How universal is behavior? A four country comparison of spite, cooperation and errors in voluntary contribution mechanisms

This paper studies behavior in experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries. Our 'contribution function' design allows us to obtain a view of subjects' behavior from two complementary points of view. If yields information about situations where, in purely pecuniary terms, it is a dominant strategy to contribute all the endowment and about situations where it is a dominant strategy to contribute nothing. Our results show, first, that differences in behavior across countries are minor. We find that when people play "the same game" they behave similarly. Second, for all four countries our data are inconsistent with the explanation that subjects contribute only out of confusion. A common cooperative motivation is needed to explain the date.

A generalized assignment game

The proposed game is a natural extension of the Shapley and Shubik Assignment Game to the case where each seller owns a set of different objets instead of only one indivisible object. We propose definitions of pairwise stability and group stability that are adapted to our framework. Existence of both pairwise and group stable outcomes is proved. We study the structure of the group stable set and we finally prove that the set of group stable payoffs forms a complete lattice with one optimal group stable payoff for each side of the market.

General equilibrium with asymmetric information: a dual approach

We study markets where the characteristics or decisions of certain agents are relevant but not known to their trading partners. Assuming exclusive transactions, the environment is described as a continuum economy with indivisible commodities. We characterize incentive efficient allocations as solutions to linear programming problems and appeal to duality theory to demonstrate the generic existence of external effects in these markets. Because under certain conditions such effects may generate non-convexities, randomization emerges as a theoretic possibility. In characterizing market equilibria we show that, consistently with the personalized nature of transactions, prices are generally non-linear in the underlying consumption. On the other hand, external effects may have critical implications for market efficiency. With adverse selection, in fact, cross-subsidization across agents with different private information may be necessary for optimality, and so, the market need not even achieve an incentive efficient allocation. In contrast, for the case of a single commodity, we find that when informational asymmetries arise after the trading period (e.g. moral hazard; ex post hidden types) external effects are fully internalized at a market equilibrium.

Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in general economic environments

In this paper, we consider two classes of economic environments. In the first type, agents are faced with the task of providing local public goods that will benefit some or all of them. In the second type, economic activity takes place via formation of links. Agents need both to both form a network and decide how to share the output generated. For both scenarios, we suggest a bidding mechanism whereby agents bid for the right to decide upon the organization of the economic activity. The subgame perfect equilibria of this game generate efficient outcomes.

Stable coalition structures with fixed decision scheme

This paper studies the stability of a finite local public goods economy in horizontal differentiation, where a jurisdiction's choice of the public good is given by an exogenous decision scheme. In this paper, we characterize the class of decision schemes that ensure the existence of an equilibrium with free mobility (that we call Tiebout equilibrium) for monotone distribution of players. This class contains all the decision schemes whose choice lies between the Rawlsian decision scheme and the median voter with mid-distance of the two median voters when there are ties. We show that for non-monotone distribution, there is no decision scheme that can ensure the stability of coalitions. In the last part of the paper, we prove the non-emptiness of the core of this coalition formation game

Eficiencia y equidad en la ubicación de bienes colectivos locales indivisibles

En contraste con el problema clásico en el que, en el óptimo, un bien colectivo local se suministra en todas y cada una de las localidades en alguna cantidad, la mejor ubicación para un bien colectivo local indivisible no es un problema que pueda resolverse atendiendo exclusivamente a la eficiencia paretiana. Con sólo dos ciudades ocurre que la frontera de posibilidades de bienestar asociada a la ubicación del bien en una ciudad no siempre domina o es dominada por la correspondiente a la otra ciudad. Para resolver la indeterminación existen tres alternativas: prescindir de la distribución del bienestar, de la eficiencia, o bien complementar el criterio de eficiencia paretiana con un criterio distributivo. En el trabajo se examinan diversas formas de decisión, como una función de bienestar social, los criterios de Kaldor y de Rawls, la unanimidad, la mayoría simple y el despotismo

Environmental management problems, future generations and social decisions

The decisions of many individuals and social groups, taking according to well-defined objectives, are causing serious social and environmental problems, in spite of following the dictates of economic rationality. There are many examples of serious problems for which there are not yet appropriate solutions, such as management of scarce natural resources including aquifer water or the distribution of space among incompatible uses. In order to solve these problems, the paper first characterizes the resources and goods involved from an economic perspective. Then, for each case, the paper notes that there is a serious divergence between individual and collective interests and, where possible, it designs the procedure for solving the conflict of interests. With this procedure, the real opportunities for the application of economic theory are shown, and especially the theory on collective goods and externalities. The limitations of conventional economic analysis are shown and the opportunity to correct the shortfalls is examined. Many environmental problems, such as climate change, have an impact on different generations that do not participate in present decisions. The paper shows that for these cases, the solutions suggested by economic theory are not valid. Furthermore, conventional methods of economic valuation (which usually help decision-makers) are unable to account for the existence of different generations and tend to obviate long-term impacts. The paper analyzes how economic valuation methods could account for the costs and benefits enjoyed by present and future generations. The paper studies an appropriate consideration of preferences for future consumption and the incorporation of sustainability as a requirement in social decisions, which implies not only more efficiency but also a fairer distribution between generations than the one implied by conventional economic analysis.

