Enforcement in environmental law: an economic analysis of citizen suits

Previous to 1970, state and federal agencies held exclusive enforcement responsibilities over the violation of pollution control standards. However, recognizing that the government had neither the time nor resources to provide full enforcement, Congress created citizen suits. Citizen suits, first amended to the Clean Air Act in 1970, authorize citizens to act as private attorney generals and to sue polluters for violating the terms of their operating permits. Since that time, Congress has included citizen suits in 13 other federal statutes. The citizen suit phenomenon is sufficiently new that little is known about it. However, we do know that citizen suits have increased rapidly since the early 1980's. Between 1982 and 1986 the number of citizen suits jumped from 41 to 266. Obviously, they are becoming a widely used method of enforcing the environmental statutes. This paper will provide a detailed description, analysis and evaluation of citizen suits. It will begin with an introduction and will then move on to provide some historic and descriptive background on such issues as how citizen suit powers are delegated, what limitations are placed on the citizens, what parties are on each side of the suit, what citizens can enforce against, and the types of remedies available. The following section of the paper will provide an economic analysis of citizen suits. It will begin with a discussion of non-profit organizations, especially non-profit environmental organizations, detailing the economic factors which instigate their creation and activities. Three models will be developed to investigate the evolution and effects of citizen suits. The first model will provide an analysis of the demand for citizen suits from the point of view of a potential litigator showing how varying remedies, limitations and reimbursement procedures can effect both the level and types of activities undertaken. The second model shows how firm behavior could be expected to respond to citizen suits. Finally, a third model will look specifically at the issue of efficiency to determine whether the introduction of citizen enforcement leads to greater or lesser economic efficiency in pollution control. The database on which the analysis rests consists of 1205 cases compiled by the author. For the purposes of this project this list of citizen suit cases and their attributes were computerized and used to test a series of hypotheses derived from three original economic models. The database includes information regarding plaintiffs, defendants date notice and/or complaint was filed and statutes involved in the claim. The analysis focuses on six federal environmental statutes (Clean Water Act} Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, Clean Air Act, Toxic Substances Control Act, and Safe Drinking Water Act) because the majority of citizen suits have occurred under these statutes.

Strategic enforcement of anti-discrimination law : a new role for Australia's equality commissions

In Australia, anti-discrimination law is enforced by individuals who lodge a discrimination complaint at a statutory equality commission. The equality commission is responsible for handling complaints and attempting to resolve them. In most instances, the equality commission cannot advise or assist the complainant; it must remain neutral. In other countries, the equality commission plays a role in enforcement, principally by providing complainants with assistance to resolve their complaint including funding litigation. The equality commission’s assistance function has been most effective when used strategically as part of a broader enforcement program, rather than on an ad hoc basis. This article discusses equality commission enforcement in the United States of America, Britain, Northern Ireland and Ireland and shows how the equality commissions have engaged in strategic enforcement in order to develop the law and secure remedies which benefit the wider community, not only the individual complainant. Based on their experience, it is argued that the Australian equality commissions should play a role in enforcement so that they can tackle discrimination more effectively.

Disclosure of Leniency Materials: A Bridge between Public and Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law. Research Paper in Law 08/2013, December

The disclosure of leniency materials held by competition authorities has recently been under the spot. On the one hand, these documents could greatly help cartel victims to prove the damage and the causation link when filing damage actions against cartelists. On the other hand, future cartelists could be deterred from applying for leniency since damage actions could be brought as a result of the information submitted by themselves. Neither the current legislation nor the case law have attained yet to sufficiently clarify how to deal with this clash of interests. Our approach obviously attempts to strike a balance between both interests. But not only that. We see the current debate as a great opportunity to boost the private enforcement of antitrust law through the positive spillovers of leniency programmes. We hence propose to build a bridge between the public and the private enforcement by enabling a partial disclosure of the documents.

THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH MUNICIPAL LAW IN THE UNITED STASTES

Mode of access: Internet.

State nondiscrimination enforcement efforts in Nebraska : a review of implementation of Public Law 97-35 obligations in Health and Human Services Programs /

Includes bibliographical references.