Securing one's livelihood. Philanthropy in a mixed economy of welfare in the early 20th century

Since the late 19th century different social actors have played an important role in providing social security in Switzerland. Cooperatives, philanthropic organisations, social insurances, and the poor relief of the communes were all part of a "mixed economy of welfare". This article examines how the different actors in this "mixed economy" worked together, and asks what forms of help they supplied. It raises the question of whether a dichotomy between public and private forms of relief can be traced in the Swiss case. Did democratically legitimised processes of redistribution shape the social security system? Or was social security rather funded by private relief programs? The author argues that in the early 20th century, a complex public-private mix structured the Swiss welfare state and the poor often depended on both public and private funding. In this system, financially potent philanthropic organisations successfully contested the legal power of public actors.

The Restructuring in the Post-Crisis Korean Economy

The current paper evaluates the restructuring measures implemented in the post-crisis Korean economy. Its policies taken after the economic crisis were quite successful in terms of economic recovery. The financial and corporate sector reforms undertaken by the Korean government contributed to strengthening the banking and corporate sectors, attracting FDI inflows. However, most indicators show worsening of income inequalities and workers. situation regarding job security. The strengths as well as the weaknesses of the development strategy of Korea and its reform measures undertaken since the occurrence of the economic crisis need to be differentiated.

The Political Economy of Constitutional Choice: A Study of the 2005 Kenyan Constitutional Referendum

Recent studies of the linkages between the wealth of nations and the institutions of governance suggest that concentrating political power in a monarchy or a ruling coalition impedes economic growth and, moreover, that while power-diffusing reforms can enhance the wellbeing of society in general, opposition by groups benefitting from the status quo is predictable. In November 2005, Kenyans rejected a proposed constitution that, despite promises made by their new chief executive, would not have lessened the powers of the presidency. Using a unique, constituency-level dataset on the referendum vote, we estimate a model of the demand for power diffusion and find that ethnic groups' voting decisions are influenced by their expected gains and losses from constitutional change. The results also highlights the importance of ethnic divisions in hindering the power-diffusion process, and thus establish a channel through which ethnic fragmentation adversely impacts economic development.