Colombian international trade from a physical perspective: towards an ecologial "Prebisch Thesis"

Prebisch's approach to economic development was based on the notion that there is an international historical division of labour. Peripheral countries are specialized in exporting primary goods while centre countries export industrial goods. The Terms of trade for peripheral countries tend to deteriorate. This approach can be extendend to ecological issues. The international Centre-Periphery division does not only involve the monetary exchange of goods and capital, but also the physical exchange in which Southern countries provide materials and energy so that Northern countries can develop their socioconomic metabolism. This metabolism process is guaranteed through cheap prices for primary goods. This paper aims to apply and extend Prebisch's thought on unequal exchange, both monetary and ecological, in relation to colombian trade in the period 1970-2002, using material flow analysis.

Socio-economic impacts and assessment biological invasions

Biological invasions have been object of ecological research for years. As one objective, natural scientists investigate the effects of invasive species on ecosystems and their functioning (Levine et al. 2003). However, impacts on ecosystems are also of relevance for society. Changes in ecosystems affect humans in so far as ecosystems provide goods and services, such as fresh water, food and fibbers or recreation, which might be altered due to invasive species. Therefore impacts of biological invasions should be an object of socio-economic interest, which is also demanded by the Convention on Biological Diversity

Between specialization and globalization. The marketing of agrarian products and its environmental impacts seen from a historical perspective: the province of Barcelona in the mid-nineteenth century

Ecological economics has five good reasons to consider that economic globalisation, spurred by commercial and financial fluxes, to be one of the main driving forces responsible for causing environmental degradation to our planet. The first, is the energy consumption and the socio-environmental impacts which long-distance haulage entails. The second, is the ever-increasing flow of goods to far-away destinations which renders their recycling practically impossible. This is particularly significant, because it prevents the metabolic lock of the nutrients present in food and other agrarian products from taking place. The third, is that the high degree of specialization attained in agriculture, forestry, cattle, mining and industry in each region, generates deleterious effects not only on the eco-landscape structure of the uses of the soil, but on the capability to provide habitat and environmental functions to maintain biodiversity as well

On punishment and well-being

The existence of punishment opportunities has been shown to cause efficiency in public goods experiments to increase considerably. In this paper we ask whether punishment also has a downside in terms of process dissatisfaction. We conduct an experiment to study the conjecture that an environment with stronger punishment possibilities leads to higher material but lower subjective well-being. The more general motivation for our study stems from the notion that people??s subjective well-being may be affected by the institutional environment they find themselves in. Our findings show that harsher punishment possibilities lead to signficantly higher well-being, controlling for earnings and other relevant variables. People derive independent satisfaction from interacting under the protection of strong punishment possibilities. These results complement the evidence on the neural basis of altruistic punishment reported in de Quervain et al. (2004).

The Appraisal of projects with environmental impacts. Efficiency and Sustainability

It is usually assumed that the appraisal of the impacts experienced by present generations does not entail any difficulty. However, this is not true. Moreover, there is not a widely accepted methodology for taking these impacts into account. Some of the controversial issues are: the appropriate value for the discount rate, the choice of the units for expressing the impacts, physical or monetary units -income, consumption or investment- and the valuation of tangible and intangible goods. When approaching the problem of very long term impacts, there is also the problem of valuing the impacts experienced by future generations, through e.g., the use of an intergenerational discount rate. However, if this were the case, the present generation perspective would prevail, as if all the property rights on the resources were owned by them. Therefore, the sustainability requirement should also be incorporated into the analysis. We will analyze these problems in this article and show some possible solutions.

Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.

The biophysical perspective of a middle income economy: material flows in Mexico

We analyse natural resource use dynamics in the Mexican economy during the last three decades. Despite low and uneven economic growth, the extraction and use of materials in the Mexican economy has continuously increased during the last 30 years. In this period, population growth rather than economic growth was the main driving force for biophysical growth. In addition, fundamental changes have taken place in the primary sectors, in manufacturing, and in household consumption and these are reflected in an increasing emphasis on the use of fossil fuels and construction materials. Mexico’s economy has been strongly influenced by international trade since the country commenced competing in international markets. In the 1970s, Mexico mainly exported primary resources. This pattern has changed and manufactured goods now have a much greater importance due to a boom in assembling industries. In contrast with other Latin American countries, Mexico has achieved a diversification of production, moving towards technology-intensive products and a better mix in its export portfolio. However, crude oil exports still represent the single most important export good. Mexico’s material consumption is still well below the OECD average but is growing fast and the current resource use patterns may well present serious social and environmental problems to the medium and long term sustainability of Mexico’s economy and community. Information on natural resource use and resource productivity could provide valuable guidance for economic policy planning in Mexico.

Estudio previo a la implantación de un ERP en una empresa transitaria

Aquest projecte tracta de l'estudi previ que cal fer en una empresa abans d'aventurar-se a la implantació d'un sistema ERP. Ens centrarem en una PIME que té com a activitat bàsica la importació-exportació de mercaderies a o des de les Illes Canàries. L'estudi s'ha centrat en tres sistemes ERPs que es troben en el mercat actualment. La selecció té com a objetiu exposar els productes dels dos principals fabricants, SAP i Microsoft Navision. En contrapartida, ens ha semblat molt interessant incloure com a tercer sistema estudiat Open Bravo, un ERP basat en software lliure.