Dopaminergic stimulation increases selfish behavior in the absence of punishment threat.

RATIONALE People often face decisions that pit self-interested behavior aimed at maximizing personal reward against normative behavior such as acting cooperatively, which benefits others. The threat of social sanctions for defying the fairness norm prevents people from behaving overly selfish. Thus, normative behavior is influenced by both seeking rewards and avoiding punishment. However, the neurochemical processes mediating the impact of these influences remain unknown. Several lines of evidence link the dopaminergic system to reward and punishment processing, respectively, but this evidence stems from studies in non-social contexts. OBJECTIVES The present study investigates dopaminergic drug effects on individuals' reward seeking and punishment avoidance in social interaction. METHODS Two-hundred one healthy male participants were randomly assigned to receive 300 mg of L-3,4-dihydroxyphenylalanine (L-DOPA) or a placebo before playing an economic bargaining game. This game involved two conditions, one in which unfair behavior could be punished and one in which unfair behavior could not be punished. RESULTS In the absence of punishment threats, L-DOPA administration led to more selfish behavior, likely mediated through an increase in reward seeking. In contrast, L-DOPA administration had no significant effect on behavior when faced with punishment threats. CONCLUSIONS The results of this study broaden the role of the dopaminergic system in reward seeking to human social interactions. We could show that even a single dose of a dopaminergic drug may bring selfish behavior to the fore, which in turn may shed new light on potential causal relationships between the dopaminergic system and norm abiding behaviors in certain clinical subpopulations.

Giving According to Preferences: Decision-Making in the Group Dictator Game

We study the decision process in a group dictator game in which three subjects can distribute an initial endowment between themselves and a group of recipients. The experiment consists of two stages; first, individuals play a standard dictator game. Second, individuals are randomly matched into groups of three and communicate via instant messaging regarding the decision in the group dictator game. In contrast to former studies our results show that group decisions do not differ from individual decisions in the dictator game. Furthermore, the analysis of the chat history reveals that players make proposals according to their preferences as revealed in the single dictator game and that these proposals in groups drive the final allocation.

Loyal to the Game? Strategic Policy Representation in Mixed Electoral Systems

In Germany's compensatory mixed electoral system, alternative electoral routes lead into parliament. We study the relationship between candidates' electoral situations across both tiers and policy representation, fully accounting for candidate, party and district preferences in a multi-actor constellation and the exact electoral incentives for candidates to represent either the party or the district. The results (2009 Bundestag election data) yield evidence of an interactive effect of closeness of the district race and list safety on candidates' positioning between their party and constituency.

On the comparison of a novel serious game and electroencephalography biomarkers for early dementia screening

Patients with amnestic mild cognitive impairment are at high risk for developing Alzheimer's disease. Besides episodic memory dysfunction they show deficits in accessing contextual knowledge that further specifies a general spatial navigation task or an executive function (EF) virtual action planning. Virtual reality (VR) environments have already been successfully used in cognitive rehabilitation and show increased potential for use in neuropsychological evaluation allowing for greater ecological validity while being more engaging and user friendly. In our study we employed the in-house platform of virtual action planning museum (VAP-M) and a sample of 25 MCI and 25 controls, in order to investigate deficits in spatial navigation, prospective memory, and executive function. In addition, we used the morphology of late components in event-related potential (ERP) responses, as a marker for cognitive dysfunction. The related measurements were fed to a common classification scheme facilitating the direct comparison of both approaches. Our results indicate that both the VAP-M and ERP averages were able to differentiate between healthy elders and patients with amnestic mild cognitive impairment and agree with the findings of the virtual action planning supermarket (VAP-S). The sensitivity (specificity) was 100% (98%) for the VAP-M data and 87% (90%) for the ERP responses. Considering that ERPs have proven to advance the early detection and diagnosis of "presymptomatic AD," the suggested VAP-M platform appears as an appealing alternative.

