, partially dominated by Jihadists, is difficult to size up.

spotlight europe #2013/02-Februar 2013. Syrien-vom aufstand zum krieg = Syria: from rebellion to all-out war

No abstract.

E3+3 coercive diplomacy towards Iran: Do the economic sanctions add up? CEPS Policy Brief No. 292, 6 June 2013

More than ten years of international negotiations have brought no resolution to the nuclear dispute with Iran. In January 2012 the EU and US autonomously adopted an unprecedented sanctions package, mainly directed at the Iranian oil industry. Eighteen months later, figures show that the Iranian economy has been hit hard. Sanctions have not changed the regime’s calculus, however. Instead of further upping the pressure on Iran, the authors argue for a return to a more balanced dual-track approach so as to reinforce the moderate narrative within the Iranian ruling elite.

Obama 2: future implications for EU-US relations. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 12, No. 8, November 2012

Introduction. The week following his reelection, President Obama traveled to Asia – Thailand, Myanmar, and Cambodia –, while facing at home a fiscal cliff, the need to select the next Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, and the resignation of one of America’s most senior and respected generals and Director of the CIA, David Petraeus; all this at the moment wherein the Middle East is burning in flames due to another round of violence between Israel and Hamas. On the other side of the pond, the EU is currently trying to solve or at least contain several crises: the Eurozone, agreeing on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020, or MFF 2014-2020,2 and saving France.3 For both giants, the American and European priorities are domestic; they both need to do some ‘nation-building at home.’4 The threat of the fiscal cliff in the US and the one of the Eurocrisis in Europe are too important to be ignored and so visceral that they will affect the way both actors behave internationally and interact with one another. The big question since Obama’s reelection has been what will the EU-US relations look like under his second mandate? And will there be any differences from the first one?5 This paper argues that the US-EU relations will remain quite similar as it was under the first Obama presidency. Nevertheless, with the current shift to Asia, the ‘pivot,’ the EU will be required to increase its contributions to global politics and international security. This paper is structured in three parts. First, the economic and political climax of the EU and the US will be presented. In a second a part, the EU and US strategies and foreign policies will be laid out. Last but not least, several core issues facing the Euro-Atlantic community, such as the Asia pivot, Iran, climate change, and the economy will be addressed. Other issues such as Syria, Afghanistan, and the Middle East and North Africa will not be addressed in this paper.6

Syria and the red lines of international law. CEPS Commentary, 4 September 2013

As the US and its allies France and Turkey dither over whether or not to punish Assad for having used sarin gas to kill his own people, the crucial question is: What response might the outside world legally take without the authority of the UN Security Council, which remains blocked by two veto-wielding members, Russia and China? Sadly, international law provides no clear-cut answers to this dilemma. To respond to what US Secretary of State John Kerry has rightly called a “moral obscenity”, this commentary explores ways in which formal interpretations of international law might give way to a more pragmatic approach to punish the Assad regime for its use of chemical weapons.