Ciencia, industria e ideología en la Cataluña del siglo XX: el Instituto Ravetllat-Pla en Sudamérica entre 1924 y 1936

En 1923, Ramón Plá i Armengol (1880-1958) fundó el Instituto Ravetllat-Pla para la comercialización y producción de dos productos antituberculosos (Hemo-Antitoxina y Suero Ravetllat-Pla) fundamentados en una teoría heterodoxa postulada por el veterinario Joaquim Ravetllat i Estech (1871-1923). A través del instituto creó una gran red internacional científico-comercial principalmente en Latinoamérica. Plá i Armengol fue doctor en medicina y participó activamente en la lucha antituberculosa en Cataluña sin dejar de lado su militancia socialista. A través de estos dos productos, logró crear un mercado que se sustentaba en una teoría heterodoxa que integraban sus principios e ideología.

Migration and trade: Theory with an Application to the Eastern- Western European Integration

The remarkable increase in trade flows and in migratory flows of highly educated people are two important features of globalization of the last decades. This paper extends a two-country model of inter- and intraindustry trade to a rich environment featuring technological differences, skill differences and the possibility of international labor mobility. The model is used to explain the patterns of trade and migration as countries remove barriers to trade and to labor mobility. We parameterize the model to match the features of the Western and Eastern European members of the EU and analyze first the effects of the trade liberalization which occured between 1989 and 2004, and then the gains and losses from migration which are expected to occur if legal barriers to labor mobility are substantially reduced. The lower barriers to migration would result in significant migration of skilled workers from Eastern European countries. Interestingly, this would not only benefit the migrants and most Western European workers but, via trade, it would also benefit the workers remaining in Eastern Europe. Key Words: Skilled Migration, Gains from Variety, Real Wages, Eastern-Western Europe. JEL Codes: F12, F22, J61.

On the current existence of a coccidial line of development in the malaria parasites: a theory

Most opinion favors the origin of the malaria parasites from a coccidial ancestor. It is assumed that whatever the process through which the coccidia differentiated into a Plasmodium this phenomenon very probably occured millions of year ago, and during that differentiation process the original coccidia vanished. Therefore it has never repeated. At the light of some experiments the existence, at the present time, of a coccidial cycle of development in the malaria parasites, is proposed. The conection routes and mechanisms through which the malaria parasite changes to a coccidial life, and the routes in reverse are exposed. Transmission of the malaria-coccidial forms is suggested.

A well-posedness theory in measures for some kinetic models of collective motion

We present existence, uniqueness and continuous dependence results for some kinetic equations motivated by models for the collective behavior of large groups of individuals. Models of this kind have been recently proposed to study the behavior of large groups of animals, such as flocks of birds, swarms, or schools of fish. Our aim is to give a well-posedness theory for general models which possibly include a variety of effects: an interaction through a potential, such as a short-range repulsion and long-range attraction; a velocity-averaging effect where individuals try to adapt their own velocity to that of other individuals in their surroundings; and self-propulsion effects, which take into account effects on one individual that are independent of the others. We develop our theory in a space of measures, using mass transportation distances. As consequences of our theory we show also the convergence of particle systems to their corresponding kinetic equations, and the local-in-time convergence to the hydrodynamic limit for one of the models.

Lp theory for the multidimensional aggregation equation

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Interactive Epistemology and Reasoning: On the Foundations of Game Theory

Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have been conducted so far. However, in the case of imperfect information some players are not fully informed about some choices. Game-theoretic analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, games are modelled by so-called form structures which extract and formalize the significant parts of the underlying strategic interaction. The basic and most commonly used models of games are the normal form, which rather sparsely describes a game merely in terms of the players' strategy sets and utilities, and the extensive form, which models a game in a more detailed way as a tree. In fact, it is standard to formalize static games with the normal form and dynamic games with the extensive form. Secondly, solution concepts are developed to solve models of games in the sense of identifying the choices that should be taken by rational players. Indeed, the ultimate objective of the classical approach to game theory, which is of normative character, is the development of a solution concept that is capable of identifying a unique choice for every player in an arbitrary game. However, given the large variety of games, it is not at all certain whether it is possible to device a solution concept with such universal capability. Alternatively, interactive epistemology provides an epistemic approach to game theory of descriptive character. This rather recent discipline analyzes the relation between knowledge, belief and choice of game-playing agents in an epistemic framework. The description of the players' choices in a given game relative to various epistemic assumptions constitutes the fundamental problem addressed by an epistemic approach to game theory. In a general sense, the objective of interactive epistemology consists in characterizing existing game-theoretic solution concepts in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as in proposing novel solution concepts by studying the game-theoretic implications of refined or new epistemic hypotheses. Intuitively, an epistemic model of a game can be interpreted as representing the reasoning of the players. Indeed, before making a decision in a game, the players reason about the game and their respective opponents, given their knowledge and beliefs. Precisely these epistemic mental states on which players base their decisions are explicitly expressible in an epistemic framework. In this PhD thesis, we consider an epistemic approach to game theory from a foundational point of view. In Chapter 1, basic game-theoretic notions as well as Aumann's epistemic framework for games are expounded and illustrated. Also, Aumann's sufficient conditions for backward induction are presented and his conceptual views discussed. In Chapter 2, Aumann's interactive epistemology is conceptually analyzed. In Chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Conrad Heilmann, a three-stage account for dynamic games is introduced and a type-based epistemic model is extended with a notion of agent connectedness. Then, sufficient conditions for backward induction are derived. In Chapter 4, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa, a topological approach to interactive epistemology is initiated. In particular, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge is defined and some implications for games considered. In Chapter 5, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa and Andrés Perea, Aumann's impossibility theorem on agreeing to disagree is revisited and weakened in the sense that possible contexts are provided in which agents can indeed agree to disagree.

Aspects of Iwasawa theory over function fields

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Generic Nekhoroshev theory without small divisors

In this article, we present a new approach of Nekhoroshev theory for a generic unperturbed Hamiltonian which completely avoids small divisors problems. The proof is an extension of a method introduced by P. Lochak which combines averaging along periodic orbits with simultaneous Diophantine approximation and uses geometric arguments designed by the second author to handle generic integrable Hamiltonians. This method allows to deal with generic non-analytic Hamiltonians and to obtain new results of generic stability around linearly stable tori.

El marketing de valores

El present treball pretén aportar una definició del “màrqueting de valors” distingint-lo d'altres tipus de màrqueting que es podrien prestar a confusió: el màrqueting comercial, el màrqueting social, el màrqueting amb causa, i el màrqueting no lucratiu. Posteriorment ens endinsem en la filosofia postmoderna amb els corrents relativistas i nihilistas sobre la pèrdua dels valors tradicionals per a demostrar que, encara remanent en la nostra societat les visió del relativisme moral, no significa que hagi un relativisme ètic, legitimant així la nomenclatura de “màrqueting de valors”. En un segon capítol, s'analitzen vuit casos de projectes reals en països en vies de desenvolupament com exemples de màrqueting de valors. Acarem la viabilitat de la nostra proposta de definició de màrqueting de valors amb cadascun dels exemples, arribant a la conclusió que la definició és viable i defineix un tipus de màrqueting particular.