Trust, Competition and Cooperation in Autism Spectrum Disorder

Objective: Impaired social interactions and repetitive behavior are key features of autism spectrum disorder (ASD). In the present study we compared social decision-making in subjects with and without ASD. Subjects performed five social decision-making games in order to assess trust, fairness, cooperation & competition behavior and social value orientation. Methods: 19 adults with autism spectrum disorder and 17 controls, matched for age and education, participated in the study. Each subject performed five social decision-making tasks. In the trust game, subjects could maximize their gain by sharing some of their money with another person. In the punishment game, subjects played two versions of the Dictator’s Dilemma. In the dictator condition they could share an amount of 0-100 points with another person. In the punishment condition, the opponent was able to punish the subject if he/she was not satisfied with the amount of points received. In the cooperation game, subjects played with a small group of 3 people. Each of them could (anonymously) select an amount of 5, 7.5 or 10 Swiss francs. The goal of the game was to achieve a high group minimum. In the competition game, subjects performed a dexterity task. Before performing the task, they were asked whether they wanted to compete (winner takes it all) or cooperation (sharing the joint achieved amount of points) with a randomly selected person. Lastly, subjects performed a social value orientation task where they were playing for themselves and for another person. Results: There was no overall difference between healthy controls an ASD subjects in investment in the trust game. However, healthy controls increased their investment over number of trials whereas ASD subjects did not. A similar pattern was found for the punishment game. Furthermore, ASD subjects revealed a decreased investment in the dictator condition of the punishment game. There were no mean differences in competition behavior and social value orientation. Conclusions: The results provide evidence for differences between ASD subjects and healthy controls in social decision-making. Subjects with ASD showed a more consistent behavior than healthy controls in the trust game and the dictator dilemma. The present findings provide evidence for impaired social learning in ASD.

Legal Aspects of Sino-­African Tied Aid: The Art of Playing with a Legal Grey Area

Sino-African trade has seen a fifty-fold increase in the years 1999 to 2008. In some African regions, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, China has even replaced the US as the most important trading partner today. But China holds not a single FTA on the African continent, while other major trading partners of African economies rely on an extensive framework of different trade agreements. What is, thus, the legal basis of the recent increase of Sino-African trade? Interestingly, Sino-African trade has seen a particularly strong increase in countries that have entered into tied aid agreements with China. These agreements are commonly known under the term ‘Angola-Model’ and consist of a multifaceted network of barter-trading-systems, aspects of tied aid and concessions for oil and other commodities linked with a state loan. It is likely that these agreements have an impact on the trade-flows between African countries and China. This paper discusses the legal character of this new form of economic cooperation, or modern version of tied aid. Critical legal aspects related to this form of tied aid refer to violation of the principle of most-favoured nation (MFN), illegitimate export subsidies, market access, public procurement and transparency in the international trading system. However, despite the recent outcry of the foremost Western community against the strategy of the Chinese government on the African continent, the practice of the Angola-Model based tied aid is not entirely new, and neither is it against the law. The case of tied aid is situated in a legal grey area that should be examined thoroughly in order to strengthen the international trading system and to support developing countries in their attempt to gain from tied aid arrangements.

Livelihood and Community Development: LforS learning and simulation game

Up to 15 people can participate in the game, which is supervised by a moderator. Households consisting of 1-5 people discuss options for diversification of household strategies. Aim of the game: By devising appropriate strategies, households seek to stand up to various types of events while improving their economic and social situation and, at the same time, taking account of ecological conditions. The annual General Community Meeting (GCM) provides an opportunity for households to create a general set-up at the local level that is more or less favourable to the strategies they are pursuing. The development of a community investment strategy, to be implemented by the GCM, and successful coordination between households will allow players to optimise their investments at the household level. The household who owns the most assets at the end of the game wins. Players participate very actively, as the game stimulates lively and interesting discussions. They find themselves confronted with different types of decision-making related to the reality of their daily lives. They explore different ways to model their own household strategies and discuss risks and opportunities. Reflections on the course of the game continually refer to the real-life situations of the participants.

