A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, February 2006

Supplemental Security Income Program, February 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, April 2006

Supplemental Security Income Program, April 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, March 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, March 2006

Organizational Choice and Environmental Change

We explain the choice between franchising and vertical integration by estimating a model of relative performance in a sample of 250 Spanish car distributors, controlling for self-selection and including environmental factors. The method allows us to estimate performance counterfactuals. Organizational choice seemingly aims to contain moral hazard for both distributors and manufacturers but it is subject to start-up constraints and switching costs. While the market for franchises remained underdeveloped, information asymmetries led to the opening of integrated outlets. Their subsequent conversion into franchised outlets probably involved prohibitive transaction costs. Consequently, they performed worse than would have been expected had they been independent, as confirmed by the systematic improvement observed when they were in fact converted. The timing of such conversions suggests that switching costs were prohibitive until firms developed a substantial cushion of temporary contracts, previously forbidden by regulation.

Social Security in Theory and Practice (II): Efficiency Theories, Narrative Theories, and Implications for Reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forces create and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "government economizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory". The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, July 2006

Supplemental Security Income Program, May 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, May 2006

Supplemental Security Income Program, May 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, June 2006

Supplemental Security Income Program, May 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, August 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, August 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, September 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program produced by the Department of Human Services

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, June 2002

Monthly report from Iowa Department of Human Services on income.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, January 2002

Monthly report from Iowa Department of Human Services on income.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, February 2002

Monthly report from Iowa Department of Human Services on income.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, March 2002

Monthly report from Iowa Department of Human Services on income.