Mixed Public-Private Enterprises in Europe: Economic Theory and an Empirical Analysis of Italian Water Utilities. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 4/July 2006

Mixed enterprises, which are entities jointly owned by the public and private sector, are spreading all over Europe in local utilities. Well aware that in the vast majority of cases the preference of local authorities towards such governance structure is determined by practical reasons rather than by the ambition to implement new regulatory designs (an alternative to the typical “external” regulation), our purpose is to confer some scientific value to this phenomenon which has not been sufficiently investigated in the economic literature. This paper aims at proposing an economic analysis of mixed enterprises, especially of the specific configuration in which the public partner acts as controller and the private one (or “industrial” partner) as service provider. We suggest that the public service concession to mixed enterprises could embody, under certain conditions, a noteworthy substitute to the traditional public provision and the concession to totally private enterprises, as it can push regulated operators to outperform and limit the risk of private opportunism. The starting point of the entire analysis is that ownership allows the (public) owner to gather more information about the actual management of the firm, according to property rights theory. Following this stream of research, we conclude that under certain conditions mixed enterprises could significantly reduce asymmetric information between regulators and regulated firms by implementing a sort of “internal” regulation. With more information, in effect, the public authority (as owner/controller of the regulated firm, but also as member of the regulatory agency) can stimulate the private operator to be more efficient and can monitor it more effectively with respect to the fulfilment of contractual obligations (i.e., public service obligations, quality standards, etc.). Moreover, concerning the latter function, the board of directors of the mixed enterprise can be the suitable place where public and private representatives (respectively, welfare and profit maximisers) can meet to solve all disputes arising from incomplete contracts, without recourse to third parties. Finally, taking into account that a disproportionate public intervention in the “private” administration (or an ineffective protection of the general interest) would imply too many drawbacks, we draw some policy implications that make an equitable debate on the board of the firm feasible. Some empirical evidence is taken from the Italian water sector.

Off-farm Labour Decision of Italian Farm Operators. Factor Markets Working Document No. 61, August 2013

This paper analyses the factors affecting off-farm labour decisions of Italian farm operators. Using micro-level data from the Farm Business Survey (REA) over the pre- and post-2003 CAP reform periods, we investigated the impact that operator, family, farm and market characteristics exert on these choices. Among other things, the paper focuses also on the differential impact of those variables for operators of smaller and larger holdings. The main results suggest that operator and family characteristics have a significant impact on the decision to participate in off-farm work more for smaller than for bigger farms. By contrast, farm characteristics are more relevant variables for bigger farms. In particular, decoupled farm payments, by increasing the marginal productivity of farm labour, lower the probability of working off the farm only in bigger farms, while coupled subsidies in pre-reform years do not have a significant impact on labour decisions. Finally, we show that, after accounting for the standard covariates, local and territorial labour market characteristics generally have a low effect on off-farm work operators’ choices.

The Impact of the SFP System on Italian Farmland Prices and Tenure Contracts. Factor Markets Working Document No. 65, August 2013

EDITED VERSION TO BE PUBLISHED SOON. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the estimation of the potential effects of the CAP reform on propensity to transaction, particularly comparing the effect of different new instruments/policy settings with the current policy (CAP health check) used as a baseline. The work is focused on three of new policy instruments within the post 2013 CAP reform proposal: regionalization, greening and capping. The first and second are analysed in more detail. The analysis will be based on a survey of farmers in the Province of Bologna, Emilia Romagna, Italy. The questionnaire focuses on mechanism of access to land and related incentives towards different land use/economic behaviour. The survey includes information about respondent characteristics (farm, farmer, household and payments received) and stated intention about potential changes in land operated under alternative agricultural policy scenarios (particularly the post-2013 reform proposals).

The Italian Parliament and the EU: a slow and gradual Europeanization. ACES Working Papers, August 2009

In this paper we discussed how the literature traces a growing involvement of the national parliaments in EU policy-making. Three phases can be distinguished: limited or no involvement was the trend until the 1980s; after the Single Act (SEA, 1987), national parliaments started to be interested in European affairs and to set up specialized committees; following the Maastricht Treaty (TUE, 1992), the involvement of national parliaments in EU affairs became a response to the question of "democratic deficit" in the EU (Norton, 1995). The growing number of policies dealt with at the EU level, the consequently increased influence of EU law in national legislations, the new powers of the Union: all of these worked together to push national legislators to seek a scrutiny role in the drafting of EU legislation. According to Laprat (1995: 1), once the TUE was formally approved, a more parliamentary climate prevailed. In more recent years, national parliaments have distinguished themselves for their increased role in the scrutiny of EU legislation (Raunio and Hix, 200I: !52); more specialized MPs sit in the committees on EU affairs; the amount of work for EU specialists has increased. Also, parliamentary scrutiny, initially only optional and ex post, is now increasingly ex ante and/or mandatory (Maurer and Wessels, 2001: 425-475).