Sustainable Pasture Management : LforS learning and simulation game

Three teams consisting of 2 to 5 persons each play the game. Each team represents a farm. Each team decides jointly on its strategy. In annual meetings in winter, the farm teams jointly discuss, evaluate and decide on how to proceed and actions to be taken. The farms make use of three different pasture areas (village pasture, intensive pasture and summer pasture) for grazing their livestock. The carrying capacity of each pasture area is different and varies according to the season. In each season, the farms have to decide on how many livestock units to graze on which pasture. Overgrazing and pasture degradation occur if the total number of livestock units exceeds the carrying capacity of a specific pasture area. Overgrazing results in a reduction of pasture productivity. To diversify and improve their livelihood strategy farms can make individual investments to increase productivity at the farm level, eg. in fodder production or in income generating activities. At the community level, collective investments can be made which may influence livestock and household economy, e.g. rehabilitate and improve pasture productivity, improve living conditions on remote pastures etc. Events occurring in the course of the game represent different types of (risk) factors such as meteorology, market, politics etc. that may positively or negatively influence livestock production and household economy. A sustainable management of pastures requires that farms actively regulate the development of their herds, that they take measures to prevent pasture degradation and to improve pasture productivity, and that they find a balance between livestock economy and other productive activities. The game has a double aim: a) each farm aims at its economic success and prosperity, and b) the three farm teams jointly have to find and implement strategies for a sustainable use of pasture areas.

"Big game shooting" : (Rudolf de Goldschmidt)-Rothschild

H. C. Q.

Stratégies de ménages et développement communal: LforS learning and simulation game

Au travers de stratégies appropriées, les ménages, appelés ici Unités de Production et de Consommation (UPC), cherchent à faire face à différents évènements et à améliorer leur situation économique et sociale tout en tenant compte des conditions écologiques. Au travers de l’Assemblée Générale Communale (AGC), les UPC peuvent créer des conditions cadres locales plus ou moins favorables aux stratégies qu’ils poursuivent. Par le développement d’une stratégie d’investissement communale mise en œuvre par l’AGC et une bonne coordination entre les UPC, les joueurs peuvent optimiser leurs investissements au niveau des ménages. Vainqueur est l’UPC qui à la fin du jeu dispose du plus grand patrimoine.

CONMICOM – conflict mitigation in communities: LforS learning and simulation game

Three extended families live around a lake. One family are rice farmers, the second family are vegetable farmers, and the third are a family of livestock herders. All of them depend on the use of lake water for their production, and all of them need large quantities of water. All are dependent on the use of the lake water to secure their livelihood. In the game, the families are represented by their councils of elders. Each of the councils has to find means and ways to increase production in order to keep up with the growth of its family and their demands. This puts more and more pressure on the water resources, increasing the risk of overuse. Conflicts over water are about to emerge between the families. Each council of elders must try to pursue its families interests, while at the same time preventing excessive pressure on the water resources. Once a council of elders is no longer able to meet the needs of its family, it is excluded from the game. Will the parties cooperate or compete? To face the challenge of balancing economic well-being, sustainable resource management, and individual and collective interests, the three parties have a set of options for action at hand. These include power play to safeguard their own interests, communication and cooperation to negotiate with neighbours, and searching for alternatives to reduce pressure on existing water resources. During the game the players can experience how tensions may arise, increase and finally escalate. They realise what impact power play has and how alliances form, and the importance of trust-building measures, consensus and cooperation. From the insights gained, important conflict prevention and mitigation measures are derived in a debriefing session. The game is facilitated by a moderator, and lasts for 3-4 hours. Aim of the game: Each family pursues the objective of serving its own interests and securing its position through appropriate strategies and skilful negotiation, while at the same time optimising use of the water resources in a way that prevents their degradation. The end of the game is open. While the game may end by one or two families dropping out because they can no longer secure their subsistence, it is also possible that the three families succeed in creating a situation that allows them to meet their own needs as well as the requirements for sustainable water use in the long term. Learning objectives The game demonstrates how tension builds up, increases, and finally escalates; it shows how power positions work and alliances are formed; and it enables the players to experience the great significance of mutual agreement and cooperation. During the game and particularly during the debriefing and evaluation session it is important to link experiences made during the game to the players’ real-life experiences, and to discuss these links in the group. The resulting insights will provide a basis for deducing important conflict prevention and transformation measures.