Secondary victimization of crime victims by criminal proceedings

It is conceivable that criminal proceedings cause psychological harm to the crime victims involved, that is, cause secondary victimization. To investigate this hypothesis, negative and positive effects of criminal proceedings were investigated, as perceived by 137 victims of violent crimes who were involved in trials several years previously. Trial outcome and procedure variables were measured as potential causes of secondary victimization. Results show a high proportion of victims reporting overall negative effects. Powerful predictors were outcome satisfaction and procedural justice, but not subjective punishment severity, interactional justice, and psychological stress by criminal proceedings. The practical implications of the results pertain to whether victims should be advised to report the crime to the police or not, and to appropriate prevention and intervention measures of secondary victimization by criminal proceedings.

Kundmachung: von dem k. k. Nieder-Oester. Appellations- und Criminal-Obergerichte wird zur Beseitigung umlaufender Gerüchte bekannt gemacht ...

Welsch (Projektbearbeiter): Bekanntgabe, daß sich seit dem 16. März 1848 in und um Wien keine Fälle von Raub oder Brandstiftung ereignet hätten

Criminal Solicitation, Entrapment, and the Enforcement of Law

This paper examines the optimal use of criminal solicitation as a law enforcement strategy. The benefits are greater deterrence of crime (due to the greater likelihood of apprehension), and the savings in social harm as some offenders are diverted away from committing actual crimes through solicitation. The costs are the expense of hiring undercover cops and the greater likelihood of punishment. The optimal use of solicitation balances these factors. The paper also examines the justification for the entrapment defense, which exonerates those caught in a criminal solicitation but who otherwise had no predisposition to commit a crime.

Credible Criminal Enforcement

Economic models of crime and punishment implicitly assume that the government can credibly commit to the fines, sentences, and apprehension rates it has chosen. We study the government's problem when credibility is an issue. We find that several of the standard predictions of the economic model of crime and punishment are robust to commitment, but that credibility may in some cases result in lower apprehension rates, and hence a higher crime rate, compared to the static version of the model.

Criminal Solicitation, Entrapment, and the Enforcement of Law

This paper examines the optimal use of criminal solicitation as a law enforcement strategy. The benefits are greater deterrence of crime (due to the greater likelihood of apprehension), and the savings in social harm and apprehension costs as some offenders are diverted away from committing actual crimes through solicitation. The costs are the expense of hiring undercover cops and the greater likelihood of punishment. The optimal use of solicitation balances these factors. The paper also examines the justification for, and impact of, the entrapment defense, which exonerates those caught in a solicitation but otherwise not predisposed to commit a crime.

Deterrence and Incapacitation: Towards a Unified Theory of Criminal Punishment

Economic models of crime have focused primarily on the goal of deterrence; the goal of incapacitation has received much less attention. This paper adapts the standard deterrence model to incorporate incapacitation. When prison only is used, incapacitation can result in a longer or a shorter optimal prison term compared to the deterrence-only model. It is longer if there is underdeterrence, and shorter if there is overdeterrence. In contrast, when a fine is available and it is not constrained by the offender's wealth, the optimal prison term is zero. Since the fine achieves first-best deterrence, only efficient crimes are committed and hence, there is no gain from incapacitation.

Der geheimnißvolle Thurm oder Das Opfer der Ehre : Criminal-Erzählung aus der Neuzeit

von L. Gothe